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Thesis Abstract 
This thesis draws on a range of theoretical lenses from different disciplines, to 
understand the implications of transnational migration and citizenship. It largely uses 
different strands of citizenship theory to guide thinking on the displacement and flight of 
Zimbabweans since the year 2000, conceptualising it as a product of a deep-rooted 
‘citizenship crisis’ within Zimbabwe. This thesis focusses on Zimbabwean emigration since 
year 2000 and beyond because this period is considered the height of the socioeconomic and 
political crisis in Zimbabwe; but it also traces the historical roots of this crisis. This thesis 
therefore acknowledges how a focus on post-2000 developments and experiences, leaves out 
fragments of the Zimbabwean nation who left earlier in the nation’s history.1 Experiences of 
these older fragments of the Zimbabwean diaspora fall outside the scope of this thesis, but 
causes of their departure will be examined in Chapter three to reveal the link between 
citizenship and emigration. 
This thesis also demonstrates how this crisis-driven emigration reconfigures the 
practice of citizenship profoundly, but it is not clear how. This makes it fascinating to explore 
the modes by which these emigrants negotiate citizenship both in the host country and 
country of origin, while hosted outside Zimbabwe. This multi-sited qualitative study examines 
experiences of a sample of 145 Zimbabweans living in selected locations in the UK and South 
Africa. This thesis also contains a stand-alone methodology chapter in which I critically reflect 
on my own unique fieldwork experiences, highlighting useful methodological and practical 
insights on researching diaspora citizenship in South Africa (in contradistinction to the UK).  
                                                          
1 These include the imperial diaspora who escaped repressive, discriminatory and violent colonial rule, those 
who left the Matabeleland and Midlands regions during the civil strife in the early 1980s, and those who left in 
response to the devastating neoliberal economic policies in the late 1980s-earlry 1990s.  
5 | P a g e  
 
Results of this study confirm that Zimbabwean migrants indeed constitute a fractured 
diaspora, but their fragmentation manifests not only materially but also in their modes of 
citizenship (Pasura, 2010; 2008). They imagine and enact citizenship in multiple ways, beyond 
universal, state-centric, modes of politico-legal citizenship. In terms of findings, with a small 
proportion of participants engaging in overt political activism aimed at directly influencing 
homeland political processes, discursive political activity (everyday political talk) emerged as 
a dominant way of indirectly engaging and contesting authoritarian state back in their 
homeland. This thesis shows how formal legal status, rights and claims-making directed at the 
state, also tend to be supplanted by diasporas’ everyday social practices. Lastly, this study 
shows how this fragmented and everyday diasporic citizenship is mediated by an interplay of 
historical, geographical and contextual factors. And comparing experiences of Zimbabweans 
in the South African and UK illustrates the role of context in shaping emerging modes of 
diaspora citizenship in those two places.  
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Chapter One: Transnational Migration and the Reconfiguration of Citizenship  
1.1 Chapter Introduction 
People have become more mobile than ever before, resulting in political, economic and 
sociocultural changes (Urry, 2000; Adey, 2000). In 2010, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees estimated that 221 million of the world’s 6.7 billion people were 
living outside their countries of birth (UNCHR, 2010). In Africa, people continue to move from 
place to place and settle outside their own countries both within and outside the continent, 
for different reasons and motivations. Most of the migration within and from Sub-Saharan 
Africa is involuntary and crisis-driven, motivated by the need for protection and survival 
(Bascom, 1995; Akokpari, 1999; Betts, 2013; Adepoju, 2004). This pattern of migration is 
historical, but has intensified in recent years. 
People from Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, tend to emigrate as a result of unabated 
socioeconomic problems, repressive regimes, environmental pressures and other threats to 
their security and daily survival (see Chazan, 1987; Betts, 2013; Betts and Jones, 2016; 
Adepoju, 1991). This thesis uses Castles and Davidson (2000)’s concept of ‘crisis of citizenship’ 
as a lens with which to understand deep-seated drivers of emigration in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
with specific reference to post-2000 Zimbabwe (also see Open Society Foundation, 2009).2 
The first dimension of this crisis of citizenship, manifests in the deficient relationship between 
the state and citizens in Sub-Saharan Africa, results in emigration. The second dimension of 
the crisis of citizenship is that it complicates and reconfigures modes of citizenship for those 
emigrants in the countries that host them (Castles and Davidson, 2000). It is this latter facet 
                                                          
2 The crisis of citizenship generally denotes a failure of the western model of citizenship in other countries outside the west. This crisis is 
linked with the challenges and deficiencies facing the nation-state. Open Society Foundation also identifies deprivation of meaningful 
citizenship as one of the causes of civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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of the crisis of citizenship makes it critical to explore how emigration is accompanied by new 
modes of citizenship for those scattered outside the country.  
This thesis recognises that emigration does not result in perpetual dislocation and 
exclusion for those who would have exited the country (see Laguerre, 1998; Nyers, 2011; 
Betts and Jones, 2016). Instead, citizenship (or lack of it) is indeed crucial to the lives of 
migrant (and displaced) people, and those who migrate find ways of reclaiming it outside the 
territories of their countries (see Mehta and Napier-Moore, 2010). Citizenship crisis-driven 
migrants would, therefore, be in constant search of new modes of citizenship while hosted 
outside the country. It therefore becomes critical to explore emerging modes of citizenship 
for those displaced and pushed out of their countries by these kinds of crises. This thesis also 
suggests that to migrate itself is a demonstration of what Lister (1998) refers to as citizenship 
agency. 
Although this study primarily focusses on the implications of transnational migration to 
citizenship, it would also be interesting to use the same concept of ‘crisis of citizenship’ to 
understand dynamics of internal displacement and migration (for example, rural-
urban/urban-rural). This would be an interesting line of inquiry for another project. In the 
above context, the thrust of this thesis is not so much about characterising and explaining 
contemporary trends and patterns in transnational migration of people from sub-Saharan 
Africa, of Zimbabweans in particular. Rather, the primary focus is on experiences of migrants 
after emigrating and settling outside their countries of origin. This will be achieved by looking 
at the specific reference to experiences of Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa. As such, 
this thesis generates broader lessons and contributes to a number of debates on the 
relationship between migration and citizenship in contemporary world.  
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This study, for example, challenges the dominant, sedentarist, way of thinking about 
citizenship as territorially bounded national citizenship, based on an assumed congruency 
between the state, citizens and territory (Bellamy, 2008; Tambini, 2001; Bretell and Hollifield, 
2007). This presupposed consistency between place, people and the state are, however, 
disrupted when those meant to be citizens within the state, physically move into spaces for 
other national communities (see Castles and Davidson, 2000). This presents uncertainty as to 
where and how those migrants become incorporated, while outside their country. 
Another debate to which this thesis contributes is that on who migrants become after 
departure from their country of origin (Soyal, 1994; Baubock, 1994; Apadurai, 1993; Laguerre, 
1998; Klusmeyer and Aleinikoff, 2001; Zeleza, 2003). With some holding that they assimilate 
in the host country; become a nation outside its territory (Anderson, 1983); or become global 
citizens (Soysal, 1994; Appadurai, 1993; Kymlicka and Norman, 1994; Tambini, 2001). This 
thesis argues that emigrants do not adopt any universal and homogenous identity, but 
become a diaspora with multiple and fluid identities, both maintaining a commitment to their 
homeland and host country (Cohen, 1997; Laguerre, 1998; Zeleza, 2005; Pasura, 2010). It 
therefore, uses the concept of a diaspora as a lens with which to understand their everyday 
life experiences within the host country and transnational relationship with their homeland. 
Another important area of contribution of this thesis relates to citizenship studies. It 
generates useful insights not only on how citizenship is reconfigured by transnational 
migration, but how we can begin to understand its practice by different diaspora communities 
hosted in different contexts. Broadly, there two citizenship theoretical traditions, with some 
that emphasis its politico-legal elements such as legal status, rights and political participation 
(Soysal, 1994; Bosniak, 2000; Kubal, 2012; Manby, 2009; Baubock, 2008; Itzigsohn and 
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Villacres, 2008). Other scholars emphasise the sociocultural expressions of citizenship 
including cultural identity, social practices and senses of belonging (Oldfield, 1997; Lister, 
1997; Vertovec, 2001). This uses the concept of diasporic citizenship to demonstrate the 
multiplicity, fragmentation/fracturing and complexity that characterise citizenship as 
practiced by diasporas (Laguerre, 1998; Pasura, 2010).  
The key proposition, in other words, is that diasporas do not practice citizenship in any 
universal way, but different sections of the diaspora express their citizenship in multiple ways. 
Citizenship, as practiced by diasporas, also occurs in multiple sites and is multi-scaled (see 
Staeheli, 1999). Another additional and key defining feature of citizenship, particularly for 
diasporas living in abject conditions, relates to its everydayness (see Dickinson et al, 2008; 
Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011; Nyers, 2011; Hepworth, 2012; Sharkey, 2008).3 These are 
some of the features of diaspora citizenship discussed in this thesis, and this generates 
insights on how citizenship is changing from national citizenship in the context of migration. 
Lastly, this study generates specific empirical insights on experiences of the Zimbabwean 
diaspora. A significant body of knowledge Zimbabweans’ day to day life experiences already 
exists, including work by McGregor and Primorac (2010), Pasura (2010), Muzondidya (2006) 
and Mbiba (2005) among other work in different contexts. As it is a new diaspora, according 
to McGregor and Primorac (2010), a lot is still to be understood, which makes empirical 
studies of this nature important. 
 The decision to focus on experiences of Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK was 
largely inspired by my own past experiences, having migrated and settled in these two 
                                                          
3 Related concepts that also help us understand the everydayness of diaspora citizenship include 
abject/irregular citizenship (Nyers, 2011; Hepworth, 2012). These will be discussed in subsequent sections. 
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countries. South Africa and the UK host significant populations of Zimbabweans (particularly 
South Africa), which made it worthwhile to explore the dynamics of their life experiences in 
these two places. My personal challenges I encountered attempting to acquire formal legal 
status in South Africa, despite feeling at home in that particular country, also triggered 
questions on what it means to be a citizen. I felt I had become a part of the South African 
society because of the number of years I had lived in that country and the contributions I felt 
I was making towards that society. Yet, the South African state was denying me that 
opportunity to formally become a part of South Africa. 
My experiences, as a member of the diaspora, had contradictions and complexities, which 
warranted systematic exploration. My own experiences, both as a member of the 
Zimbabwean diaspora and an activist, also raised a number of unanswered questions, which 
I thought I could answer by way of empirical research of this nature. My work with a Cape 
Town-based organisation called PASSOP prior to my move to the UK, for example, heightened 
my interest in the plight of Zimbabweans. During the time of my activism, I witnessed 
different forms of exclusion and injustice perpetrated not only by the South African 
government but some sections of the broader society. What complicated my situation was 
that this hostility was being perpetrated by a country that is often celebrated as a progressive 
society. 
 It was also difficult for me to understand why people leave their own countries only to 
endure harsh experiences (which I thought were worse than those back in Zimbabwe, at 
times). I also failed to understand how Zimbabweans still managed to thrive in such a hostile 
environment, without secure legal statuses and with limited access to significant substantive 
benefits and entitlements associated with citizenship. On the other hand, my experiences in 
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South Africa felt in slight contrast to what I felt when I arrived in the UK, where Zimbabweans 
appeared to feel more comfortable and at home, compared to their South Africa 
counterparts. This, therefore, explains why I became interested in comparing modes of 
citizenship (if any) by Zimbabweans hosted in the two countries, more deeply and more 
systematically.  
1.2 Key Concepts 
A ‘crisis of citizenship’ occurs in circumstances of deficiencies in national citizenship 
such as legal status, rights and political participation. These dysfunctions in citizenship are 
accompanied by different consequences including conflict and emigration in African countries 
(Azarya, 1988; Open Society Foundation, 2009). This crisis of citizenship also encompasses 
how Marshallian citizenship based on welfare and social provisioning has not been effective 
– a key factor in the Zimbabwean context. A further dimension of this crisis of citizenship 
relates to the predicament of where and how best transnational migrants become 
incorporated (Castles and Davidson, 2000; Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2001). For instance, 
there is no universal model nor consensus among practitioners and scholars on whether they 
should remain citizens of their country of origin or become integrated in their host country; 
it is also unclear what rights, identity, welfare guarantees, and political inclusion should or 
can be extended to those transnational migrants. These are some of the issues characterising 
the second dimension of the crisis.   
The concept of ‘diaspora’ (Zeleza, 2005; 2010; Sheffer, 2003; McGregor, 2010; Pasura, 
2008; 2010) recognises how migrants do not become a homogenous nation outside their 
home territory, do not become cosmopolitan citizens of the world, and do not become 
integrated into one particular society. Rather, diaspora has a number of defining features 
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including scattering, settlement in multiple countries, commitment to homeland, multiple 
attachments and transnationalism.  The concept of ‘fractured/fragmented diaspora’ (Pasura, 
2010) is premised on the failure of nation-building and how emigrants from different 
backgrounds and in different circumstances develop multiple and fluid identities and 
allegiances towards both the host country and country of origin. This fracturing is traceable 
to the failure of the nation-building project, which is particularly acute in Zimbabwe, which 
has become a divided society since national independence.  
The concept of ‘diasporic citizenship’ coined by Laguerre (1998) also helps 
characterise the differentiated, multiple and multi-scaled expressions of citizenship by 
different elements of the diaspora. ‘Transnationalism’ (Basch et al, 1994; Baubock, 1994; 
Levitt, 2004) depicts the enduring social ties sustained by members of diasporas 
simultaneously between homeland and host country. ‘Everyday citizenship’ (Dickinson, 2008; 
Hopkins, 2011; Desforges et al, 2005) is another key concept depicting how those with limited 
opportunities to claim citizenship by engaging the state, find ways of acting as citizens outside 
the state (also see Sharkey, 2008; Nyers, 2011; Hepworth, 2012).4 This citizenship is localised, 
informal and is facilitated by (largely informal) civil society networks in different local spaces. 
Lastly, ‘affective citizenship’ (Fortier, 2016) encompasses subjective sentiments, emotions 
and feelings towards a particular state. This encompasses how diasporas ‘feel’ about both the 
host country and country of origin, particularly where they feel ‘at home’ (Anthias, 2006; 
Wodak and Krzyzanowski, 2007). This dimension can be in contradistinction to material 
                                                          
4 Nyers, Hepworth and Sharkey also propose the concept of ‘abject citizens’ to understand the day to day 
experiences of this category of the diaspora population.  
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expressions of citizenship explored in this study, including overt political and social practices, 
but the two components of citizenship are not entirely mutually exclusive.  
1.3 Thesis Outline 
Based on observations of the lived experiences of Zimbabweans in South Africa and the 
UK, this study demonstrates that indeed transnational migration represents a critical 
citizenship issue today, particularly as it results from dysfunctional relationship between the 
state and citizens, prompting emigration from many Sub-Saharan African countries. It also 
shows that such transnational migration prompted by failure in national citizenship is 
accompanied by changes in how migrants relate with both their homeland and host country. 
In other words, although transnational migrants often appear perpetually excluded and 
marginalised in some host countries, experiences of Zimbabweans, in fact, reveal that 
migrants do not become passive victims of exclusion but find different ways of becoming 
citizens while outside their countries.  
The key question is on what modes of citizenship evolve among transnational migrants, 
and this is a matter of ongoing scholarly debate as I will demonstrate in the literature review 
section. However, suffice to mention, experiences of Zimbabweans show that modes of 
citizenship become fragmented, with different sections imagining and enacting their 
citizenship differently (Young, 1989; Laguerre, 1989; Yuval-Davies, 1999). This thesis also 
demonstrates that arenas in which citizenship is practiced also become multiple, and so do 
the scales of citizenship, with the everyday becoming a key sphere of citizenship for the 
majority of Zimbabweans excluded from politico-legal and other state-centred modes of 
citizenship. This fragmentation of citizenship does not occur in a vacuum, but is mediated by 
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an interplay of historical, spatio-temporal and socio-demographic factors among many 
others. 
In terms of structure, the thesis comprises two broad sections. The first part of this thesis 
contains two chapters - one conceptual and one methodological- and the rest of the thesis is 
empirically-based. Chapter two sets out and contains critical reflections on the methodology 
used to answer questions raised in this study, with a particular emphasis on the 
transformative and empowerment potential of approaches used in sampling, identification of 
participants and actual encounters with participants during the fieldwork process. Chapter 
three reconceptualises emigration using citizenship lenses, by proposing that the mass 
exodus of Zimbabweans was a result of a crisis of national citizenship. In so doing, this chapter 
also situates this kind of citizenship-crisis-driven emigration in its historical context, to 
counter the ahistorical manner in which migration causes and patterns are often approached.  
The second part of the thesis contains three empirical chapters, which use empirical data 
to demonstrate the argument that diaspora citizenship is indeed fragmented, as follows: 
Chapter four argues and demonstrates that diasporas become citizens by engaging in 
different kinds of material and discursive political activities. Chapter five proposes that 
diaspora do not only become citizens by way of being political, but through everyday social 
practices that bear profound citizenship implications. The third empirical chapter, Chapter six, 
argues that diasporas do not only act as citizens in material ways, but diaspora citizenship is 
also subjectively (and inter-subjectively) constructed through senses of belonging. The 
Conclusions chapter ends by highlighting the study’s main findings, including a summary of 
the thesis, how it advances knowledge on the relationship between citizenship and migration, 
and suggestions on further areas of research. It also discusses implications for policy and 
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practice emanating from the findings of this study.  The next section considers scholarly 
debates on the relationship between migration and citizenship, and different perspectives on 
emerging modes of citizenship for migrants. 
1.4 The Fragmented and Everyday Diasporic Citizenship: A Survey of Literature 
Significant volumes of scholarly work exist on the nexus between transnational migration 
and citizenship, but recent trends indicate what seems to be an overemphasis on growing 
movements of people, negating the implications of those patterns of human mobility. 
Growing crisis-driven migration from different crisis regions and countries across the world 
such as the Middle East, North Africa and other places, makes it increasingly critical to 
consider emerging modes of citizenship (Castles and Davidson, 2000). This is what primarily 
concerns this study, particularly what happens to the citizenship of those migrants once they 
get settled in different destination countries.  
Apart from the primary focus on modes of citizenship emerging among those migrants, 
this study also revisits existing thinking on the causes of emigration, suggesting another way 
of thinking and understanding it beyond the traditional push-pull factor framework. This need 
to rethink the causes of migration emanates from the realisation of how migration is often 
understood from an immigration vantage point, often negating the emigration dimension 
(Castles and Davidson, 2000). This thesis, therefore, uses citizenship theory to understand the 
causes and implications of emigration in Sub-Saharan Africa, with specific reference to post-
independence Zimbabwe. 
Indeed, human mobility is ever-growing in the contemporary world, whose impact on 
existing social and political order has been seismic both in migrant hosting and sending 
countries (Castles and Davidson, 2000). For example, considerable work also exists on how 
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and where they become incorporated once they settle outside their countries. Some hold 
that they become fully incorporated in the host country, while others observe how they 
maintain ties with their countries of origin (see Anderson, 1991; Bulcha, 1988; Harrell-Bond, 
1985). Another category of scholars, more usefully, recognises how complex and fragmented 
identities of migrants become, leading them to characterise those migrants as diasporas 
(Laguerre, 1998; Pasura, 2008; Zeleza, 2003; McGregor, 2010). Of course, there are certain 
other characteristics which render them diasporic, as I will highlight in following sections of 
this chapter. 
It is generally accepted that most emigrants hosted outside the country do not 
automatically and completely become embedded in the host country, nor remain fully 
attached back to their home country, as suggested by some scholars (Bulcha, 1988; Harell-
Bond, 1986; Hack-Polay, 2013). Recognising the effects of their fractious country of origin 
backgrounds and other factors, diasporas in reality tend to develop multiple allegiances and 
loyalties spanning host and home country. These are often expressed through diverse 
sociocultural, political and economic connections sustained in-between the two places 
(Baubock, 1994; Portes, 1999; Levitt, 2004; Vertovec, 2001; Laguerre, 1998). Additional 
features which make transnational migrants a diasporic community, including dispersal from 
a common country of origin (as discussed above), commitment to their homeland and 
maintaining separate and distinct identity from national identity of host country (McGregor, 
2010; Muzondidya, 2006; Pasura, 2014; also see Brubaker, 2005; Sheffer, 2003; Shepperson, 
1966). It is clear that transnationalism represents one of the defining component of diasporic 
communities.  
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However, the notion of a diasporic community has its own problematic elements. For 
example, referring to it as a community is somewhat essentialist and groupist, according to 
Brubaker, giving the impression of emigrants as constituting a coherent and homogenous 
entity outside the territory of their country (Brubaker, 2005).  This negates the diversity that 
often characterises diasporic communities, particularly those originating from countries in 
the global south (Mehta and Napier-Moore, 2010). Rather, as Pasura correctly observes in 
relation to Zimbabweans in the UK, diasporas also tend to be fragmented and fractured, given 
the disunity and difference along the lines of gender, legal status, length of stay in the host 
country and other fractures (see Pasura, 2008; 2010; 2014). This analysis, therefore, builds on 
this notion of fragmentation as a response to the holist and universalising ways of thinking 
about citizenship (see Young, 1989), and this will provide a useful lens with which to 
understand the empirical experiences of Zimbabweans living in different spaces within South 
Africa and the UK.   
Diasporas would have left their countries of origin at different times and under different 
circumstances and crises, and they would have settled under different conditions in the host 
country. Therefore, these different fragments subsequently develop different conceptions of 
citizenship, identities and senses of belonging. Therefore, those Zimbabweans constitute a 
fractured transnational diaspora, encompassing all the above features. This thesis, therefore, 
shares the latter view that some migrants hosted in different contexts indeed constitute 
diasporic communities, particularly Zimbabweans who themselves have been observed to 
display these traits in the UK and South African contexts (see Pasura, 2008; McGregor, 2010; 
Crush and Tevera, 2010; Muzondidya, 2006). The next section considers the idea of diaspora 
citizenship, with an aim of identifying its key features.  
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1.4.1 Diasporas and Different Ways of Becoming Citizens 
This thesis uses different theoretical lenses to understand how different sections of 
the diaspora imagine and practice citizenship differently. As a starting point, Laguerre’s notion 
of diasporic citizenship offers a useful way of characterising these multiple ways of becoming 
citizens (Laguerre, 1998; also see Thomas, 2002).5 Diasporic citizenship also becomes 
transnational, with multiple ways of becoming a citizen simultaneously directed at the host 
country and homeland (see Laguerre, 1998; Pasura,2014; Levitt, 2004). This speaks to the 
nature of material, sentimental and other links diasporas sustain with their homeland, 
illustrating how diasporas direct their citizenship practices to more than one country 
(McGregor, 2010; Pasura, 2005; Zeleza, 2005; also see Sheffer, 2003). The fragmentation and 
transnational nature of diasporic communities, as discussed earlier, also becomes another 
distinguishing feature of the ways of becoming citizens (Pasura, 2014). In other words, as 
theoretical and empirical evidence will demonstrate later, different categories of diasporas 
begin to act as citizens in multiple ways in terms of scale, loci, meanings and expressions of 
citizenship.  
Citizenship itself is difficult to define with any degree of precision, but it generally 
encompasses the relationship between the state and people (Lister, 1997; Heater, 1999; Isin 
and Wood, 1999). It also implies membership in some form of a broader community, such as 
a nation, which raises questions of who is included and excluded (see Lister, 1997). Various 
other definitional features of citizenship can be identified (see Lister, 1997; Heater, 1999). It 
is multifaceted and scholars often emphasise different elements of it (Dwyer, 2000; Thomas, 
                                                          
5 The idea of multiple ways of becoming citizens is also drawn from Elaine Thomas, who identifies several 
competing conceptions of political belonging. For example, she talks of citizenship on the basis of identity, 
contribution to society, legal status, blood and shared culture and way of life among other facets of citizenship. 
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2002). A liberal stance, for instance, often stresses the importance of legal status and rights, 
while communitarians place emphasis on commitment to and identifying with the wider 
community as a basis for being a citizen (see Kymlicka and Norman, 1994; Heater, 1999).  
A civic-republicanist conception of citizenship also views citizenship as practice, 
realised through performance of duties and responsibilities to the community (Thomas, 2002; 
Lister, 1997; Oldfield, 1990). This understanding of citizenship will be built upon in this thesis 
to understand how diasporas without formal citizenship enact citizenship through their 
everyday social practices. There are also some who propose that citizenship is not only an 
area of practice or status, but it is subjectively constructed (Fortier, 2016; also see Anderson, 
1991). In this context, this thesis holds that indeed citizenship is not imagined and enacted by 
diasporas in universal ways; rather, it has many faces and can be realised in multiple material 
and non-material ways.  
This understanding of citizenship is based on Elaine Thomas’s multifaceted 
conceptualisation of citizenship; and in the same fashion, diasporas can claim and enact their 
citizenship in multiple ways (Thomas, 2002). For Thomas, a person can be a citizen on the 
basis of ‘blood’ or descent, shared way life, contributions to society, legal status and other 
bases on which citizenship can be claimed (see Thomas, 2002). This only goes to show the 
importance of a conception of diaspora citizenship which takes into account the plural ways 
citizenship can be practiced. This challenges the universalist, state-centric politico-legal 
conceptions premised on the notion that citizenship is only performed through politico-legal 
means of formal legal status, rights and political participation (Bosniak, 2000; Laguerre, 1998).  
This, again largely liberal, way of thinking about citizenship is thought to be only fully 
realised in the ostensible epicentre of citizenship (Western Europe and North America) 
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compared to the weak and second-class citizenship practiced in ‘failed states’ in Africa and 
the rest of the world (see Brysk and Shafir, 2004; Castles and Davidson, 2000; Open Society 
Foundation, 2009).6  The argument here is that diasporas of an African origin, including those 
hosted on the continent itself, do not always become completely ‘citizenship-less’, but 
conceive and enact citizenship differently to the universalistic (liberal) logic.  
This kind of citizenship, as practiced by African diasporas, becomes less universal in 
the sense that it is no longer directly tied to the state, legal status and formal politics, but 
something that is practiced in various sociocultural, discursive and others ways as part of their 
daily lives (see Young, 1989; Laguerre, 1998; Thomas, 2002; Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011; 
Desforges et al, 2005). This predominantly resonates with the experiences of those that live 
on the margins of host societies. While liberal citizenship would have us think migrants are 
predominantly completely excluded from any form of citizenship, this thesis shows how even 
those perceived to be marginalised still find spaces and strategies of negotiating citizenship 
(Isin and Rygiel, 2007; McGregor, 2008).7  
Those marginalised sections of the diaspora are often characterised as ‘abject citizens’ 
(Hepworth, 2012; Sharkey and Shields, 2008); or ‘irregular citizens’ (Nyers, 2011). They appear 
excluded in terms of their irregular and precarious legal statuses, exclusion from the formal 
economy, denial of formal political rights, disengaged from the mainstream political system, 
and lack of integration into mainstream sociocultural fabric of the society, but a closer analysis 
of their daily lives reveals how they negotiate citizenship through their, largely informal, 
everyday social practices.  
                                                          
6 Castles and Davidson (2000) refer to this ostensible lack of citizenship in the global south as ‘chaos’. 
7 The concept of ‘abject spaces’ helps map these spaces where marginalised diasporas negotiate inclusion and 
transnational ties. 
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A republicanist variant of the above liberal conception emphasises political 
participation aimed at influencing homeland politics, as the dominant expression of 
citizenship by diasporas (see Thomas, 2002; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Kuhlmann, 2008; 
Tarrow, 2005). Of course, there are some sections of the diaspora who find opportunities to 
participate in politics aimed at influencing homeland politics, but not everyone becomes 
political in the same way. In other words, political participation does not only occur in the 
form of overt, ’Big P’ political activism (see Flint, 2003; also see Scott, 1985).8 Instead, they 
find other ways of being political, for example through partaking in discursive forms through 
online and offline everyday political discourses (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Shah et al, 
2005; Huckfeldt, 2009; Klofstad, 2009).  
There are various other, less distinctly political (in its ‘Big P sense), ways diasporas can 
negotiate citizenship, particularly through spatially-differentiated, informal social practices 
constituting a part of their daily lives (see Isin and Wood, 1999; Oldfield, 1998; Dickinson, 
2008; Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011; Desforges et al, 2005). This resonates with experiences 
of those sections of the diaspora population living in precarious conditions, excluded from 
mainstream political and economic life, primarily due to their irregular legal statuses and 
backgrounds (see Nyers, 2011). 
 In this formulation, citizenship also represents a means by which diasporas seek 
inclusion within broader society (both back home and in host country) through diverse 
strategies such as informal social and economic practices (see Laguerre, 1998 Levitt, 2004). 
Diaspora citizenship, therefore, is not only about legal status, rights and political participation, 
                                                          
8 Ordinary people, particularly marginalised sections, do not only become political by partaking in overt 
political action (what Flint [2003] refers to as ‘Big P’ political participation) such as voting, petitioning, political 
party campaigning, and demonstrations aimed at directly influencing the state. Instead, there are various 
other ways, sometimes seemingly inconsequential, in which marginalised peoples still manage to be political.  
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but also encompasses lived experience in diasporas’ everyday lives (see Lister, 1998; 
Dickinson et al, 2008; Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011). Thirdly, this thesis also holds that 
diaspora citizenship is not only performed through material ways, but also encompasses 
subjective and intersubjective senses of belonging and attachment between homeland and 
host country (see Anthias, 2008; Fortier, 2016; McGregor, 2010; Laguerre, 1998). These 
diverse ways of becoming citizens show the differentiated nature of diasporic communities 
observed by other scholars, particularly by Pasura (2008) in his work with Zimbabweans in the 
UK. The point here is that migration does not always result in the exclusion of all migrants, 
but different sections find ways of being citizens in different contexts. 
How diasporas perform citizenship is not the only contour of their fragmentation, but 
also where and the scale at which they engage as citizens (see Yuval-Davies, 1999). This aspect 
of the thesis recognises the reconfiguration of the arena in which citizenship, as practiced by 
diasporas, occur (Laguerre, 1998; Baubock, 1994). For example, the state no longer remains 
the sole site of citizenship as a result of growing transnational migration, globalisation and 
other factors, as observed by Laguerre (1998) and many other scholars, but spaces in which 
it is performed become multi-scaled (see Laguerre, 1998; Yuval-Davies, 1999; Tarrow, 2005; 
Dickinson, 2008; Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011). Although emphasis is often placed on 
transnational and global arenas above the level of the state, this thesis demonstrates the pre-
eminence of everyday arenas (largely informal) invented by diasporas as part of their 
everyday lives, where citizenship is negotiated (see Desforges et al, 2005; Isin and Rygiel, 
2007; Gaventa, 2006). Thus, diasporic citizenship is practiced in multiple ways, in different 
locations/sites and at different scales. 
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This thesis also notes several other defining and critical characteristics of diaspora 
citizenship, especially as experienced by diasporas hosted in contexts of marginalisation, 
poverty and xenophobia, as is the case with South Africa. These include its everydayness, 
bottom-up, struggle, contested, negotiated, survivalist and tactical nature of these new 
modes of citizenship become discernible, contrary to somewhat status-based and other 
dominant conceptions of citizenship portraying its practice as a top-down and effortless 
process (see Kubal, 2012; Desforges et al, 2005). Transnational and fragmented diaspora 
citizenship does not emerge in a vacuum but is mediated by an interplay of context, history, 
spatial and temporal variations and structural factors among many other factors determining 
how different categories of those migrants perform citizenship. Having provided a summary 
of the thesis, I now move on to conceptualising discussing dominant conceptions of 
citizenship, with an aim to highlight their inadequacy and demonstrate the need for other 
ways of thinking about citizenship in the context of transnational migration.  
The attainment of formal legal status constitutes one of the ways citizenship is 
expressed, but there are multiple other ways of becoming citizens. These include everyday 
practices and political subjectivities constitute other ways of becoming citizens, as I will 
illustrate in this chapter. Therefore, building on Elaine Thomas’s and Pasura’s empirical work 
with Zimbabweans in the UK, this thesis suggests that diaspora citizenship becomes 
multifaceted and fragmented (Thomas, 2002; Pasura, 2008; also see Young, 1989).9 This 
challenges the universalistic way in which citizenship is thought about in liberal scholarship. 
Citizenship, at least as practiced by diasporas, is also mediated by historical, 
sociodemographic, spatial and other factors, which explains why different categories and 
                                                          
9 Elaine Thomas (2002) notes more than five faces of citizenship including citizenship on the basis of 
contributions to society, citizenship by ‘blood’, citizenship by legal status among other dimensions. 
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sections of diasporas become citizens in different ways. The next section, therefore, discusses 
some of the different ways diasporas can act as citizens while outside their countries, starting 
with the dominant liberal conception of citizenship. Before that, it is worth acknowledging 
that discussing these expressions of citizenship separately by no means suggests their mutual 
exclusivity. These intersect, interrelate and mutually reinforce each other, but I will analyse 
them as distinct from each other just to demonstrate their multiplicity. 
1.4.1.1 Diasporic Citizenship as Legal Status 
Diasporas can perform citizenship on the basis of legal status. Most of the scholarship 
tends to speak of diasporic citizenship in terms of its liberal status-based and rights-based 
dimensions, for example observing the possibility for diasporas to obtain citizenship in the 
host state through naturalisation, or opportunities to acquire dual/multiple citizenships 
(Baubock, 1994; Bosniak, 2000; Muzondidya, 2006; Manby, 2009; Spiro, 2011; Stasiulis and 
Ross, 2006).10 In other words, migrants can become citizens in more than one country on the 
basis of obtaining legal status. This thesis challenges the above (dominant) liberal and state-
centric conceptions of citizenship based on legal status, rights and political participation, 
which continue to dominate thinking on the relationship between migration and both the 
host and home country state today (see Bosniak, 2000; Sicakkan and Lithman, 2005; also see 
Kubal, 2012; Laguerre, 1998). The liberal model of citizenship does not always seamlessly 
match the experiences of diverse sections of diasporas. This thesis, therefore, holds that this 
liberal conception of citizenship is an important way of thinking about diaspora citizenship, 
                                                          
10 Citizenship for diasporas tends to be narrowly conceived in terms of the denial of dual or multiple 
citizenships, as is the norm in many other African countries. 
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but its tenets do not reflect the experiences of the majority of the diasporas who find it 
difficult to engage the state directly in this way.  
I will start by reflecting on the utility of legal status as a basis for diasporas to claim 
citizenship, highlighting its pros and cons. It is important to highlight that this thesis does not 
seek to dismiss the importance of legal status, rights and other aspects of liberal citizenship 
for diasporas. In fact, despite practical challenges migrants face when trying to obtain it, my 
view is that the desire for legal status becomes one of the priorities for diasporas as soon as 
they immigrate and settle in the host country (also see Morreira, 2011; Kubal, 2012). For 
example, having secure legal status is often associated with greater security, access to 
livelihood opportunities and allows diasporas to effectively partake in various transnational 
practices such as remittance-sending and travelling back home. In this context, diasporas 
often fight hard to get legal recognition, sometimes through illegal means (see Bosniak, 2000; 
Kubal, 2012). Despite its desirability and utility in migrants’ transnational lives, citizenship 
defined in terms of legal status has its own limitations.  
The possibility of dual and multiple citizenships is often celebrated as they open 
opportunities for claiming rights and other entitlements that come with citizenship in more 
than one polity (Baubock, 1994). Yet in reality there is often resistance by conservative and 
nativist sections of host societies, who tend to view multiple allegiances and citizenships of 
diasporas as a hindrance to nationhood and immigrant integration into the host society (see 
Geyer, 1996). This points to the limits of status-based, flexible citizenship, particularly for 
diasporas with a desire to sustain transnational ties with their homelands. Legal status is also 
inherently exclusionary as it seeks not only to control who enters and settles within the 
territory of the political community, but to identify who belongs in the nation and who does 
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not (see Brubaker, 1992).11 This is achieved by way of imposing identities, sometimes 
marginal identities such as ‘alien’, ‘foreigner’ ‘immigrant’ and so on, depending on the legal 
status one holds. 
 Restrictive rights, terms and conditions attached to legal status also allow some 
sections of the diaspora to become more incorporated than others. This leaves marginalised 
sections of the diaspora, particularly those without secure and stable legal statuses and 
limited livelihood opportunities, to engage in different survival and self-help strategies to 
realise citizenship (see Nyers, 2011; Sharkey, 2008). These include various social practices 
outside the ambit of the state and as part of their everyday lives, which enable them to thrive 
and sustain themselves (and loved ones) in the host society and back home (see Nyers, 2011; 
Kubal, 2012). As such, those marginalised often engage in a struggle to contest marginal 
statuses as well as rights, terms and conditions associated with them, thus negotiating new 
(in some cases semi-legal) statuses and legal identities.12  
Even if a country had the most liberal immigration and citizenship laws allowing diasporas to 
integrate through legal status, this thesis proposes that not everyone finds it easy to obtain 
legal status, as empirically demonstrated by numerous studies documenting the challenges 
immigrants often face in seeking to legalise their stay in host countries due to restrictive 
immigration and citizenship policies and practices among other factors (Kubal, 2012; Alfaro-
Velcamp and Shaw, 2016; Nyers, 2011). Some diasporas find it easier to claim legal status 
than others within the host country due to their levels of education, professional backgrounds 
                                                          
11 Brubaker (1992) observes the social functions of legal status as an approach to building a nation, by 
excluding those who do not belong in the nation.  
12 Kubal proposes a useful concept - semi-legality - as a way of understanding those with ambiguous, in-
between and unclear statuses. This is often the case in countries where opportunities for regularising 
immigration status and pursuing formal pathways to citizenship are limited. 
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and class. As a result, diasporas denied legal status at times adopt a range of strategies 
designed to contest their exclusion on the basis of their legal status.  
Above strategies include seeking the support of mediators such as NGOs in contexts 
of power imbalances between immigrants and the state; some even resort to the use of illegal 
means to acquire legal status, including the use of fraudulently obtained documentation and 
breaching conditions of residency permits when travelling to country of origin (see Von Lieres 
and Piper, 2014; also see Kriger, 2010; Muzondidya, 2006). In this context, this thesis shows 
how legal recognition is not always granted ‘on a silver platter’, but struggled for and 
contested between the state and diasporas, as part of diasporas’ everyday struggles for 
survival.  This, therefore, challenges the top-down notion of the state as the granter of and 
dictator of legal identities of diasporas, and this also shows the agency that seemingly 
disempowered diasporas may exercise in their relationship with the host state.  
This tendency often affects migrants hosted in countries such as South Africa where 
exclusionary forces are entrenched; and those without background experience engaging with 
the state potentially find it difficult to meaningfully partake in the above form of citizenship. 
In such countries, migrants tend to be viewed as intruders, presenting themselves where they 
do not belong; thus, they are frequently met with hostility, antagonism and rejection in those 
societies which host them (Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004; Neocosmos, 2010; Nyamnjoh, 
2006). This, therefore, makes it clear that not everyone among immigrants indeed has an 
equal and easy opportunity to assert citizenship through legal status, as portrayed in 
mainstream, liberal, citizenship thinking (see Kubal, 2012). In countries such as South Africa, 
the majority of diasporas find it difficult to gain legal recognition in terms of citizenship and 
immigration documentation due to exclusionary immigration, citizenship and related policies 
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and practices (see McGregor, 2008; Neocosmos, 2010; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Nyers, 2011). This 
demonstrates the need for new ways of thinking about how the majority of excluded indeed 
perform their citizenship in those contexts.  
The above liberal conception of citizenship also gives the impression that citizenship 
is granted neatly without contention, which obscures the struggles and contestations for 
access to resources, recognition and other aspects of citizenship between diasporas and both 
the host and country of origin states (see Kabeer, 2002; also see Kubal, 2012; Manby, 2009).13 
This means diasporas engage in everyday struggles to act as citizens, even in countries where 
they are not legally recognised as citizens or without participating in formal political processes 
as emphasised by other scholars (Bosniak, 2000; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001). This thesis, 
therefore, observes that not only does it become possible for African diasporas to practice 
citizenship outside the state, but it has historically been struggled for (see Manby, 2009; 
Gaventa, 2005).14 In this context, there is also always a likelihood that contestation and 
struggle continue to form part of the citizenship practice logic for  diasporas hosted in 
countries on the continent which, in turn, demonstrates the limits of status-based citizenship, 
as a way of performing citizenship.  
Citizenship on the basis of legal status is not only exclusionary and difficult to obtain, 
but also contradictory in that immigrants who may be more integrated through practices, 
sociocultural identities, contributions to society and other ways, may still be designated non-
citizens. It is in this context, citizenship defined narrowly defined in terms of legal status 
                                                          
13 Kubal (2012) poignantly captures the struggle for legal status between the state and migrants, as a way by 
which illegal immigrants or those with marginal legal statuses contest illegality or marginalisation. Manby 
emphasises the struggle nature of citizenship in the African context, where different forms of exclusion and 
inequality have been historically prevalent. 
14 Manby (2009) emphasises the struggle nature of citizenship, underscoring how it was never granted by the 
state without some kind of a fight. 
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makes immigrants who are physically present and identify with the territory of the host state 
in sociocultural and other ways, strangers (also see Brubaker, 1992). Furthermore, citizenship 
on the basis of legal status is not only narrow and exclusionary, but also fundamentally 
divisive as it results in the fragmentation of the diasporic community according to the 
different statuses they hold (see Pasura, 2008). Different categories of the community are 
often granted different status such as ‘illegal’, ‘asylum seeker’, ‘refugee’, ‘permanent 
resident’, ‘dependent’ and so on; and one of the implications of this is that it creates internal 
inequalities within the diaspora community itself.  
This tendency undermines the assumed principle of equality of status among all 
citizens, as is assumed by principle of liberal citizenship (Marshall, 1949; Thomas, 2002). In 
addition to pre-existing social hierarchies along lines of gender, class, ethnicity and region, 
imposed legal status adds another dimension in ways that further fracture the diaspora. This 
segmentation of the diaspora according to legal status also invalidates notions of diasporas 
as a ‘community’ or ‘long distance nationalists’, as proposed by some scholars (see Laguerre, 
1998). This kind of imposed fracturing, also partly contributes to the difficulty diasporas often 
find in mobilising to speak with one ‘voice’ on various matters affecting them, in their 
engagements with the host and home country states (see Pasura, 2008). Let me turn the 
different ways diasporas become citizens, starting with their political expressions of 
citizenship while outside their country.  
1.4.1.2 Diasporic Citizenship as Political Participation 
As part of this liberal, materialist tradition, diasporas can also perform citizenship by 
way of political participation. However, most of the scholarship thinks of political participation 
in materialist terms, emphasising overt political activism of diasporas aimed at the home 
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country state. For example, emphasis is often placed on how diasporas find it possible to 
engage in various political activities aimed at influencing homeland politics (Ostergaard-
Nielsen, 2001; Kuhlmann, 2008; Baubock, 2003). This represents a republicanist variant of this 
liberal mode of citizenship, which tends to emphasise the political activism of citizens within 
organised civil society on subnational, national and transnational scales, but with the same 
purpose of influencing the state and mainstream political processes ( Yuval-Davies, 1999; 
Tarrow, 2005; also see Thomas, 2002; Kuhlmann, 2008).15 This thesis recognises that indeed 
partaking in political life constitutes an important way of enacting citizenship.  
However, this thesis mainly contributes to debates on how diaspora political 
participation (as an expression of citizenship), is performed. Recognising how fragmented 
they frequently are, this thesis further argues that diasporas partake in political life in multiple 
ways.  By exiting their countries of origin, transnational migrants become exposed to new 
citizenship statuses allowing them to participate in political processes aimed at influencing 
homeland politics, especially those hosted in ostensibly more democratic states in the global 
north (see Baubock, 2006; Kuhlmann, 2008; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Castles and Davidson, 
2000). Political activities they engage in include diaspora voting, running for political office 
(Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Kuhlmann, 2008). This likely resonates with past experience with 
political activism prior to their departure from their home country. In particular those hosted 
in countries with democratic political cultures and spaces are allowed to partake in active 
forms of political mobilisation. 
                                                          
15 This variant resonates with scholarship on diaspora political participation and transnational political 
activism. 
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  As I indicated earlier, some categories of the diaspora are more likely to engage in 
overt forms of political activism than others depending on their context, individual 
circumstances, past experiences, gender and other factors. Diasporas participate in homeland 
electoral politics in different ways including forming political parties, voting and sourcing 
party funding (Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008; Pasura, 2008; Lafleur, 2013). Similarly, those 
empowered to do so will enact their citizenship by partaking in different kinds of political 
activism such as organised protests, petitions, demonstrations, boycotts and other activities 
targeted at both the host and home country governments, as observed among diasporas in 
different contexts (Baubock, 2003; Betts and Jones, 2016; Pasura, 2008). Again, this is not the 
only other way of expressing citizenship neither are these conventional forms of political 
activism the only ones by which diasporas become political. Such an emphasis on the political, 
rights and legal status aspects of citizenship obscures its multifaceted-ness and everydayness. 
At least two criticisms can be levelled against this way of thinking about citizenship. 
Firstly, it shares the state-centricity observed in relation to status-based citizenship, 
particularly discussing diaspora political participation (as an expression of citizenship) 
predominantly in terms of seeking to influence homeland political processes (see Kuhlmann, 
2008; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008). Therefore, this conception of 
what it means to participate politically is somewhat narrow as it often only focusses on 
material elements of politics, thus ignoring discursive and other ways by which diasporas can 
be political (see Dorman, 2016; Fortier, 2016). For these and many other reasons, this thesis 
acknowledges that some sections of the diaspora may perform their citizenship in this way; 
however, it also recognises that not all diasporas can influence politics by way of conventional 
modes of political participation such as diaspora voting, political party membership and 
engaging in conventional forms of political activism. Instead, this thesis holds that 
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disengagement from overt forms of political activism and mobilisation does not suggest 
passivity or inactivity. Rather, diasporas potentially engage in other forms of political activity, 
beyond formal political processes.   
While this thesis acknowledges the importance of political participation as one of the 
ways diasporas perform their citizenship, it suggests that only a minority are able to engage 
this way. This is due to historical, structural, institutional and other impediments making it 
difficult for most of diasporas with or without formal citizenship status to partake in politics 
both of the host and home country. Beyond the materialist conception of diaspora politics 
discussed earlier, this thesis also suggests that diasporas can be political in different other 
ways, including discursively (see Fortier, 2016). In other words, these sections not actively 
engaging with mainstream political processes are characterised by Pasura (2008) as a 
dormant section of the diaspora, can easily be mistaken as powerless or unwilling to influence 
political processes.16 However, this thesis argues that these seemingly inactive diasporas still 
find less overtly political ways of being political, such as engaging in everyday discussions, 
online and offline, political talk as an informal expression of political preferences (Wright, 
2017; also see Crush, 2016; Peel, 2010; Willems, 2009; 2011). This represents a less risky, 
popular and convenient way of engaging discursively in politics, without necessarily overtly 
antagonising the government of the country of origin (see Wright et al, 2017; Willems, 2009).  
This relates to James Scott’s recognition that chronically oppressed and excluded 
people, particularly from backgrounds of oppression as is the case with Zimbabwean 
diaspora, find ways of being political aimed at resisting, contesting and exposing the 
unreasonableness of actions of their oppressors (Scott, 1985; Spivak, 1988; Mbembe, 2001). 
                                                          
16 Based on Pasuras empirical study of Zimbabweans in the UK. 
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To help us understand how a minority of diasporas, often with legal status, with experience 
of partaking in political activism and of higher socioeconomic status and hosted in countries 
conducive for their engagement in formal politics and political activism, the ‘Big P’/’small p’ 
might be a helpful conceptual framework as it illustrates the different ways in which diasporas 
can be political (see Flint, 2003). As a conceptual binary, it is still not nuanced enough to 
capture other diverse ways diasporas perform their citizenship, including discursively.  
Given how dispersed diasporas tend to be, being hosted across different countries 
away from home, direct (in-situ) participation in homeland becomes limited by geographical 
distance and other factors. However, the internet is one of the factors making it possible for 
diasporas to connect and engage epistemically, by way of exchanging of information and 
ideas regarding homeland politics (Haas, 2011; Mansbridge, 1999; Dahlgren, 2005; Pasura, 
2008; also see Peel, 2010).17 As such this study also considers how diasporas engage in 
everyday political talk (both online and offline), just to demonstrate how important political 
subjectivities are for diasporas. 
 In this context, thanks to the internet and existence of civic spaces for engagement in 
some host countries, diasporas often find online and offline spaces to talk, comment, joke 
and debate about the state, political actors and other political objects, without directly 
engaging the state or partaking in political activism on platforms created by organised civil 
society (Crick, 2000; Sloam, 2014; Wright, 2017). The relationship between online and offline 
forms of political engagement and mobilisation is a subject for debate, and this thesis will not 
delve into those debates. However, it is worth highlighting that some scholars found online 
                                                          
17 There is empirical evidence to support this tendency among Zimbabwean diaspora. For example, Pasura 
(2008) observes a section of Zimbabweans in the UK engaging in cyberpolitics; Clayton Peel also makes the 
same tendency among Zimbabweans of Ndebele and mixed-race origin.   
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and offline engagement mutually inextricable and reinforcing. For example, vernacular 
political discourses, can be useful in political conscientisation, awareness raising and 
mobilisation, which in turn potentially spurs those diasporas into overt forms of political 
activism (see Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Shah et al, 2005).  
It is also important to note that internet-based political talk does not always reflect 
experiences of everyone among diasporas, but resonates with relatively educated, young and 
socioeconomically advantaged sections of the diaspora who tend to have greater access to 
the internet. However, mobile technologies have been developing rapidly and now mobile 
platforms such as WhatsApp have also opened up for previously deprived citizens, including 
in rural parts of Zimbabwe (see Willems, 2009). The use of these technologies and platforms 
has not been limited to social networking, but also political conversations across geographical 
distance.  Diasporas also engage in other kinds of citizenship practice, beyond seeking to 
directly or indirectly influencing mainstream politics. Having considered some of the 
dominant ways of thinking about citizenship, as practiced by diasporas, the next section 
considers other modes of citizenship for diasporas, outside the realms of the state. 
1.4.1.3 Diasporic Citizenship as Everyday Social Practice 
Diaspora citizenship, including its transnational dimension, has an everyday logic. Even 
those that seemingly face exclusion from the state, do find ways of performing citizenship. 
The majority of those ordinary migrants particularly resort to what might be characterised as 
everyday forms of citizenship (see Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011; Dickinson, et al, 2008; 
Desforges et al, 2005). There has been a renewed focus on the ‘everyday’ as a realm of 
citizenship in geography and sociology, having been overlooked for decades due to difficulties 
associated with researching people’s everyday lives (Jacobsen, 2009). And my suspicion is 
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that, with its penchant to focus on institutions, processes and other aspects of macro-politics, 
the discipline of political science potentially still lags behind in developing analytical and 
conceptual tools for understanding lived political realities of ordinary people.   
Nevertheless, the premise of everyday citizenship is that non-citizens and other 
excluded groups who find it difficult to perform citizenship by engaging directly with the state, 
still find ways of acting as citizens (Isin, 2008; Oldfield, 1990; Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011). 
Seemingly non-political and inconsequential everyday practices often bear profound 
implications to the relationship between those ordinary people and both the host state and 
country of origin (see Beaman, 2017; also see Tarrow, 2005; Stasiulis and Bakan, 1997). 
Through everyday practices, diasporas are able to contest their exclusion both within the host 
country and back home, while also becoming a survival strategy in contexts where the state 
does not guarantee livelihood security to non-citizens (see Riccio and Russo, 2011; also see 
Mbiba, 2005; McGregor, 2008; Crush et al, 2005; Gastrow and Amit, 2015).18 Citizenship, in 
this constellation, is not separable from day to day lives of ordinary people forming the 
diaspora. 
This way of thinking about citizenship is also characterised by its emphasis on the  
bottom-up and informal nature as they occur outside the realms of the state, contrary to 
state-centric modes of citizenship discussed above (see Hopkins, 2011; Dickinson, et al, 2008; 
Laguerre, 1998; Isin, 2008).19 By being not directly centred on the state, alternative vehicles 
through which this mode of citizenship is practiced include social, kinship, clan and 
                                                          
18 Riccio and Russo (2011) observed similar tendencies by second-generation immigrant youths in Italy, using 
everyday social practices to negotiate inclusion into Italian society. They also use these as a way of struggle to 
realise socioeconomic opportunities and social mobility in the context of exclusion.  
19 This conception of citizenship builds on Laguerre (1998) and Isin and Turner’s (2008) observations that the 
practice of citizenship is not limited to the state. 
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nationality-based networks, as well as organised civil society (see Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 
2012; also see Tarrow, 2005). This study does not seek to engage in any deeper analysis of 
the role of organised civil society, but places more emphasis on unorganised and mundane 
daily social practices of diasporas in local communities they are settled. 
It is also negotiated through daily relationships and transactions with other societal 
actors in various social spaces such as marketplace, workplace, local community and so on 
(Stasiulis and Bakan, 1997; also see Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012). In this constellation, 
diasporas assume new roles, identities, rights and substantive benefits out of these 
interactions, hence begin to extend the boundaries of their citizenship (see Riccio and Russo, 
2011). Everyday citizenship is also one of the most fluid and elastic conceptions of citizenship, 
compared to status-based citizenship with rigid citizen/non-citizen boundaries, which makes 
it a useful strategy by which marginalised diasporas negotiate inclusion in host society (see 
Beaman, 2017).  
Also, everyday citizenship is not always institutionally mediated occurring in spaces 
created by the state, NGOs or associations, as is the case with status-based citizenship, but 
constitutes an integral part of ordinary people’s everyday struggles for survival (see Riccio and 
Russo, 2011; also see Dickinson, 2008). This ties with my earlier observation that even legal 
status, livelihoods and other aspects related to diaspora citizenship are not always 
automatically granted by the host state, as implied by status-based scholarship (see Bosniak, 
2000; Baubock, 2006). In the next sections, I discuss the everydayness of different spheres of 
diaspora life, just to demonstrate the usefulness of this way of thinking about diaspora 
citizenship.  
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Diaspora citizenship also has a substantive and material dimension, not only 
concerned with identitarian and discursive expressions. While most scholarship tends to 
emphasise the politico-legal aspects of citizenship discussed earlier, welfare and livelihood 
opportunities constitute an important element of citizenship form migrants escaping from 
poverty seeking survival, as is often the case with Zimbabweans most of whom were pushed 
out of the country by socioeconomic deprivation (see Betts, 2014; also see Crush and Tevera, 
2010; Kpessa et al, 2011). This represents a Marshallian variant of this conception of 
citizenship provides that the state guarantees the welfare and livelihood opportunities to its 
formally recognised citizens (Bellamy, 2008; Marshall, 1949). This explains why access to 
employment, particularly the right to work, becomes a critical component of migrants’ 
struggles for legal status, including terms and conditions of stay attached to those statuses.  
Welfare guarantees in the form of access to public services, housing, access to public 
health (such as HIV/AIDS treatment) and support for vulnerable sections of diaspora 
community, also become an important expectation for diasporas from countries where 
welfare systems would have collapsed as is often the case with Zimbabweans (see Polzer-
Ngwato and Jinnah, 2012; Crush and Tevera, 2010; also see Kpessa, et al, 2011). Access to 
welfare, livelihoods and other socioeconomic opportunities represents a critical aspect of 
citizenship for diasporas, not only for their survival in the host country but also to be able to 
support their relatives back home through financial and other kinds of household remittances 
(see Landau, 2005; Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012; von Burgsdoff, 2010). This, therefore, 
explains why diasporas hosted in any context always take seriously the importance of gaining 
any kind of legal status that would allow them the right to live and work in the host country. 
Even when denied the right to work by the host state, the importance attached to this 
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substantive component of citizenship by diasporas, also explain why those without residency 
permits allowing them to work find ways of contesting such statuses and changing the terms 
and conditions of their permits so that they somehow are able to look after themselves. 
The above Marshallian conception of citizenship has its own limitations, however, 
particularly in relation to how diasporas access livelihood and welfare opportunities outside 
the country. For example, the notion of the state as a provider does not always match the 
realities of diasporas, particularly those without legal status who are not entitled to these 
substantive benefits and opportunities associated with citizenship. The role of the state in 
welfare has been limited in many African countries, compared to some countries in western 
Europe with intact welfare systems (Freund, 2007; Kpessa et al, 2011; Mkandawire, 2010). 
This has been a result of a range of factors including economic problems induced by neoliberal 
structural adjustment programmes and economic mismanagement, resulting in diminished 
employment opportunities in the formal sectors of the economy, poor service delivery and 
weak welfare systems, in some of the migrant hosting countries on the African continent (see 
Turok, 2007; Freund, 2007; Kpessa, et al 2011). 
 In this context, this means that not only diasporas but also citizens find it difficult to 
access welfare and livelihood opportunities. And therefore, while some migrants find it easier 
to access welfare and livelihood guarantees, particularly those hosted in countries with strong 
welfare systems and with stable legal status, there is bound to be others denied access. 
Instead of relying on the state for granting access to welfare and livelihoods, those diasporas 
with limited access to these opportunities due to their legal status and other factors find 
alternative ways of sustaining themselves in their everyday lives. For example, some of those 
in abject conditions  often end up resorting to other providers outside the state such as the 
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market, social networks and NGOs among other civil society actors (McGregor, 2008; Nyers, 
2011; Polzer, 2012; Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012; Misago, 2010). Others, living in abject 
conditions, often resort to informal social and kinship networks for support with their day to 
day needs while outside Zimbabwe (Muzondidya, 2006; Mbiba, 2011; Polzer, 2012; Jinnah 
and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012). Concepts of abject and everyday citizenship are just some of the 
useful tools for a deeper understanding the experiences of these sections of the diaspora who 
live on the margins of the host societies (Nyers, 2011; Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011; 
Hepworth, 2012).  The next section discusses yet another way by which diaspora citizenship 
is subjectively and differently felt among diasporas hosted in different contexts.  
1.4.1.4 Diasporic Citizenship as Senses of Belonging 
Diaspora citizenship also has an identitarian-attitudinal dimension, in addition to legal 
status, political participation and mundane social practices discussed above (see Wodak and 
Krzyzanowski, 2007; Bocaggni, 2012; Fortier, 2016; also see McGregor, 2010). In addition to 
being a material reality experienced by diasporas, citizenship is also constructed through 
senses of belonging (see Fortier, 2016; Laguerre, 1998; Beaman, 2017). Anthias defines 
belonging as ‘the sense of being accepted or being a full member’; and ‘a sense of intimacy’ 
and love for that particular community which they see as their ‘home’ (Bocaggni, 2012; also 
see Anthias, 2006). What this tells us is that communities in which migrants seek or claim to 
belong also have their boundaries marking who belongs and who does not (see Yuval Davis 
2006). Another more elastic understanding of belonging is that which is offered by Yuval Davis 
who defines it as being ‘about feeling ‘at home’ and …about feeling ‘safe’’ (Yuval-Davis, 
2006:2). People feel ‘at home’ and ‘safe’ in different places, and these feelings are mediated 
by circumstances and other factors.   
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Therefore, these senses of belonging are perhaps the most fluid and flexible aspects 
of diaspora citizenship, particularly in the sense that they can be directed towards more than 
one country and change rapidly (see Bocaggni, 2012; Anderson, 1991; also see McGregor, 
2010).20  Unlike legal citizenship based on legal status and other material bases, this mode of 
citizenship is not fixed, but constantly fluid, unstable and uncertain subject to various factors 
including place, time and context. These senses of belonging also form the basis for claiming 
identity, based on what individual members of the diaspora subjectively feel in relation to 
both the host and home countries. And such identity claims can be justified and legitimised 
on a variety of bases (both real and perceived), including perceived contributions to society, 
sociocultural proximity and other various of bases.  
These subjectively constructed senses of belonging are not arbitrarily imposed by the 
state, as is the case with legal status, which makes them an epitome of individual autonomy 
(see Fortier, 2016). These subjective constructions can also represent a way of contesting 
exclusion and marginalisation within host country, but also back in the country of origin. In 
other words, although structural and institutionalised forms of exclusion may be operating in 
both societies, these subjective senses of belonging can serve as an endogenous resource 
through which diasporas challenge and reject those marginalising societal forces. We have 
seen in the foregoing sections of this chapter that indeed citizenship has many faces and can 
be imagined and practiced in multiple, not necessarily mutually exclusive, ways. Another 
dimension of the fragmentation of diaspora citizenship relates to the multiplicity of sites in 
which it is practiced.  
                                                          
20 For McGregor (2010), diaspora communities are products of historical, political and other processes through 
which ideas of belonging are defined by way of a shared national imaginary.  
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1.4.2 Multiple Arenas of Diasporic Citizenship 
As I noted earlier, the liberal citizenship is universally state-centric as it assumes 
everyone engages with the state to access citizenship. This, makes it imperative to think about 
alternative opportunities for diasporas to act as citizens while outside the country (see 
Laguerre, 1998; Fortier, 2016). Although the state remains important in mediating certain 
aspects of diaspora lives including the granting of permission to enter, settle and work in the 
host country, not everyone is in a position to engage with the state for other substantive 
benefits associated with citizenship while in the host country. Different sections will relate 
and engage differently with the state, and they will hold varying perceptions about the state 
depending on their backgrounds and circumstances, immigration status, socioeconomic 
status, gender and so on.  This thesis, however, notes how citizenship of the majority of 
diasporas generally shifts from the nation-state to other spaces above and below the state 
(Desforges et al, 2005; Laguerre, 1998; Miraftab, 2004; Yuval-Davies, 1999). In other words, 
citizenship claims and practices of diasporas are not always directed at their territorially-
bounded nation-state only, as suggested by liberal conceptions of citizenship. And various 
new opportunities for diasporas to engage have been considered.  
Firstly, other liberal universalist variants of this status-based citizenship argue that the 
state is no longer the arena of citizenship in a globalising world, but other arenas are thought 
to be emerging at the supranational and global scales (Soysal, 1994; Tarrow, 2005; Hopkins 
and Blackwood, 2011; Dickinson et al, 2008). Concomitantly, it is believed that a transnational 
civil society in which transnational migrants can partake with an aim of influencing 
supranational and global institutions of governance (Tarrow, 2005). However, this is not 
always the case with all migrants due to lack of empowerment to enable them to engage in 
46 | P a g e  
 
politics above the level of the state (Jones and Gaventa, 2007). Instead, some immigrants 
tactically rely on the above broader discourses of citizenship framework to claim rights and 
entitlement, allowing them to effectively become more embedded and contest exclusion 
within the host society (see Landau and Freemantle, 2004; Muzondidya, 2006; also see Mbiba, 
2005). It is apparent that not everyone has an equal chance and capacity to perform 
citizenship by way of legal status, rights and welfare, as liberal scholarship tends to suggest; 
but some will partake in political activism, while others would have to find alternative ways 
of performing citizenship. 
 Another discourse on how the site of citizenship changes as a result of transnational 
migration ties with the transnational nature of diasporas, discussed earlier. In this 
configuration, the locus of their citizenship no longer occurs through the engagement of the 
diaspora and the host state with the latter seeking to integrate into the host society, but social 
and political lives of diasporas straddle the host and home country in a dynamic way thanks 
to ICTs, globalisation and other related factors (Laguerre, 1998; Tarrow, 2005). Diaspora 
citizenship, therefore, becomes transnationalised by way of sustained bottom-up 
transnational practices, political participation, legal status in the form of dual citizenship and 
so on (see Levitt, 2004; Tarrow, 2005; Baubock, 2006).  
Although some diasporas may become embedded and assimilated into the host 
society permanently, not everyone shares this desire which explains why these diasporas 
simultaneously sustain transnational politico-legal links and connections with their countries 
of origin, as has been observed in different contexts (Baubock, 2006; Manby, 2009; Geyer, 
1996). Therefore, one defining feature of diaspora citizenship relates to its transnational in 
nature (see Laguerre, 1998). However, this tendency by migrants to sustain transnational links 
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with their home countries often becomes a source of antagonism between diasporas, and 
nativist and exclusionary forces within host countries.  
Apart from its transnational dimension, diaspora citizenship does not exclusively 
revolve around the state, but diasporas find other arenas of citizenship outside the state 
(Laguerre, 1998; Desforges et al, 2005). While some scholars emphasise the upward rescaling 
of the locus of citizenship resulting in its trans-nationalisation, this thesis places more 
emphasis on the rescaling that occurs downwards to encompass invented, localised and 
informal spaces where citizenship is imagined, practiced and contested as part of their 
everyday lives (see Tarrow, 2005; Gaventa, 2006; Desforges et al, 2005; Painter and Philo, 
1995). While diasporas settled in countries where modes of citizenship tend to be state-
centric in terms of the liberal tradition are likely to find it opportune and easier to engage 
directly with the state (as citizens), those hosted in contexts of exclusion and marginalisation 
may not have the same opportunity (see Desforges et al, 2005; Von Lieres and Piper, 2014). 
Of course, several other factors such as class, socioeconomic status and gender among others, 
determine whether different sections of the diaspora are in a position to engage directly with 
the state (or with institutions at other levels of governance above it), or whether they resort 
to everyday spaces of citizenship, particularly if they are disempowered non-citizens.  
This thesis also holds that state-centred citizenship is problematic for the majority of 
diasporas, at least in the African context where the state often represents a tool of repression, 
corruption and violence to be avoided, evaded or cheated both in the host country and home 
country (see Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Ake, 1992; Chazan, 1997; Azarya, 1988; Sachikonye, 
2011).  It would, therefore, be difficult to anticipate whether diasporas whose origins are in 
such dysfunctional states, will have a strong inclination towards engaging with the state. It is 
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important to point out, however, that this cannot be generalised because some diasporas, 
depending on the nature of state and dominant political cultures in host countries, may hold 
patrimonial conceptions of the state, seeing it as a provider and guarantor of their success in 
their daily lives. In short, not all diasporas hate the state, but some look up to it for the 
requisite legal status allowing them to live and work among many other necessities for their 
survival outside their home country.   
As such, because of citizenship deficiencies in countries where diasporas originate,  
citizenship (as practiced by the majority of African diasporas) becomes decentred, 
downscaled and localised, to include platforms and sites beyond and below the level of the 
nation-state (Desforges et al, 2005; Laguerre, 2000; Tarrow, 2005; also see Eke, 1975; 
Bhandari, 2006; Obadare, 2004).21 These new arenas below the nation-state level do not 
always pre-exist and are not always in the form of organised platforms such as transnational 
civil society straddling the host country, due to the limits of civil society  (see Obadare, 2004). 
Instead, these highly informal spaces are often invented as part of diasporas’ everyday lives 
(see Miraftab, 2004; Cornwall, 2004; Gaventa, 2006). They may also include relationships, 
transactions and interactions with local community structures and people.  
As such some diasporas will perform their citizenship through host country (and 
transnational) NGOs, social movements, diaspora associations; but also through daily 
platforms such as social and kinship networks, local communities, marketplace and workplace 
among other spaces where citizenship outcomes can be achieved (see Cornwall, 2002; 
Tarrow, 2005; also see Muzondidya, 2006). In short, with or without organised civil society 
                                                          
21 Diasporas often come from countries with more than one public, where some engage effectively with the 
state and other sections do not. The rest have to find alternative and less formal spaces to engage, including 
organised civil society and the everyday. 
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support, ordinary members of the diaspora community find spaces to perform their 
citizenship wherever they are hosted. Diasporas utilise these spaces to realise needs for their 
daily survival, support their transnational practices, and contesting their exclusion both within 
the host country and back home. Therefore, engagement in these alternative sites presents 
an opportunity for diasporas to act as citizens outside the state, even in countries they are 
not formally recognised as citizens in terms of their legal status, rights and entitlements. 
As I noted earlier, diasporic citizenship is transnational in nature, but those 
transnational practices in which diasporas engage are not always directed at (or mediated by) 
both the home country and host country states. Instead, in addition to daily interactions with 
non-immigrant, fellow immigrants and compatriots within the host country, transnational 
practices of diasporas also constitute a part of their day to day interactions, relationships and 
transactions often sustained in these alternative spaces of citizenship across territorial 
borders (see Nyers, 2011; Bocagnni, 2012). Marginalised diasporas, for example, often avoid 
the state and its formal structures, opting for social, kinship and nationality-based networks, 
when engaging in remittance sending, communication, social interactions, cross-border 
trading and different other kinds of practices towards their countries of origin.  
1.5 Concluding Discussion 
This introductory chapter argued that transnational migration results from failure of 
modes of national citizenship, and the movement of people across territorial borders 
reconfigures the practice of citizenship. For one, those migrants often cease to be a coherent 
nation outside its territorial borders, but develop multiple and fluid identities qualifying them 
as diasporic communities. This thesis suggests another dimension of the diasporic nature of 
transnational migrants, and that relates to the way(s) they become (or fail to become) citizens 
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while outside the country. National citizenship assumes that everyone universally belongs in 
the state often by ways of formal citizenship status accompanied by a set of citizenship rights.  
However, this thesis argues that, once outside the county, different categories of the 
diaspora become citizens in different and multiple ways. These multiple and different 
expressions of citizenship by diasporas are characterised by the multiplicity of arenas and 
scales at which it occurs, with the majority of those unable to engage the state resorting to 
everyday spaces and practices of citizenship outside the direct ambit of the state. These 
fragmented modes of citizenship were observed empirically during six months of fieldwork I 
conducted with a total of 145 Zimbabweans living in South Africa and the UK from February 
to August 2015. The following chapter sets out the methodological framework of this study 
in greater detail, including reflections on experiences and lessons learned about fieldwork in 
general. 
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Chapter Two: Researching Diasporic Citizenship: Methods, Experiences and Challenges  
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter discusses the sampling and qualitative data gathering techniques used 
during the field research phase of this study. I used a mixture of non-random sampling 
techniques - purposive and snowballing. I also used multiple data collection techniques such 
as focus groups, interviewing and participant observation among others, which I will discuss 
in greater detail in the following sections. This chapter also contains reflections on my 
fieldwork experiences with methodological and practical lessons on how to conduct research 
with marginalised migrants of the diaspora, particularly in the South African context. Although 
fieldwork in the UK had a number of peculiar lessons associated with it, I felt my experiences 
in South Africa were more fascinating and intriguing, as it would hopefully become apparent 
in this stand-alone chapter.  
Some of the lessons learnt are as follows: the need for deliberate efforts to identify 
and negotiate access to marginalised sections of migrants so that they take part in research; 
secondly, creating space for them to speak and make their voices heard during the research 
process, which was far harder; and thirdly, being reflexive and sensitive to biases, identity 
differences and power dynamics. This chapter also highlights the importance of fieldwork 
planning and the ability to anticipate potential risks, pitfalls and opportunities before arriving 
in the field. It also highlights ethical and other issues that arose during fieldwork experience 
in South Africa, and the implications these may have to our understanding of how diaspora 
citizenship is researched in South Africa and other contexts where majority of diasporas tend 
to live on the margins of society. 
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2.2 Methodological Assumptions 
As I stated earlier, this thesis is not only conceptual but also empirical in design, thus 
a robust methodological framework is required to collect data that enables the answering of 
the above question(s). This qualitative study is not only conceptually grounded, but also 
empirically rigorous and systematic. For example, I have also highlighted earlier, conceptually, 
the different ways in which diasporas can perform citizenship including through legal status, 
political participation, mundane daily social practices and subjectively through senses of 
belonging. Thus, recognising this multidimensionality and fragmented nature of citizenship, 
as practiced by diasporas, one of the assumptions underpinning the design of this study was 
that diaspora citizenship is not only material, but also encompasses subjectivities (see Della 
Porta and Keating, 2008). Therefore, diverse data collection tools had to be used which would 
enable an understanding not only of how diasporas overtly practise citizenship through a 
variety of political, socio-legal and sociocultural practices, but also how they imagine and feel 
about citizenship in terms of their sentimental and affective connections they sustain with 
the host and home country. 
I have also noted how the state is no longer the exclusive arena in which citizenship is 
performed, with other sites of citizenship opening below (and above) the state, forming part 
of ordinary people’s everyday lives outside the state. It was, therefore, critically important to 
use methods that enabled an exploration of everyday aspects of migrant life outside the 
realms of direct interaction with the state.  In terms of positionality, the best methodology 
would be that which would position me, as the researcher, as close to the researched diaspora 
community as possible in order to fully understand how they go about their daily lives (see 
Bourke, 2014; Ganga and Scott, 2006; Wolcott, 1995). Furthermore, marginalised sections of 
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society tend to be ignored in research, and some sections of the diaspora (such as 
undocumented persons and those living in squalid and relatively inaccessible urban spaces) 
fit in this category (Given, 2008). This recognition is important when researching the plight of 
migrants hosted in hostile societies where some sections of the population endure poverty, 
violence and different forms of exclusion in their daily lives, as is the case in South Africa. 
  In the above context, given how excluded and alienated South Africa-based 
Zimbabweans tend to be due to their identities and circumstances, the methodology of this 
study was guided by the need for the research process, and the emerging knowledge, to be 
as transformative and empowering as possible (see Liamputtong, 2010; Given, 2008; also see 
Hungwe, 2013). In doing so, this study was designed not only for ends of knowledge 
generation, but also as a tool for empowerment aimed at advancing social justice ends, as 
others have acknowledged (see Lorenzetti, 2013; Given, 2008). This is often achieved through 
the use of transformative qualitative methodologies, which seek to address skewed power 
relationships entrenched within researched populations’ everyday lives and specific social 
relationships forming part of the research processes (see Finley, 2008; Given, 2008). 
Researchers operating in a transformational mode ought to ask themselves some of the 
following reflexive questions: who is included in their study and why; whose voice is heard, 
and are minority segments of the community under study given space in the study (see Finley, 
2008). The next section explains why I decided to focus on Zimbabweans in both South Africa 
and the UK. 
2.3 Why Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK? 
There is no doubt migration and its related phenomena represent a fascinating area 
of study across the world at present, and the focus of study could have been on any migrant 
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population hosted in different popular destination countries and regions. However, I decided 
to examine the experiences of Zimbabweans settled in three locations within two countries – 
Johannesburg and Cape Town (South Africa) and South-East England (UK).  My decision to 
focus on Zimbabweans, was based on a number of considerations. Firstly, given the 
infeasibility of researching and generalising about the experiences of the entire migrant 
population given how diverse their experiences often are (see Levy and Lemeshaw, 2008; 
Barbie, 2008), I decided to narrow down my focus to Zimbabwean migrants (constituting a 
sizeable migrant population).  
The decision to focus on Zimbabweans was motivated by a number of factors. My own 
past personal experiences, having lived for five years as an asylum seeker in South Africa and 
being subjected to injustices and xenophobia. Familiarity with both locations also influenced 
my decision, having lived in South Africa and the UK for a number of years. A focus on a 
familiar research population located in spaces I am versed with would, therefore, make it 
practically and logistically convenient to navigate both research sites in these two countries. 
Also, the presence of sizable migrant populations in both countries whose plight constitutes 
a policy and practical challenge, also ensured that some of the knowledge generated on both 
cases would potentially have meaningful and practical implications.  As I indicated above, I 
examined experiences of Zimbabweans located in more than one site, specifically in 
Johannesburg, Cape Town and South-East England.  
Multi-siting, as an ethnographic method, would be accompanied by methodological 
benefits to this study, compared to a focus on a single site (Marcus, 1995). For example, a 
multi-sited study would allow me to examine cross-contextual variations and uniformities in 
modes of citizenship of Zimbabweans hosted in those different contexts, which is difficult to 
achieve using a one-sited focus (Saukko, 2003; Marcus, 1995). Multi-siting would also enable 
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the exploration of transnational practices, flows and connections, which would, in turn, help 
overcome methodological nationalism (the tendency to organise research within confined 
territorially bounded national spaces) which is rife in political research (see Glick-Schiller, 
1994). Instead, recognising how migration involves the transcendence of territorial borders, 
states and national communities, this study was designed to allow observation of 
Zimbabweans in more than one place. Having identified the broader population forming the 
focus of this study, it was important to identify a manageable sample on which to focus. 
2.4 Who Was Included in the Study: Sampling Techniques and Issues 
The process of selecting the participants was not unsystematic, but it was a matter of 
‘trial and error’ to a large degree. In identifying and selecting participants in this study, on-
random techniques such as purposive sampling and snowballing were primary techniques 
used. Snowballing uses personal contacts and social networks when identifying and selecting 
research participants, while purposive sampling enables the researcher to identify 
participants with pre-determined qualities that the researcher is interested in observing 
(Barbie, 2008; Given, 2008; Adler and Adler, 2001). In this regard, I found my own experiential 
knowledge of the research population and the spatial context in which the research was sited 
useful at this phase of the research process, as observed by other scholars (Given, 2008). I, 
therefore, relied on my own experiential knowledge of migrant life having lived in South Africa 
for more than 5 years as a migrant and a migrant rights campaigner. 
 I took advantage of my existing social, family and nationality-based networks to 
identify potential participants in the study. I was also able to identify and gain access to a 
significant number of Zimbabweans using formal and informal networks I built during my five-
year stay in South Africa (2009-2013) working as a migrant rights activist at PASSOP. I made 
use of my own contacts from one of the church groups for Zimbabweans based in Lower 
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Crossroads, with branches in Kraaifontein, Masiphumelele, DuNoon and Worcester and other 
places around the Western Cape Province. Its name is Boarneges Apostolic Church. A sizeable 
proportion of the participants were members of this church and their involvement alleviated 
some of the logistical and other related challenges I would have met without such networks 
and contacts.  
These strategies seemed to have worked better in Cape Town than Johannesburg, 
given my previous experience having lived and worked with immigrants in that location and 
general familiarity with Cape Town’s urban spaces, compared to Johannesburg and South-
East England where I had limited knowledge on its geography as well as how the Zimbabwean 
community was constituted and distributed across the city. On the other hand, identifying 
participants in South-East England was difficult due to a number of social complexities, 
including work commitments, childcare and other everyday commitments of Zimbabweans in 
the UK. Social networks also appeared less knit in the UK compared to South Africa, probably 
due to growing problems of social desolation, atomisation and work-life imbalance, in many 
western societies (Hickman et al, 2016). Although there could be other explanations on why 
social networks seem less vibrant in the Zimbabwean migrant community, this is not the 
preoccupation of this study. The point here is that most Zimbabweans I encountered were 
not in a position to refer me to other Zimbabweans beyond their family and work networks, 
as was the case in South Africa.  
In both Johannesburg and the UK, perhaps an effort to identify civil society groups, 
such as church organisations, political formations, NGOs and diaspora associations operating 
in these places, may have been helpful. This could have helped observe how they partake in 
political mobilisation, but the everyday and senses of belonging components of citizenship 
would require the researcher to be immersed in communities where Zimbabweans live. This 
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was the emphasis in this study. Nonetheless, the importance of collaboration with civil society 
was more evident in the Cape Town context, compared to Johannesburg and the UK.  
Working with civil society was helpful in identifying participants for the study, 
particularly in Cape Town where I had worked prior to the PhD research as a migrant rights 
campaigner. This kind of collaboration between civil society and the academy has been 
acknowledged by other researchers in other contexts, especially if the outcomes of research 
are to have a more direct impact on practice (Polzer, 2012; Kapiszewski et al, 2015; Bastow et 
al, 2014; Legault and Vanderplaat, 2008). I, therefore, associated closely with a local civil 
society organisation based in Cape Town known as PASSOP, working with immigrants of 
different nationalities (including Zimbabweans), for information on the sociodemographic 
and other profiles of Zimbabweans around Cape Town. Again, this strategy was not as 
effective in Johannesburg and the UK due to a geographical bias among migrant and refugee 
NGOs which tend to be concentrated in metropoles in both places.  
Furthermore, in an attempt to make the study transformative, it became important to 
use purposive sampling to specifically target and include marginalised sections of the migrant 
population in the study. This would respond to the observed tendency for marginalised and 
vulnerable sections of society to be excluded from research (Williamson, 2008). In this vein, I 
recognised the existence of an acutely marginalised and vulnerable section of the migrant 
population, particularly Zimbabweans in South Africa, some of whose day to day life 
experiences and struggles for survival are often concealed from many studies (Adida, 2014). 
Invisible sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora often include women, undocumented and 
those living in places that are difficult to access for different reasons such as crime-infested 
black townships in Johannesburg, Cape Town and other parts of South Africa (See Morreira, 
2010). I was, therefore, able to identify and select samples of 80 participants in Cape Town; 
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40 participants in Johannesburg; and 25 participants in the Blackwater Valley (Aldershot, 
Camberley, Farnborough, Bordon) and St Albans (South East England). The next section 
discusses how participants were accessed, including some of the limitations and ways of 
overcoming them.  
2.4.1 Negotiating Access to Participants: Methodological and 
Practical Considerations 
Identifying a suitable sample of research participants based on a sampling framework 
was not a straightforward process, but getting them to actually participate in the study was 
more challenging, as some researchers attest (see Liamputtong, 2007; Denscombe, 2010). 
Having identified a suitable sample for the study, I had to grapple with these challenges 
related to access, with budgetary and time implications. For example, during fieldwork 
planning, I somewhat naively anticipated that being a Zimbabwean and having lived in South 
Africa and the UK would make the process of fieldwork straight forward, but that was far from 
what actually transpired. The actual process of getting sufficient numbers of participants with 
suitable qualities at the right time and place, turned out to be messier and more time-
consuming than I initially contemplated. It rather turned out to be an arduous and, in many 
ways, astonishing exercise during those three months I spent in South Africa, and I want to 
highlight, in the following sections.  
When I arrived in the field, I took a few steps designed to make access to participants 
easier. For example, I held a consultative meeting with PASSOP just to make them aware of 
what I was trying to achieve in my research. This also helped identifying where ‘hidden’ 
migrants were located and just finding out more about recent developments affecting 
migrants in general; explaining and popularising my research; and networking (see Bloch 
2007; Parrado et al. 2005). However, I could not do it as elaborately as planned due to time 
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and resource constraints. This study had various other potential biases relating to the 
accessibility of certain categories of Zimbabweans, which I had to be aware of and had to 
make efforts to circumvent. There is tendency for researchers, policy makers and 
practitioners to focus their attention on problems experienced in urban areas and overcoming 
this entrenched spatial bias would have been useful in this study (see Polzer, 2012; see Lipton, 
1984; 1977). The spatial focus of this study was primarily urban, due to time, resource and 
other limitations. 
By being unable to encompass Zimbabweans living in rural parts of South Africa and 
farming areas such as De Doorns in the Western Cape province as initially planned, I could 
have incorporated long-term residents, undocumented and circular labour migrants, often 
less educated Zimbabweans often from rural backgrounds back in Zimbabwe. The lived 
experiences of these sections of the migrant population outside large metropoles have been 
understudied, particularly the experiences of Zimbabweans living and working on the farms 
around the Cape Winelands in the Western Cape province (see Polzer, 2012). There are scant 
bodies of empirical work on experiences of Zimbabweans on the farms such as Blair 
Rutherford and Maxim Bolt, more work needs to be done (Rutherford, 2010; Bolt, 2011). 
Without any doubt, broadening the geographical scope of the study to these rural, peri-urban 
and farmland communities would have empirically enriched this study. Nevertheless, 
important methodological and empirical insights still emerged in the urban contexts which 
formed the primary focus of this study. 
Methods and strategies of accessing participants and gathering data are also shaped 
by spatial dynamics in any context. I observed that acute spatial disparities that characterise 
the South African society which often shape the scope of focus of researchers, would also 
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affect this study. Immigrants are generally thought to prefer living in inner city enclaves 
because of perceived safety and security, opportunities for better paying jobs, easy access to 
immigration offices and high density of services providers like rights groups representing 
migrants in close proximity (Mbiba, 2011; Mbiba, 2012; Polzer, 2012; see Lipton, 1977). On 
the other hand, black townships tend to be less accessible for researchers because of 
prevalence of crime and other factors, which explains the relatively limited amount work 
done on immigrants living in those places (see Polzer, 2012; Landau and Freemantle, 2004). 
There is also a related tendency by researchers to target those with valid and secure 
immigrations statuses, because those without are often difficult to locate, because they tend 
to live ‘under the radar’ in the townships (Polzer, 2012; Morreira, 2011). I therefore made 
deliberate efforts to incorporate these segments of the Zimbabwean population, and devised 
strategies to penetrate those places considered inaccessible by some researchers and 
practitioners.  
Concerns of security and safety pervaded the entire process of field research in South 
Africa. Considering how unsafe it tends to be in parts of South Africa, I had to employ some 
tactics aimed at avoiding being a victim. Firstly, I was constantly vigilant having anticipated 
and forethought about possible risks in such a context of violence and insecurity. All this was 
part of the risk assessment in the Geography Department, which forms part of the fieldwork 
planning process within the department. However, this was not enough; I had to deal with 
fear and anxiety throughout the process of fieldwork. Of course, I still had memories of 
muggings and petty crime in Phillipi and at the Refugee Reception Office before it moved from 
the Airport Industria to Maitland, and these past experiences fed into my own anxieties 
working in the townships.  
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However, I used everyday crime avoidance strategies derived from my past experience 
having lived in the townships of Langa, Khayelitsha and Lower Crossroads for a relatively long 
time prior to my move to the UK. Some of the tactics I employed included being ‘streetwise’ 
in terms of dressing and demeanour, by way of avoiding wearing expensive and fancy clothing 
and jewellery, not speaking in English language when in predominantly Xhosa, Sotho or Zulu 
speaking townships, not walking around with valuables such as wrist watches and 
smartphones, not walking about during night time, weekends and month-ends when people 
get paid because that is when petty criminals (‘amaskoli’) tended to be on the rampage. 
Other challenges were encountered relating to the context in which the study was conducted. 
For example, the restrictive immigration and socio-political environment pushed participants 
underground, while risks of violent crime made all the more difficult to navigate urban spaces 
in South Africa (Jacobsen and Landau, 2003). This is in contrast to the UK and other popular 
migrant destination countries where regularisation of stay is relatively easier.  
Given the difficulties associated with getting people to come forward voluntarily and 
share with me their experiences while in South Africa, I sought the collaboration of civil 
society organisations working with immigrants in South Africa, specifically PASSOP in Cape 
Town. Before embarking on my fieldwork, my expectation was that doing research while 
hosted by a civil society organisation in the migration sector has some advantages (see Polzer, 
2012). Firstly, PASSOP provided me with unrestrained access to a pool of Zimbabwean 
migrants coming to their offices for support, which made it easier to interact with participants 
in a relatively safe environment. I was also able to rely on their networks and contacts, as they 
allowed me access to their contact databases they often use when mobilising immigrants for 
protests and campaigns. They also provided me with access to their internet, telephone and 
office space, which was logistically useful. I was also able to work with PASSOP activists 
62 | P a g e  
 
responsible for outreach social integration of immigrants work across Cape Town, which 
presented me with quality opportunities for encounters with participants, while observing 
them at work.  
My experiences were slightly different in Johannesburg, where I resorted to the use 
of intermediaries to negotiate access to Zimbabweans in townships around Vosloorus and 
Boksburg. The inaccessibility of participants was compounded by the timing of the study, 
following the outbreak of xenophobic violence in parts of Johannesburg in April 2015, 
resulting in many non-South Africans becoming relatively invisible at the time. It was largely 
unsafe for both participants and myself to engage in public spaces, which threatened to derail 
my fieldwork plans in Johannesburg. With the help of intermediaries (Jabulani and Gregory), 
I managed to navigate areas such as Vosloorus, parts of which are notorious for petty crime 
and violence, without any problems.  
Having intermediaries did not only help identifying participants, but seemed to 
alleviate or minimise the fear, anxiety and suspicion between the researcher and the 
researched (see Bloch 2007; Polzer, 2012). However, though useful, the use of intermediaries 
came with its own downside. Intermediaries, for example, put me under some pressure to 
complete interviews quickly, while they also tended to take me to places they thought I would 
find ‘good’ interviewees. Clearly, identifying a sample is not enough when conducting field 
research, but a number of practical strategies become useful as a way of circumventing 
practical challenges associated with gaining access to the participants during fieldwork. The 
following section considers the actual data collection tools employed and the rationale behind 
their use.  
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2.5 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis 
The appropriateness of data collection techniques depended on whether they would 
allow me to achieve the aims of the study. I used diverse qualitative techniques I thought 
would enable an understanding of the fragmented nature of citizenship. As I noted earlier, 
citizenship encompasses a subjective dimension and therefore it was important to use tools 
allowing an exploration of participants’ subjectivities. Thirdly, given the everydayness of 
citizenship, techniques enabling the researcher to get as close to the daily lives of participants 
as possible were favoured.    
2.5.1 Semi-Structured Interviewing  
Semi-structured interviewing was the key technique used to collect data from 
participants, primarily due to its flexibility and possibility of further probing respondents (see 
Halperin and Heath, 2012; Barbie, 2007). The total number of interviews conducted was 145 
and the distribution of the interviews across the three research sites was as follows:  80 in 
Cape Town; 40 in Johannesburg; and 25 in South East England. The interviews were guided 
by a set of open-ended questions. There were also some slight variations in the nature of 
questions I asked in South Africa and the UK, due to contextual differences. Interviewing was 
aimed at probing the interviewees’ experiences and perceptions and other subjective 
elements in relation to how they felt towards the two host countries and Zimbabwe. I carried 
out these interviews on a one-to-one basis at different venues and places. In all interviews, I 
usually started off our conversations by a bit of an ‘ice-breaker’, which is thought useful for 
alleviating anxiety and making the respondent free to speak (Halperin and Heath, 2012; 
Barbie, 2007). I achieved this by way of asking general questions without anything to do with 
the research questions, just to get them to start talking.  
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The clarity of questions during interviews is always critical so that respondents may 
not feel awkward or ignorant caused by repeated failure to understand the question (Halperin 
and Heath, 2012). Hence, I was very sensitive about this and made an effort to be careful in 
the way I posed questions to ensure that they would be clear and unambiguous. Linguistic 
and cultural barriers also tend to present challenges during field research, especially when 
conducting cross-cultural studies (see Liamputtong, 2007). If not managed carefully, these 
barriers negatively affect the accessibility of certain information and the overall quality of 
data emerging from the study (Liamputtong, 2007). In designing this study, I was careful to 
recognise the multicultural and multilingual nature of Zimbabweans as a people in the 
interest of multiculturalism, but the participants were predominantly Shona-speaking (with a 
small proportion of multi-lingual individuals). This, therefore, meant there were no serious 
language and cultural issues to be sensitive to and to deal with during encounters with 
research participants.  
2.5.2 Focus Groups  
Data was also gathered by way of talking to people in small groups of six – eight people 
at a time, throughout the process. A total of 18 focus group meetings were convened as 
follows: eight in Cape Town, four in Johannesburg and six in the UK. Focus group discussions 
are often helpful when trying to understand the intersubjective dimensions of any particular 
phenomenon, especially shared and diverging views and perceptions (Halperin and Heath, 
2012). They are also considered flexible in that they could be used in combination with other 
techniques (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990), which made them particularly useful in 
combination with other qualitative techniques. However, focus groups, as a data gathering 
technique, have their own limitations as a technique. For example, there is always risk of 
groupthink where participants tend to agree with the dominant views expressed by the 
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majority; and powerful and articulate participants may capture and dominate discussions, 
while those without confidence to speak out may suppress their views and opinions (Barbie, 
2008; Halperin and Heath, 2012). 
 One aspect of focus group discussions which inspired my decision to use them, was 
the idea that, if managed well and given sufficient trust between both among participants 
themselves and between them and the researcher, participants would be more inclined to 
feel empowered to speak openly and freely (Rwegoshora, 2014). This was critical considering 
the sense of insecurity, disempowerment and vulnerability marginalised sections of the 
diaspora (undocumented, women) often feel (see Nyers, 2011; Morreira, 2011; Adida, 2014). 
It is important to realise, however, that empowerment is elusive, and knowing whether it has 
happened or not would be a difficult exercise. Nevertheless, the ability to speak out and have 
a voice would act as an indicator that empowerment had been achieved in this study.   
 Furthermore, while some researchers emphasise the disadvantages of divulging 
personal experiences and any other disclosures by the researcher during focus group 
discussions (see Halperin and Heath, 2012), doing so helped participants feel at ease and safe 
to discuss more openly. Disclosure of researcher identity also helps in forging long-lasting 
contacts with the researched community after the fieldwork, which would be helpful in my 
post-PhD research work. I therefore constantly kept participants informed about who I was 
and made efforts to share my own personal experiences as a migrant in both South Africa and 
the UK, in ways that I thought would perhaps help boost their confidence.  
The focus groups meetings were designed in ways that would make them inclusive 
and conducive for meaningful dialogue, in line with what many scholars have suggested 
(Hennink, 2007; Krueger and Casey, 2014).  Another potential risk often associated with focus 
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group discussions that I had to be aware of and try to mitigate, was the problem of group-
thinking, which was not easy to decipher from genuinely shared realities and experiences (see 
McDougall and Baum, 1997). I was only there to facilitate conversation and dialogue among 
the participants by, for example, asking provocative questions and, as McDougall and Baum 
(1997), suggest playing the devil’s advocate by way of asking questions designed to stimulate 
discussion. As a result, all the meetings seem to have provided a platform for all participants 
to discuss freely, judging by the intensity of debates and dialogue participants engaged in 
among themselves. 
2.5.3 Participant Observation: Being Immersed in the Community 
Another technique I utilised was immersing myself, as a participant observer, 
particularly in the community of Phillipi in Cape Town. The idea underpinning this technique 
was to get as close to the participants as possible for a deeper insight into their everyday lives, 
including everyday ways of being political (see Schatz, 2009; Van Maanen 2011). The whole 
essence of fieldwork, as Van Maanen correctly observes, is to live with and live like those 
being studied (Van Maanen, 2011). I, therefore, spent over two months immersed in a black 
township in Cape Town called Philippi, carrying out interviews and observing how 
Zimbabweans got on with their day to day lives in that particular community. During the 
process, I had adequate opportunities to meet and have conversations with a number of 
Zimbabweans in various settings around that community, discussing their views and 
perceptions on life in South Africa compared to Zimbabwe. Immersion would, therefore, place 
me in a better position to understand not only citizenship as everyday social practice but also 
citizenship as sense of belonging. 
Apart from set up face to face interview appointments, knowledge of social spaces 
were potential participants are most accessible was important. For example, I was also able 
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to participate in various activities including attending church services at Boarneges Apostolic 
Church attended by Zimbabweans only, travelling around Philippi on public transport 
(Metrorail, Golden Arrow buses, taxis and ‘amaphela’), visited the local market and 
accompanied my associates and intermediaries for shopping and so on. The aim was to be in 
the spaces where Zimbabweans were so as to make my own impression of their experiences 
thus gaining experiential knowledge out of the process. Immersion also enabled me to 
observe ways of life and social relations between Zimbabweans and other actors such as 
South Africans, fellow immigrants, service providers and other relevant actors with local 
urban neighbourhood, which was helpful in understanding how citizenship is negotiated 
outside the state within urban settings (Ocejo, 2013).  
One of the limits of this technique is that the researcher often foregoes the 
advantages associated with being a detached researcher; and the researcher begins to 
develop emotional commitments to that particular community in ways that compromises the 
objectivity of emerging data (see Tanner, 2008). My shared past experiences as a migrant and 
my identity as a Zimbabwe would still have led me to understand and make sense of those 
participants’ experiences in a subjective way anyway.   
2.5.4 Being Immersed in an Intermediary Organisation  
Another way by which I got close to the participants relates to organisational 
ethnography, like community immersion, falls within the ethnographical tradition (Kostera, 
2007). Being a participant observer would help provide a good space in which to appreciate 
the nature of problems encountered by migrants more broadly, in a addition to those coming 
to the organisation for assistance. It would also allow a better understanding of the citizenship 
tradition underpinning the work of any particular organisation, thus enabling broader 
conclusions on the role of civil society in promoting diaspora citizenship (Neyland, 2007). This 
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technique would also be useful also due to its amenability to triangulation with other 
techniques, particularly interviews, observation and text analysis (Kostera, 1997).  
Therefore, in the spirit of civil society-academia collaboration, I decided to spend over 
six weeks as a participant observer at PASSOP.  This is a Cape Town-based civil society 
organisation assisting migrants from different nationalities with paralegal advice and 
advocating for the integration of immigrants in South Africa. Negotiating access to the 
organisation’s infrastructure, work and clientele was not difficult for me thanks to my pre-
existing links with this organisation, since I had worked with it for nearly four years before 
moving to the UK to pursue PhD studies. Therefore, during my time as a participant observer 
at PASSOP, I was able to observe issues facing migrants in South Africa in general, civil society 
responses and assumptions about citizenship underpinning those approaches.  
2.5.5 Being a Researcher on the Move 
This study is firmly built on the recognition that we now live in a world of mobilities, 
where people are always on the move for different reasons in contemporary times (Adey, 
2000; Jensen, 2009; Urry, 2000). This tendency has always been recognised in the global north 
(see Cresswell, 2006), but indeed mobility tendencies have also become a feature of ordinary 
people’s everyday lives in urban settings in the global south.  People living in urban areas, for 
example, are always on the move travelling to and from work, going for shopping, visiting 
friends and relatives et cetera (see Amin and Thrift, 2002). Most research methods and 
techniques often employed by researchers on migration-related phenomena appear to be 
based on the underlying sedentarist notion of citizenship, which is flawed in its failure to take 
into account the mobile nature of people.  
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My intention was, therefore, to use the same logic to understand the conceptions and 
practices related to citizenship by Zimbabweans while on their everyday movements. This 
method has been used in a systematic way by other researchers observing mobilities of 
Zimbabweans in both rural and urban contexts (see Mbiba, 2011; Mutopo, 2014). Considering 
the mobile nature of diasporas, I therefore decided to travel with tens of Zimbabweans from 
Cape Town to Zimbabwe on 29th March 2015 on a cross-border bus (Chihwa) plying the Cape 
Town to Harare route. This bus, Chihwa Bus Service, was popular among Zimbabwean 
travellers at the time due to its affordable prices and other benefits it offered. This generated 
useful insights on the transnational practices of Zimbabweans, particularly the kinds of 
connections they forge and sustain between South Africa and Zimbabwe. I also gained useful 
insights into their different ideas about being in South Africa compared to their past life 
experiences back in Zimbabwe prior to their departure. 
2.5.6 How Data Was Analysed 
The kind of data I managed to collect during this study was entirely qualitative and its 
analysis of data started during the process of data collection, which means the two processes 
were merged initially (Halperin and Heath, 2012). After completion of data gathering, I 
transcribed and digitised the data by way of typing it out onto the computer for easy storage 
and access (Halperin and Heath, 2012). Also, as part of my analytical framework, I developed 
different structures and categories which would represent the different modes of 
incorporation (Portes, 1995)22; the different kinds of political communities; and the different 
facets/dimensions of citizenship, to see if any of the data fitted in any of these categories or 
not. Based on data emerging from the three different research sites, I also performed a 
                                                          
22 Portes’s concept of segmented integration helps understand the differentiated and layered incorporation of different categories of the 
diaspora population. 
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comparative analysis of both the dependent and some independent variables, mostly context 
and geographical distance, to see how these factors mediate emerging modes of citizenship 
among different categories of Zimbabweans. Conclusions were therefore based on a 
comparison of data from the field and different understandings of citizenship23, to determine 
which best fits with the empirical realities of Zimbabweans.  
2.6  The Researcher-Researched Relationship and Its Methodological 
Implications 
This section contains the key highlights and reflections on the process of field 
research, with an aim to demonstrate some of the peculiarities and complexities associated 
with doing research and being a researcher in the African context.  The following reflections 
on my own experiences will also confirm what Wolcott (1995) observed, that empirical 
research in the real world is far from being a neat and linear process. Instead, based on my 
own experience, fieldwork constitutes an organic, dialectical and ‘trial and error’ process, but 
filled with challenges and opportunities. I embarked on fieldwork at the beginning of February 
2015 armed with a robust methodological framework, coupled with a set of preconceptions 
derived from research methods textbooks and research trainings about the research process. 
However, as the process unfolded, most of these were destabilised, prompting a rethink of 
the several elements of my research approach, strategy and techniques.  
As a result, I learned a number of specific lessons on how to negotiate the field and 
interact with the researched in ways that help achieve research aims during field research. 
My experiences as a field researcher indeed show that field research methods are far from 
being an a neatly packaged way of acquiring knowledge, to be learned in seminar rooms and 
                                                          
23 As discussed in Chapter Two, these are: Citizenship as legal status, political participation, social practice or sense of belonging. 
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applied in the field, as Attia and Edge (2015) observe. Another lesson to learn from these 
experiences is that, as much as we try to plan and anticipate what happens during fieldwork, 
actual field is more complex. It presents a lot of unexpected opportunities and challenges 
which require innovativeness and creativity. Field research, therefore, requires flexibility and 
adaptation of techniques and strategies in response to the demands of the context in which 
the study is conducted, as I discovered during the three months I spent in Johannesburg and 
Cape Town.  
Standard research methods textbooks tend to provide different qualitative techniques 
and tools for gathering data, but the actual encounters and interactions between the 
researcher and researched people present other interpersonal and other dynamics the 
researcher needs to be aware of to gain meaningful data. My experiences, therefore, indicate 
the need for reflexivity and sensitivity on the part of the researcher in order to build 
relationships with the researched people that allow us to understand their lives more deeply 
in any given context. This study, therefore, demonstrates that far from being a neat and 
technical process, field research is in many ways organic.  
One of the biggest lessons emerging from this process is that qualitative field research 
is fundamentally about relationships with the researched and other intermediary actors 
involved in the process (see Kobayashi, 2001). The relationship between the researcher and 
researched people determines not only the quality of emerging data but also whether the 
process itself is empowering to those involved in the study. The following discussion 
emphasises this researcher-researched relationship as it is accompanied by important 
dynamics during qualitative research. I want to acknowledge the inescapability of 
subjectivities in social research, and then underscore the importance of being aware of them, 
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being honest about them (not to pretend to be objective), and how to begin to respond to 
them.  
2.6.1 Subjectivities and Biases 
Scholars subscribing to a positivist epistemology believe that good empirical research 
is one conducted by an objective, emotionally detached and unbiased researcher (Harding, 
2015). However, when one conducts their research in contexts where the researched 
experience injustice, suffering and oppression, it becomes difficult for research to be totally 
‘dispassionate’ and objective (see Dwyer and Limb, 2001). As my own experiences reveal, the 
researcher’s own subjectivities and biases will always permeate the entire research process – 
from the questions asked, how answers are generated and how the researcher makes sense 
of those results. Some even observe that emotional engagement is useful in generating good 
research outcomes, especially when researching lived experiences of marginalised and 
vulnerable groups in society (see Liamputtong, 2007; Tolman and Brydon-Miller, 2001).  In 
the same vein and based on my own experiences, it is always crucial to acknowledge and be 
honest about those subjectivities and biases, as they are not easily voidable and escapable.  
Although my fieldwork experiences confirm the advantages associated with having 
some degree of prior familiarity and connections with the target research population and 
spatial focus of the study, it is also apparent that subjectivity is inescapable during field 
research (see Given, 2008; Van Maanen, 2011; Liamputtong, 2008). My passion towards this 
research and the researched population emanated from my own past experiences as a 
migrant in Cape Town, which was useful for the study. Being a Zimbabwean who lived in South 
Africa for more than 5 years as a migrant, the intimacy of my emotional connection with the 
researched community is not questionable. Having also been directly affected by some of the 
73 | P a g e  
 
issues that form the subject of this research, especially the struggle for legal status and 
recognition as well as the different forms of discrimination that continue to be experienced, 
it was not possible to detach myself from the emotions and sentiments triggered by the 
experiences of Zimbabweans. 
 My background also shaped the kinds of subjectivities I had to deal with in the process 
of this study.  I embarked on this research in the first place not only because I am Zimbabwean 
but also as a result of my own feelings about the discrimination and hostility I experienced 
when I lived in South Africa. I felt these experiences needed to be exposed in some way, one 
of which would be through research of this nature. This explains the strong empathy I 
constantly felt and displayed towards participants; and some of the personal stories invoked 
stronger emotions and imaginations including anger and painful memories of my own past 
struggles as a migrant in South Africa. This shows the inescapability of subjectivities when 
doing research with a primary focus on marginalised sections of society. 
Some of the events and day to day occurrences facing the researched during fieldwork 
make emotion, passion, sentiment and other aspects of subjectivity more perceptible as the 
research process unfolds (Van Maanen, 2011).  This is particularly true in contexts of socio-
political instability, victimisation and exclusion targeting the researched group, as was the 
case in South Africa where I carried out my fieldwork (see Kobayashi, 2001). For example, the 
outbreak of xenophobic violence in Durban and Johannesburg in May 2015, coupled with 
attacks on Somali informal traders in Cape Town around the same time (see Marongwe and 
Mawere, 2016), further compounded my empathy towards the research population and 
feelings of anger towards South Africa and its nationals.  
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Here is another example of how subjectivities pervade the research process: I also 
witnessed a crime incident during my time in Philippi involving a Zimbabwean woman named 
Beaulah, whose house was broken into by armed men at 0130hrs. They assaulted her and got 
off with some of her belongings. Although the matter was reported to the South African Police 
Service immediately after the incident, police officers only arrived at the scene at around 
0900hrs the following morning, 8 hours later. These events particularly made me feel upset 
and cynical at times the South African way of life.  I therefore got the dominant impression 
that Zimbabweans were being subjected to exclusion and were no longer desired in the South 
African society, thus justifying my feelings of empathy towards them.  
Being a Zimbabwean by nationality also meant I had my own viewpoints and 
sentiments regarding socioeconomic and political events and developments in Zimbabwe, 
which I held strongly during the process. These could have easily filtered into my own reading 
of the participants’ own perceptions of the same phenomenon. However, I think some of 
these aspects of my subjectivities placed me in a better vantage point from which to have a 
better view on what Zimbabweans were going through at the time perhaps in ways that 
socially and emotionally distant researchers would not have realised. That means I could 
easily grasp the agonies and trauma some of the participants shared with me during 
interviews and focus group discussions, and that meant I was more inclined to listen 
passionately and empathetically. All the above examples help demonstrate how subjectivity 
is not easily avoidable in social research, and at times can be help the researcher relate more 
closely to the experiences and realities of the researched group. 
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2.6.2 Power Dynamics in the Field: The Researcher and the 
Researched 
This study was partly built on a commitment to a transformative epistemological and 
methodological framework, with a particular emphasis on the relationship between the 
researcher and the researched aimed at empowering the latter (Liamputtong, 2007; Given, 
2008). I shared the assumption that this transformative paradigm and related methodologies 
prove useful in societies characterised by structural imbalances in power relations among 
different categories of society among other forms of injustices operating in those societies 
(Finley, 2008). The question that potentially arises is on how to verify whether empowerment 
happened and who was empowered. While it is indeed difficult to measure empowerment, 
Davies (2008) provides elements for researchers observe in order to determine whether 
research methodologies are empowering or not, including creating space for them to speak 
and make their voices heard.  
Davies (2008) also notes how empowering methodologies potentially reconfigure and 
equalise the relationship between the research and researched. This can be achieved in a 
number of ways, including the fostering of a collaborative relationship with participants. This 
realisation explains the particular attention I paid to the dynamic interaction between myself, 
as the researcher, and the participants; and how they related with each other during the 
process. For example, I avoided dominating discussions by way of asking too many questions 
and comments, in order to give participants more space and time to speak themselves. It was 
also always careful to ensure none of the participants captured and dominated discussions 
within focus groups.   
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2.6.3 Researching Historically Repressed Participants 
Histories and backgrounds of violence, intimidation and marginalisation may have also 
limited the confidence of some potential participants to take part in the study. This issue was 
more acute in South Africa, compared to the UK perhaps due to geographical distance and 
exposure to liberal political values in the host country among other factors. Because of this, 
participants in the UK spoke more freely and confidently compared to those in South Africa 
who openly expressed their fear of being targeted and victimised upon to Zimbabwe. As a 
result of their past experiences again both back in Zimbabwe and in South Africa, 
Zimbabweans may have developed a lack of trust for other people they consider strangers or 
not part of them in different contexts; including those they perceive to be threats to their 
security while hosted in other countries outside their own (see Polzer, 2012). One of my 
suspicions is that this might have been the case with some Zimbabweans, particularly those 
who may have witnessed or been victims of traumatic and violent events before and after 
immigrating into South Africa.   
  Some of the Zimbabweans who could not come out for the study may have directly or 
indirectly experienced different forms of violence, human rights abuses, domination and 
repression at the hands of ZANU PF and the state back in Zimbabwe, in the past. There is a 
large body of literature which demonstrate how the post-independence Zimbabwean state 
has generally dominated its citizenry, sometimes using violent and repressive means (see 
Kasambala, 2007; Sachikonye, 2012; Dorman, 2016). Internalised and entrenched fear and 
suspicion also threatened to militate against the quality of encounters, particularly when 
some participants expressed their discomfort with having their life experiences researched. 
They feared for their own lives and the lives of their relatives back in Zimbabwe, if they were 
to speak negatively against the Zimbabwean state. What might also have aggravated the 
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wariness of some of the potential participants is the belief often shared among Zimbabwean 
‘diaspora’ across the world, that the Zimbabwean government deployed intelligence 
operatives in countries where its citizens are hosted to spy on their activities and target ZANU 
PF regime’s opponents living in exile (see Pasura, 2014; Betts and Jones, 2016).  
This fear of Zimbabwean intelligence operatives directly played out in my interactions 
with participants in Johannesburg. For instance, I had an encounter with a small group of 
Zimbabweans at Voslorus (Johannesburg) who openly displayed their suspicion that I was a 
Zimbabwean state agent. These participants were initially wary of engaging in open 
conversations with me in relation to their views and perceptions relating to their past 
experiences and imagined futures in both Zimbabwe and South Africa. This underscored the 
importance of building trust and proving my authenticity as a bona fide student; being 
introduced by intermediaries and my affiliation to PASSOP well known for being critical to the 
Zimbabwean government were some of the helpful tactics in gaining the confidence of 
participants. I also presented a one-page statement on paper with a Royal Holloway logo, 
detailing who I was and the purpose of my research. I also offered to share contact details of 
my supervisors, if anyone wanted to verify my identity as a student. This helped alleviate this 
challenge and I was able to engage with participants relatively smoothly. 
2.6.4 Reflections on Power Dynamics During Encounters 
Going into the field, I was aware that power dynamics could play out in different 
subtle, hidden ways not only among the researched themselves but also between them and 
the researcher. One question I constantly asked myself concerned how they would view me 
and how perceptions they would have of me would affect the nature of information they were 
inclined to share. Without awareness and forethought of these things, there was a risk that 
they could end up telling me what they thought would please me, or provide me with 
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distorted stories on their experiences. In extreme cases, my fear was that they would 
withhold information and perhaps withdraw from any meaningful conversations with me 
thinking I was out to use them and their experiences for my own benefit. It was therefore 
critical to build a relationship based on mutual trust, respect and confidence in the process to 
avoid or minimise such complications in the process. 
This sense of ambivalence in me regarding the nature of relationship that would be 
appropriate between me and the participants was intense from the outset, particularly my 
concern that I would come across as wielding power over them. For example, I was not sure 
whether to introduce myself comprehensively in terms of who I was, my own personal 
achievements and what I was up to at the time, among other aspects of my own life story.  
On one hand, I thought it would have been not only ethical but also a gesture of openness 
towards them about who I am, but at the same time some of the participants might have 
thought I was a well-to-do, successful and powerful researcher who was down in South Africa 
to learn about their experiences for my own benefit.  Particularly, their perception of me as 
someone powerful could have potentially perpetuated a sense of disempowerment and 
disadvantage among some of the participants some of whom, for example, may have lost 
their own educational and other life ambitions due to the situation back in Zimbabwe and 
other challenges related to their settlement in South Africa.  
Therefore, I became aware that some of the participants often found themselves 
vulnerable and disadvantaged due to their legal status, discrimination and other factors 
compromising their life opportunities while hosted in South Africa, I anticipated that some of 
those participants could potentially begin to develop the perception that I was a privileged 
Zimbabwean merely using them to realise my ambitions to earn a doctorate in the UK. The 
fact that I pursue PhD studies at Royal Holloway in the UK constantly represented one of the 
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potential fault lines in my relationship with the migrants whose lives I was researching. While, 
some may have developed a sense of admiration and being proud of me as a Zimbabwean 
who had come a long way, at one point being an asylum seeker in South Africa and now being 
a PhD student in the UK; others however could have been conspicuously envious towards me 
for the same reasons. 
During focus group discussions I conducted in Johannesburg, I observed that many 
people had the perception that I had power over them, and that seemed to have heightened 
their expectations for immediate financial benefits for their participation in the study. For 
example, some approached me for financial assistance saying ‘you dine with the British in the 
UK’ (ndimi murikudya nema British’). They got the impression that I was earning a lot of 
money in the form of British pounds by virtue of being a student in the UK and therefore I had 
the capacity to help them out. Unfortunately, I had no means to help them financially, just 
being a struggling international student here in the UK. Although I introspected in relation to 
the above issues, I realised that it was not always necessary for me to engage in any kind of 
artificial, faked behaviour or try to identity myself differently during our encounters, but 
rather strove towards being just myself during the process. 
Although such dynamics put me in an awkward position most of the time, I also felt 
their perceptions may have been based on their lack of awareness of the difficulties and 
challenges foreign students face in the UK (see Mandiyanike, 2009). These included the 
dominant feeling of being away from home, coupled with the financial difficulties I 
experienced as a mature student trying to balance research, family and survival in the UK. In 
this context, Tevera (1999) usefully captured these dynamics when he observed that overseas 
students tend to be compelled by socioeconomic hardships to expend a significant portion of 
their energies pursuing parallel survival strategies, rather than reading, reflecting and 
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publishing in scholarly journals (see Mandiyanike, 2009). Therefore, during our informal 
conversations, sometimes before or after our interviews and focus group discussions, I took 
the opportunity to ‘educate’ them about life in the UK including opportunities and challenges 
Zimbabweans face, particularly students.  
To avoid being too sensitive and self-aware, I constantly strove towards remaining 
myself without trying to adjust my conduct and identity to suit the research participants at 
different stages of the fieldwork. I also made effort not to present myself as the ‘expert’ with 
all the knowledge on various aspects of immigrant life in South Africa (although I remain an 
activist and now a researcher studying for a PhD), and therefore was guided throughout the 
process by the assumption that the migrants know their lives better than me. While I may 
have been tempted to think that I had significant power over the participants by virtue of my 
academic and professional knowledge and experience, it was also critical to realise that they 
also had power by virtue of their experiential knowledge I was after derived from their day to 
day lives I was seeking to explore. They were the ones living in those risky parts of the 
townships, struggled to access public services, experienced life as ‘illegal’ immigrants and so 
on; hence I could not pretend to have more knowledge than them over those issues in any 
way.  I also found ways of conscientising them and making them aware of this kind of power 
they had during the process, for instance by highlighting this aspect when I gave opening 
remarks at the start of focus group sessions.  
2.6.5 Whose Voice Was Heard? 
Ensuring that participants’ voices are heard constitutes one of the ways of 
empowering vulnerable and disempowered participants during the research process 
(Schwarzer et al, 2006). I have already highlighted how some categories of Zimbabweans may 
have been excluded from the research process because of their marginalisation which often 
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renders them invisible. Nevertheless, I also anticipated that some of those who had made it 
into the sample may not have the power to speak out about their experiences during our 
conversations due to fear, anxiety and other factors. Ways by which these dynamics could be 
detected and dealt with included being anticipative, sensitive and reflexive in each and every 
focus group or interview encounter.   
 One of the ways in which these power imbalances manifest in research is often 
through the silence of women. And, some scholars propose another way of dealing with 
women’s silence in research, which is by way of awareness of their cultural constraints 
emanating from patriarchy (Reinharz and Chase, 2001).  In this vein, I have also highlighted 
how some women ended up being excluded from my sample and from taking part in the 
actual study because they were preoccupied with duties and tasks in the household domain. 
Moreover, although only a few women appeared not to be very comfortable sharing their 
experiences which they considered either too sensitive such as those relating to their 
relationships with their spouses.     
Women migrants tend to be under-represented and their voices are often not heard 
during social research (Polzer, 2012). This is not always the case, but it is one of the dynamics 
I observed during fieldwork in South Africa. During the planning phase of the fieldwork, I had 
anticipated such a gender bias in the way participants took part and expressed themselves in 
the study, which made it easier for me to manage these dynamics. When fieldwork 
commenced, I was briefed by PASSOP activists about the tendency of most Zimbabwean 
women to not freely take part in researches, compared to men would not allow a male 
researcher to sit down with their women in private to have a confidential conversation. 
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Although I did not experience such incidences, I was sensitised by members of PASSOP about 
such dynamics based on their experiences working with the Zimbabwean migrant community.  
Therefore, gender-sensitivity at all stages of the process was a critical way of guarding 
against and detecting any such forms of disempowerment during this research, as correctly 
observed by some scholars (Liamputtong, 2007; Reinharz and Chase, 2001). As a way of 
demonstrating sensitivity to these dynamics and to respond to it, identifying ‘safe spaces’ 
where women and other potentially vulnerable and disempowered participants would feel 
comfortable to share their stories and experiences, became a priority in all encounters. I had 
to seek the assistance of one of my former colleagues at PASSOP, a woman and a 
Zimbabwean, with great experience working with women migrants around Cape Town. She 
was of great help in identifying and inviting participants to PASSOP offices for interviews and 
ensuring some of those respondents felt safe and comfortable to speak to me. 
It was only after identifying these dynamics that I was able to start considering 
different ways of addressing them. For example, when I observed that some respondents 
were dominating discussions and presenting their experiences in general terms during focus 
group discussions, I began posing mildly critical and ‘devil’s advocate questions to the 
dominant speakers as a way of counterbalancing their dominance. Dealing with such subtle 
issues is not always easy because of the possibility of silence being a result of internalised 
structural, systemic and historical victimhood causing a sense of powerlessness among some 
participants, which can never be addressed during the actual encounter itself. In other words, 
getting someone subjected to decades of oppression and domination in their home country, 
to speak during an interview tends to be futile, but require sustained efforts, as it became 
apparent in this study.   
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2.6.6 Being an Insider/Outsider: Issues of Positionality 
Positionality was important in understanding participants’ everyday life experiences 
using citizenship lenses, particularly how they made sense of their relationship with both the 
host and homeland state. This ties with an idea of research as a relational process in which 
the researcher transacts with the researched during research encounters, thus shaping 
emerging knowledge (Finley, 2008; Dwyer and Limb, 2001; Visser, 2000). As an assumption, 
identifying with the researched group would help gain an inside view of their life experiences 
compared to ‘outsiders’ (see Dwyer and Limb, 2001; also see Merton, 1972). Several elements 
of my identity and background help shape my position in relation to the research participants 
throughout the study.  
My identity, for example, played a key role in shaping my positionality and perhaps 
making them see me as an ‘insider’ included my being a black Zimbabwean who lived in South 
Africa for more than five years; having experienced immigration documentation problems; 
speaking the dominant Shona language fluently; having experienced xenophobia and other 
forms of discrimination affecting many other migrants while living in South Africa; and having 
worked with PASSOP advocating for the rights of migrants in South Africa. Based on my 
experiences in the field, the above elements of my identity and position in relation to the 
participants, helped me a lot in understanding daily experiences of participants in Cape Town, 
compared to those in Johannesburg and the UK where I had not lived for any considerable 
time.  
However, even in Cape Town where I thought I was part of the immigrant community, 
not everyone shared a similar view of me as an ‘insider’ for several reasons. For example, my 
‘insider’ status may have made other participants less comfortable and embarrassed to speak 
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truthfully about their experiences. Similarly, others may have become too ashamed or shy to 
speak out for fear that I might recognise their experiences and end up sharing them with other 
Zimbabweans. Also, others may have been pessimistic about me and taken my work for 
granted thinking that it would not result in any meaningful change in their plight, compared 
to the often-revered researchers coming down from the global north to do work on Africa 
(see Gallagher, 2016). Certainly, identity and background play important role in shaping 
dynamics surrounding researcher-researched relationship. 
What is not certain is whether participants would have related differently with a 
researcher from any other background. Perhaps participants would have shared more 
intimate and deeper experiences if I were a white researcher, on the basis of the somewhat 
messianic view of ‘outsiders’ from the global north often held by impoverished researched 
groups in the global south. In other words, there is often a perception that ‘white’ researchers 
always have capacity to help with material and other solutions out of their problems and 
miseries. Therefore, it is not clear whether my being black, being Zimbabwean, and being a 
migrant, helped position me in ways that enabled me to gain an intimate view in the 
participants’ daily life experiences. Would experiences have been any different if it was a 
researcher of a different racial and nationality identity or indeed any other background. 
2.7 Ethical Considerations in the Field 
Ethics constitute an important consideration when carrying out research with human 
subjects, some of whom are vulnerable in many ways (Halperin and Heath, 2012). I highlight 
below, some of the issues that confronted me during fieldwork, and how I attempted to 
address them. Firstly, participation in the research has to be negotiated and consented by the 
participants on the basis of accurate information on what the research is about and its 
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implications (Barbie, 2007). Some participants, particularly those that are disempowered 
often lack the power to shape the direction of research processes, making them unable to 
refuse or agree to participate in research processes (see Jacobsen and Landau, 2003). 
Subsequently, some researchers will simply coerce or deceive them into being researched 
regardless of their will. This was problematic and I went into the field with great sensitivity to 
such issues. For instance, I asked them to sign Royal Holloway, University of London’s consent 
forms, which ensure compliance with the university’s ethical guidelines for researchers. 
However, most of the participants were reluctant to sign from the start of the study, without 
any explicit reason (s). Presumably this refusal to sign paperwork in the form of consent forms 
emanated from uncertainty regarding how their personal information would be used in 
future. Nonetheless, I decided that imposing them could have made it difficult to recruit and 
retain participants for the study entirely, while also compromising the trust between me and 
them.  
Gaining formal consent on paper was therefore not possible owing to uncertainty 
regarding how the signed documents would be used, lack of adequate confidence in the 
process and mistrust on the part of the participants, especially those without documents, who 
tend not to trust anything official/formal. However, my view was that what matters was that 
consent was gained, regardless of the form in which it was expressed by the participants. I 
therefore resorted to reciting the consent form verbally and providing assurance that their 
anonymity and the confidentiality of what would be guaranteed. One of the ways we agreed 
this could be achieved was by ensuring that no names and residential addresses were written 
on the interview schedules and in my notes, but that I would use forenames and pseudonyms 
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in my records of the interviews and discussions, and in any subsequent publications of the 
work.  
2.7.1 Anonymity and Confidentiality 
Being aware of the risk of being harmed, victimised and other forms of backlash is 
always important when conducting research with human subjects, especially if the questions 
solicit potentially sensitive information from those participants (see Barbie, 2007; Halperin 
and Heath, 2012). This kind of awareness was critical for my study due to the context in which 
I was carrying out the study. These threats to the wellbeing of participants could be through 
subjection to xenophobic abuse by native South Africans or victimised by Zimbabwe’s 
notorious intelligence operatives as a result of their involvement. It was therefore important 
to ensure no harm or backlash would confront participants during and after the study because 
of their involvement or what they would have spoken about during the process.  
Guaranteeing the anonymity and confidentiality of participants were two ways by 
which these risks could be mitigated. These concepts are sometimes mistakenly taken 
synonymously (Halperin and Heath, 2012). Anonymity entails the concealment of 
participants’ identities, while confidentiality refers to the guaranteeing of privacy to 
participants (Halperin and Heath, 2012). Assuring the privacy of everyone would be difficult 
(perhaps impossible) in practice simply because the outcome/findings of this research would 
inevitably be published in one way or another (see Liamputtong, 2007). Confidentiality also 
served to separate some of the participants from their narratives and experiences, perhaps 
against the will of some participants who may have wanted their experiences to be shared 
publicly. 
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2.7.2 Reducing/Avoiding Psychological Harm 
Apart from external harm and repercussions as a result of participation in research, 
the research itself may be a source of harm and discomfort for participants. My research 
touched on sensitive and very personal aspects of participants’ lives, which always pose 
ethical questions in social research (see Liamputtong, 2007).  For example, conversations with 
participants delved into issues that encroach on the private spheres and personal lives of 
participants; and such knowledge and information is subsequently shared with the public in 
the form of academic publications and presentations including research papers, journal 
articles and research reports. Apart from seeking their informed consent, it was also 
important to minimise or avoid harm to participants during the process and afterwards, often 
in the form of stress, trauma and anxiety (Denscombe, 2010; Halperin and Heath, 2012). My 
anticipation during the design of the study was that this would be an issue for my research 
considering the nature of the questions I was asking and issues that would likely emerge.  
During the actual fieldwork, I was always sensitive throughout the process to avoid 
questions that would negatively affect the psychologically fragile and delicate participants, 
caused by the traumas and difficulties associated with their migrant life. This required greater 
sensitivity in the way research encounters were designed and managed, to minimise or avoid 
psychological harm to participants. Although some of the issues we discussed may have been 
sensitive and potentially harmful to the emotions of those who participated, I made efforts 
to be sensitive not to ask questions in ways that would cause distress or open ‘old wounds’ 
among participants.  
For instance, when discussing issues to do with the causes and process of 
displacement of Zimbabweans from Zimbabwe, and their experiences during the 2008 
xenophobic violence while hosted in South Africa, I tried to be careful and sensitive not to 
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discuss in ways that would bring back horrific memories of the past. In this context, I set up 
quick debriefing sessions after every set of interviews and group discussions following such 
sensitive and emotional conversations with participants. I also benefitted immensely from 
those sessions because such encounters in which sensitive issues were discussed certainly 
had triggered painful memories in me, as a migrant who lived in South Africa too. 
2.7.3 Managing Expectations of Participants 
Lastly, a pertinent ethical issue that is frequently overlooked by researchers, but one 
which I had to deal with, relates to managing the expectations of participants, researcher and 
gatekeepers. Given the socioeconomic deprivation and vulnerability of some of the 
participants, they took part in the study expecting practical change and other immediate 
tangible benefits out of the research process (see Clark-Kazak, 2013). This may not be a 
serious issue for researchers in other contexts but, as I observed and as other scholars attest, 
this presents a significant emotional and ethical challenge when researching Africa (See Clark-
Kazak).  For example, some participants clearly thought their participation in the study would 
be accompanied by immediate and direct material benefits from the research process.  
One of the challenges in these circumstances was on how to manage such expectations in 
ways that would not make me appear indifferent to their plight, without making false 
promises to them which would be highly unethical.  
As a result, various strategies proved useful in addressing this complex situation. 
Firstly, I found it useful to explain the purpose of my research to the participants and in that 
process highlighted the potential impact of my research. This whole process made me realise 
the importance of being considering research impact to participants when designing research. 
I also appreciated the importance of being able to communicate it in an accessible way to 
various research audiences, including the participants during fieldwork. For example, I 
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mentioned that one ways my research could result in change in their circumstances would be 
by raising awareness about their experiences and challenges if its results get published; as 
well as shifting South Africans’ perception of immigrants which could, in turn, help in 
combatting xenophobia and other forms of discrimination against immigrants in the country. 
2.8 Chapter Conclusions 
To conclude, this chapter has sought to lay out a methodological foundation on which 
the quality of empirical material used in the rest of the thesis can be judged. The chapter itself 
contains several lessons about the nature of fieldwork in the African (particularly South 
African) context. For example, it is apparent that the conduct of fieldwork is not a rigid and 
objective enterprise, but requires flexibility in methods and approaches depending on 
context. Approaches and tools provided in standard research methodology textbooks will not 
always work the same way in all contexts, some of which demand their variation and 
adaptation. Therefore, whether a set of methods and techniques work depends on context 
and the peculiar qualities and circumstances of the researched population. Because of the 
uniqueness of each fieldwork endeavour, original insights are potentially generated on how 
to conduct research with that particular group and in that particular context.   
It is also apparent that collecting data is not simply a matter of implementing methods 
and techniques preconceived at the design stage of the research, but largely depends on the 
relationships and encounters between the researcher and the researched. Reflexivity, 
awareness and sensitivity become critical additional tools designed to ensure the researcher 
is sensitive to power, bias, subjectivities and ethical considerations emanating from these 
interactions; these aspects of the researcher-researched relationship bear significant 
implications on the quality of data and empowerment potential of the process. In this context, 
the rest of this thesis uses empirical material on experiences of Zimbabweans gained from my 
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fieldwork endeavours in Cape Town, Gauteng and South-East England, to demonstrate how 
diasporas become citizens in multiple, fragmented, ways while outside their country. The 
following chapter zooms into the experiences of Zimbabweans with an aim to use citizenship 
theoretical lenses to understand and explain their mass emigration towards different 
destinations since year 2000. 
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Chapter Three: Emigration as a Response of the Crisis of Citizenship in Zimbabwe  
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
Why people their countries can be understood in different ways, using various conceptual 
lenses in different contexts. This chapter traces how the Zimbabwean diaspora emerged at 
different times of the country’s history, and the migratory pressures underpinning their flight. 
It also uses the concept of ‘crisis of citizenship’ as a lens with which to understand this crisis-
driven emigration producing the Zimbabwean diaspora (Castles and Davidson, 2000; Crush 
and Tevera, 2010). This thesis holds that Zimbabweans living outside their country indeed 
constitute a diaspora due a number of features they display. In order for a diaspora to exist, 
a significant body of the national population has to have exited from their home country and 
become dispersed in more than one country (see Zeleza, 2003; Pasura, 2005). Though critical 
in the formation of a diaspora, emigration is by no means the only characteristic that makes 
those emigrants diasporic. There are other elements, including the modes of citizenship that 
emerge among them while living outside their homeland. Nevertheless, emigration provides 
the genesis and foundation of being a diaspora and this chapter tries to conceptualise those 
processes by which citizens exit their home countries and eventually become scattered across 
the world.  
Emigration has received growing scholarly interest since the 2000s, and before then most 
of the attention was placed on the immigration side of the coin, and most of this immigration-
centred scholarship often negates the dynamics obtaining in the migrant-sending countries 
(Stola, 1992; Okolski, 2007; Brettell and Holifield, 2000).24 While looking at the forces 
                                                          
24 Stola and Okolski make the same observations in the context of the current ‘migration crisis’, where there is 
limited emphasis and deep analysis of the forces driving those migrants out. Focus is often on receiving 
countries and factors believed to be ‘pulling’ those migrants from their home countries.  
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attracting immigrants into any particular country is a helpful way of thinking about human 
mobility, it does not assist us fully to grasp the entrenched drivers of transnational human 
mobility obtaining in societies from which those migrants originate. Therefore, using 
citizenship as a theoretical lens, this chapter focuses on the emigration dimension. It suggests 
that the massive exodus of people from most countries in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years, 
emanates from the historical failure of national citizenship. And most of the humanitarian, 
socioeconomic and political problems afflicting many countries in sub-Saharan Africa today, 
including countries such as Zimbabwe, mirror this ‘crisis of national citizenship’. This problem 
is not only a contemporary phenomenon but its seeds are traceable to the historical colonial 
and post-independence exclusionary systems of citizenship and governance on the African 
continent (Mamdani, 1996; Dorman et al, 2007; Geschiere, 2011). And today, this crisis has 
manifested in different ways, including socioeconomic and political problems directly 
responsible for the exodus of the citizenry.  
With reference to the case of post-independence Zimbabwe, this chapter primarily aims 
to situate emigration from sub-Saharan African countries in the failure of conventional, 
Eurocentric, modes of national citizenship, which were historically imposed through colonial 
rule and have not worked after independence.  By reconceptualising emigration as a response 
to the crisis of national citizenship, this chapter also suggests another way of thinking about 
the causes of transnational migration on the basis of existing empirical knowledge (see 
Azarya, 1987; also see Gaidzanwa, 1999; Trandafoiu, 2013). This thesis also draws parallels 
between experiences in different epochs in Zimbabwe’s nascent history of nationhood, as a 
way of demonstrating the historical roots of the failure of conventional modes of citizenship 
in Africa.  
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As such, this thesis also recognises that the crisis of citizenship does not end with 
emigration, but continues and takes a different dimension given the obscurity surrounding 
the modes of citizenship that emerge post-emigration. Therefore, understanding emigration 
from a citizenship perspective also enables us to compare prior modes of citizenship 
culminating in their departure from home country and those that emerge once those 
migrants settle in various host countries, to observe any parallels between migrants’ past and 
contemporary experiences in any context they are hosted. In other words, locating the 
citizenship crisis in its historical context will also help us understand emerging modes of 
citizenship for migrants, particularly how historical deprivation of meaningful national 
citizenship shape the ways migrants perform (or fail to perform) citizenship while outside the 
country.    
3.2 Crisis of Citizenship: Conceptualising its Manifestations and Responses in Africa 
The pervasive crisis of national citizenship bedevilling many African countries has been 
met with various responses by the citizenry. In other words, citizens have not been passive 
victims of this deprivation of citizenship, but they have sought to exercise their agency in 
different political, sociocultural and other ways. Some citizens have confronted their states 
violently resulting in armed civil conflict as has been the case in Ivory Coast and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo in recent decades (Azarya, 1988; Open Society Foundation, 
2009). In this vein, the Open Society Foundation has attributed the prevalence of civil conflict 
and political instability on the African continent (Open Society Foundation, 2009). This shows 
that indeed deprivation of meaningful citizenship can have far reaching consequences. 
Citizens do not always become passive by-standers or victims of oppression, impoverishment 
and violence that come with this deprivation of citizenship, but will find ways of responding.  
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Political responses often include robust political activism and mobilisation, coups 
d’état and corruption in public office (see Chazan, 1987; Azarya, 1988; Trandafouiu). While 
those already empowered because of their education, class, ethnicity and socio-political 
connections find it easier to partake in these kinds of adversarial forms of engagement and 
contestation with the state, the majority of ordinary citizens often lack the capacity and socio-
political capital to partake in these processes (see Azarya, 1988). This has not always been the 
case with civil (and wider) society often failing to engage effectively and mount opposition to 
the state in countries such as Zimbabwe (see Muzondidya, 2011; Dorman, 2016).  In the 
absence of effective direct state-citizen engagement, another broad response to the failure 
of conventional modes of national citizenship take the form of disengagement from the state, 
with the citizenry relocating their citizenship to other sites within civil society (including 
community, social and kinship networks) outside the state. 
 And this represents one of the ways by which those deprived meaningful citizenship 
exercise political agency and reclaim it, primarily by way of avoiding directly interacting with 
their repressive state (Ake, 1992; Spivak, 1988; Scott, 1985; Mbembe, 2001). This is 
epitomised by the growing informalisation of livelihoods, and other aspects of citizens’ 
everyday survival strategies (see Chitando and Manyonganise, 2011; Chiumbu and 
Nyamanhindi, 2012; Azarya, 1988; Baker and Aina, 1997; Ake, 1992). In contexts where the 
state fails to meet the material welfare of its people, some citizens tend to move into the 
informal economy to secure their livelihoods, in which their economic activities thrive outside 
the purview of the state (See Obadare, 2004; Kabeer, 2008; Hammar, 2014). This illustrates 
that citizens respond in different ways, but also may start acting out their citizenship agency 
outside the direct ambit of the state.  
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Sociality, including indulgence in contemporary lifestyles, fashion, entertainment and 
other expressions of lifestyle identities, represents another dominant way through which 
disgruntled citizenry, especially urban youths, have sought to avoid direct engagement with 
the state (see Mafessoli, 1996).  In this manner, state-centred citizenship is supplanted by an 
everyday form of citizenship in the face of repression, impoverishment and constrained civic 
spaces (see Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011; Desforges et al, 2005; Dickinson, 2008). These 
ways of contesting impoverishment, marginalisation and repressive rule are all territorially 
bounded, but at times citizens look beyond the borders of their country in search of survival.  
It is in the above context that emigration is suggested here as representing another 
response to the failure of conventional modes of citizenship in Africa. Flight of this nature is 
not an act of passivity or a condition imposed on which those migrants have no power over, 
but a deliberate way of asserting their agency (see Azarya, 1988; Gaidzanwa, 1999). In other 
words, using Isin’s conception of how citizenship is practiced and reclaimed, emigration 
triggered by citizenship deficiencies in country of origin could be interpreted as an act of 
citizenship (see Isin, 2008). For example, it represents a way of expressing marginalised 
citizens’ lack of confidence in their state by disengaging and evading it, turning elsewhere for 
more meaningful relationship with another state in any particular destination country (see 
Azarya, 1988; also see Ake, 1992). Given the ways the state has often repressed, perpetrated 
organised violence, abused its power and corruptly exploited public resources, it is not 
unimaginable that some citizens may have found ways of cheating, avoiding or escaping from 
the tentacles of their lethal and exploitative states (Ake, 1992). What links the state and 
citizens is citizenship, and the state-side of the relationship has been the most deficient in the 
African context.   
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Apart from disengagement and engaging in informal spaces within territory of the 
state, emigration also shifts and relocates the site of citizenship geographically and 
territorially from the home country to the destination country (see Castles and Davidson, 
2000; Betts and Jones, 2016). Thirdly, the immediate, substantive, reasons why people 
emigrate also constitute citizenship issues, if examined using citizenship lenses. The need for 
survival, livelihood opportunities, violence, human rights abuses and fear of persecution 
among others, directly or indirectly emanate from the dysfunctional relationship between the 
state and the citizenry, discussed above (Mamdani, 1996; Kpessa et al, 2011; Mkandawire, 
2010; Dorman et al, 2007). Put differently, some of the reasons why people emigrate can be 
viewed as fundamentally citizenship issues.  
It is important to acknowledge that decisions to emigrate are more complex; and those 
who decide to leave their country look for their destinations on the basis of other 
considerations at any particular time. Perceived prospects of livelihood opportunities, socio-
political stability and security, geographical proximity and immigration regime among other 
aspects when deciding where to move (see Crush and Tevera, 2010; Ndlovu, 2012; Chiumbu 
and Musemwa, 2012). Personal circumstances and considerations also influences decisions 
on where to emigrate to, when, routes and modes of transport and so on (see Crush and 
Tevera, 2010; Betts, 2013). What modes of citizenship emerge for those pushed outside the 
country is not certain and constitutes the key question to be answered in subsequent chapters 
of this thesis. It is clear from the above discussion that emigration is essentially a citizenship 
issue, rooted in the historical failure of colonially imposed, western-centric, modes of 
citizenship (see Dorman et al, 2007). The next section considers how post-independence 
modes of citizenship are rooted in colonial history in Sub-Saharan African countries.  
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3.2.1 Emigration as a Response to Crisis of Citizenship: Conceptual Issues  
There exist wide ranging perspectives trying to explain why people leave their countries 
destined for others. This part of the thesis uses citizenship lenses as another way of 
understanding the causes of emigration. This thesis, therefore, suggests that socioeconomic 
and political problems triggering the mass exodus of Zimbabweans, actually represent a 
manifestation of a deeper crisis in Zimbabwe. There is a pre-existing recognition that the 
emigration of Zimbabweans is survivalist and crisis-driven in nature, but there are different 
views on what the ‘crisis’ really is (see Crush and Tevera, 2010; Chiumbu and Musemwa, 2012; 
Betts, 2014). This chapter locates the crisis in the dysfunctional relationship between the state 
and its citizens in Sub-Saharan Africa, which in turn accounts the prevalence of forced 
emigration from these countries.  
This thesis seeks to contribute to this conversation by suggesting characterising the 
exodus and dispersal of Zimbabweans in recent years as a response to what Castles and 
Davidson (2000) characterise as a ‘crisis of citizenship’ affecting many countries, including 
those in Sub-Saharan Africa (Chazan, 1987; Azarya, 1988; Trandafoiu, 2013; Open Society 
Foundations, 2009; Moore et al, 2015).25 This ‘crisis of citizenship’ is linked to the challenges 
facing contemporary nation-states in a world thought to be globalising (Castles and Davidson, 
2000). The following sections will characterise and contextualise this crisis as experienced in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, with specific reference to developments in post-2000 Zimbabwe. 
 In terms of conventional citizenship theory, people belong in the political community 
through a relationship with their governing state, which is the essence of citizenship (Bellamy, 
                                                          
25 Trandafoiu (2013) notes how Romanians escaped from their country as a political act designed to show 
frustration and lack of confidence in the state. 
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2008; Isin and Turner, 2002). Those who belong in the national community relate with the 
state as legally recognised citizens conferred with rights, entitlements, and duties associated 
with their membership (Bellamy, 2008; Isin and Turner, 2002; Marshall, 1949). Those who 
belong in the national community are not only bestowed formal legal status, rights and 
entitlements but also look up to the state for their material welfare (Bellamy, 2008; Isin and 
Turner, 2002; Marshall, 1949). There is also growing recognition that citizenship encompasses 
a subjective dimension, which often manifests in the form of sentimental attachment and 
loyalty to the state (see Fortier, 2016; also see Kpessa et al, 2011). This understanding of 
citizenship is derived from experiences in Western Europe and North America, and therefore 
may not always been consistent with African realities of citizenship.  
The relationship between the state and citizens has been historically dysfunctional (or at 
least different) in both colonial and post-independence Africa, contrary to what is assumed in 
conventional citizenship theory (Mamdani, 1996; Ekeh, 1975; Ake, 1992; Sachikonye, 2011). 
This troubled state-citizen relationship has often taken the form of repressive, violent and 
corrupt modes of governance, coupled with socioeconomic problems causing the inability of 
the state to guarantee the welfare and livelihoods of the citizenry (See Turok, 1987; Betts, 
2014; Betts and Jones, 2016; Crush and Tevera, 2010; Sachikonye, 2011; Azarya, 1988). The 
latter aspect represents the failure that Marshallian citizenship has had more profound 
effects in countries like Zimbabwe, where poverty and socioeconomic deprivation has pushed 
citizens to respond in different ways just for their survival (see Betts, 2014; Crush and Tevera, 
2016).  
 In the same vein, the majority of the citizenry in post-colonial societies, owing to the 
legacy of exclusion, domination and oppression by the colonial state, often lack the capacity 
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to directly engage with the state through participating in mainstream political processes and 
rights claims-making (see Azarya, 1988; Scott, 1985; Spivak, 1988). This does not, however, 
suggest passivity and lack of political agency on the part of the post-colonial citizenry, as 
postcolonial citizenship thinking referred to above shows us. And this has been the case with 
the majority of Zimbabweans who have had to find different ways of responding to and 
contesting authoritarian modes of governance entrenched in their country’s socio-political 
fabric. The crisis of national citizenship has also had identitarian-emotive manifestations, 
particularly marked by weakened senses of national belonging, particularly leaving large 
sections of the citizenry feeling less attached to the state (see Kpessa et al, 2011; Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2009). Citizens in most African countries also tend to enjoy formal legal recognition 
represented by possession of legal identity paraphernalia such as birth certificates, passports 
and other forms of identity documents, but without greater corresponding access to other 
substantive benefits, entitlements and opportunities associated with citizenship.  
However, there have been instances when some states have even sought to delegitimise 
and alienate sections of the citizenry from enjoying formal recognition as citizens, as has been 
the case with white Zimbabweans and Zimbabweans of an immigration background (see 
Muzondidya, 2010; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). All this shows how most how conventional 
modes of citizenship have not worked the same way they have done in western Europe, North 
America and other regions (see Castles and Davidson, 2000). It is also apparent from the 
above discussion that most of the political and socioeconomic problems directly responsible 
for the flight of citizens of an African origin are, fundamentally, issues of citizenship, 
emanating from the warped relationship between the state and citizens in those respective 
countries. 
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3.3 Crisis of Citizenship and its Colonial Roots  
Colonial rule has had far reaching implications to questions of governance, citizenship and 
nationhood in the African context, and some of the political and socioeconomic problems we 
see today are rooted in these colonial systems. For instance, colonial territorial demarcations 
imposed arbitrarily at the Berlin Conference of 1884 lumped together different (and 
sometimes hostile) ethnic, cultural, linguistic and racial groups of people within the same 
territorial boundaries and under the same colonial authority (Dorman et al, 2007). 
Subsequent colonial policies sought to consolidate this coalescence of diverse peoples within 
the same territories, by placing them under different tribal authorities in their tribal lands.   
Policies of segregation also reinforced the development of separate identities along 
racial lines in different areas within the same country; while ethnicity, tribe, clan and totem 
(not nationality) became primary modes of identity among native Africans domiciled in 
designated native areas (Mamdani, 1996; Ekeh, 1975). At the same time, white Europeans 
developed their own identities and relationship with the colonial state according to liberal 
principles and values associated with modern citizenship in their own geographical spaces 
(Mamdani, 1996). This kind of imposed societal differentiation would present various 
challenges for nation-building attempts after independence in many African countries.  
The Westphalian notion of statehood, and related modes of citizenship, which 
essentialises the nation-state as the primary community in which people belong and identify, 
would also be challenged as different groups maintained their loyalty to particularistic 
communities such as ethnic, clan, regional and tribal village communities (see Bayart, 2001; 
Davidson, 1992). The imposed co-existence and enclosure of people with different ethnic, 
tribal, linguistic and cultural identities in the same territory explains the revival of precolonial 
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identity-based hostilities and incompatibilities following the demise of colonial rule which had 
previously held them together (also see Dorman et al, 1997; Kpessa et al, 2011). The 
emergence of such divided and diverse societies further complicated the development of 
nations anchored on shared national identity and collective sense of belonging in the nation, 
which undoubtedly served to undermine efforts to build cohesive societies in many post-
independence African countries, Zimbabwe included (Dorman et al, 2007; Nyamnjoh and 
Englund, 2004).  
Another important implication of segregated citizenship and governance adopted 
along racial and ethnic lines during colonial rule is that it also produced unequal and unevenly 
developed societies across the continent (Mkandawire, 2010; Kpessa et al, 2011). Policies of 
racial segregation and differentiation were accompanied by separate, unequal and uneven 
development with those areas inhabited by Europeans experiencing socioeconomic 
prosperity compared to black townships and communal rural areas (Kpessa et al, 2011). What 
made this situation even more unjust was that black majority people were paying taxes, levies 
and forced to engage in forced labour without a corresponding provisioning of public services 
(Olukoshi, 2000; Kpessa et al, 2011). Their means of livelihood were also disrupted and 
deprived by way of expropriation of resources such as land and livestock (Kpessa et al, 2011). 
Such colonial policies of segregation also accounted for the impoverishment and the general 
neglect of the welfare needs of black Africans.  
The paternalism that also characterised the vertical relationship between the colonial 
state and natives based on domination, repression and violence did not create adequate 
space for non-whites to engage meaningfully with the colonial state, hence this entrenched 
an enduring sense of disempowerment and incapacity among the citizenry in relation to the 
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state (Mamdani, 1996; Sachikonye, 2012; Dorman et al, 2007). This systematic deprivation of 
substantive citizenship among black sections of the population was met with different 
responses in different countries. As a result of their discontent, non-white victims of colonial 
repression and impoverishment engaged in different forms of struggles, including nationalist 
agitation, non-violent protest and armed struggles. In the same vein, some sections of those 
opposed to and adversely affected by these differentiated and exclusionary modes of 
citizenship often escaped and ended up in exile within the African continent and beyond (see 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems, 2010).  
In the specific context of Zimbabwe, this wave of emigration, comprising victims of 
colonial rule and modes of citizenship, represents another fragment of the Zimbabwean 
citizenry. I will not delve deeply into the dynamics surrounding their flight and their emerging 
modes of citizenship, as the scope of this study mainly focusses on those who have left 
Zimbabwe after year 2000. Clearly, national citizenship crisis has historical roots, and it is 
important to note that citizens have not been passive victims but have responded in various 
ways, including flight. The following sections seek to demonstrate how the historical failure 
of conventional modes of citizenship have manifested in contemporary political and 
socioeconomic crises pushing accompanied by recent waves of emigration in Africa, with 
specific reference to the experience in Zimbabwe since year 2000. 
3.4 Crisis of Citizenship, Flight and the Post-Independence Zimbabwean Diaspora  
During and soon after the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe, nationalists 
underscored the imperatives of building a new nation and making citizenship equally 
meaningful for everyone (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems, 2010).  Apart from pursuing 
redress, nationalist leaders also stressed the importance of reconciliation, national cohesion 
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and developing a shared national identity among the diverse peoples in order to build a 
stable, united and peaceful society in Zimbabwe (Dorman et al, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). 
However, contradictions began to emerge in the twin-agenda of nation-building and 
redressing injustices of colonial rule by way of extending meaningful citizenship to the black 
majority, and it seemed one had to suffer at the expense of the other.  
In a bid to fulfil their nation-building pledge, nationalists did not pursue retributive 
justice to make perpetrators of repression and atrocities before and during the armed 
struggle accountable for the atrocities they committed (Moore, et al, 2013; Muzondidya and 
Gatsheni, 2010). There were minimal radical administrative reforms and some white officials 
in the previous Rhodesian administration retained their positions (Muzondidya and Willems, 
2010). This was the case with people like General Peter Walls who had been the commander 
of the Rhodesian Army but was retained as the Commander of the unified Zimbabwe National 
Army; and Ken Flower who carried on as the head of the Central Intelligence Organisation. 
Efforts were also made to integrate different guerrilla formations and the Rhodesian forces, 
with the assistance of the British Military Advisory Team, in what would become the 
Zimbabwe National Army (Alao, 2012). This demonstrates what seemed to be a genuine 
commitment to nation-building and inclusive citizenship on the part of the nationalist 
government of the time.  
In the same spirit of national unity, radical redistributive economic programmes to 
address the socioeconomic disparities that had been created during colonial rule, were also 
not pursued as part of the new government’s policy agenda immediately after independence 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems, 2010). While this strategy may have helped forge some 
degree of national unity, it would always remain a sitting time bomb without a clear resolution 
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of such an important aspect of the national question. Deep-seated and structural injustices 
along lines of race were therefore not tackled at the dawn of independence in Zimbabwe, 
meaning the majority blacks remained marginalised from the economy and other benefits 
and opportunities associated with citizenship. Principles of citizenship are also based on the 
premise of democratic rule and governance, allowing the people to choose who governs them 
by way of free and fair elections.  
This, however, proved elusive for nationalist political leaders at the helm of state 
power immediately after independence in Zimbabwe. It emerged that Mugabe and his 
nationalist government were not committed to democratic government and multiparty 
system, but aimed at achieving a one-party state soon after independence, resulting in 
Nkomo and other more democratic nationalists advocating for a multiparty system (Alao, 
2012). These differences among nationalists marked the genesis of what would soon become 
a devastating ‘ethnic’ conflict with far reaching implications on the nation-building project in 
post-independence Zimbabwe (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).  
As part of its nation-building, the nationalist government led by Mugabe had made 
compromises and concessions to the white minority population in the interest of nation-
building as noted above; but, equivalent efforts were not made to forge national unity among 
the diverse tribal, regional and ethnic communities across Zimbabwe (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; 
Raftopoulos and Savage, 2004; Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1997).26 As a result 
of ZANU’s political machinations highlighted above, conflict erupted in 1982 when some 
members of the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) (the military wing of ZAPU 
led by Joshua Nkomo) were accused of attempting to sabotage the new government and 
                                                          
26 Raftopoulos refers to this tendency as selective reconciliation. 
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plotting an insurrection in their Matabeleland stronghold by engaging in terrorism, banditry 
and dissident activities (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1997; Mario, 2009; 
Raftopoulos and Savage, 2004; BBC, 1983).27 The exact cause of the conflict is disputed with 
the official narrative at the time being that it was a mission to suppress an insurrection led by 
Nkomo. 
However, there are other competing understandings of what these civil disturbances 
were about. For example, it is widely believed in some circles that it was a continuation of 
age-old tribal conflict between the Ndebele and Shona tribes dating back to precolonial times 
(BBC, 1983; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Alao, 2012).   However, there are some who contest this 
perception about the conflict, including Joshua Nkomo himself who denied that it was a 
horizontal, ethnic, conflict among different sections of the Zimbabwean people, arguing that 
it was about control of the state with an aim to dominate society.  
Joshua Nkomo, for example, denied during an interview with the BBC’s Jeremy 
Paxman in London after escaping the conflict, that the conflict was not ethnic in nature but 
purely a political one in which Mugabe sought to impose his idea of a one-party state against 
the will of his opponents within the nationalist movement (see BBC, 1983). There is no 
agreement on what exactly the causes of this devastating conflict really are. But whatever the 
real cause may have been, what is clear is that the nationalist commitment to the building of 
a nation in which everyone belonged, as liberal citizenship theory holds, did not work (see 
Bellamy, 2008; Isin, 2002).  
                                                          
27 This conflict is often referred to as ‘Gukurahundi’ meaning the water that washes the chaff at the start of the 
rainy season.  
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It can be argued that nationalist leaders’ approaches to governance and leadership 
were premised on a flawed conception of citizenship without a desire to allow citizens to 
choose freely who governs, which led to civil conflict and strife. Citizenship theory is premised 
on the idea of equality, civil and political rights (see Bellamy, 2008); yet, membership in a 
political party, region and ethnic community and other particularistic collectives appeared to 
be considered more important in enjoying citizenship on the above basis. In this context, the 
equality and political inclusion components of citizenship (see Isin, 2002), were compromised 
by the ZANU PF nationalist government. As I argued earlier, citizenship deprivation generates 
different responses from the citizenry, and in this case banditry, destabilisation and other 
paramilitary ensued.  This seems to have been the case during the 1980s, resulting in the 
marginalisation of not only Ndebele-speakers, but those in the Midlands and Masvingo and 
other regions, outside Mashonaland and Harare regions. This another way of understanding 
the causes of this civil conflict using citizenship lenses. 
 One of the consequences of this civil conflict was the flight and scattering of a 
fragment of the Zimbabwean nation predominantly from the Matabeleland and Midlands 
regions, forming a distinct segment of the Zimbabwean diaspora (see Betts and Jones, 2016). 
Popular destination countries for this older diaspora were Botswana, South Africa and the UK.  
National citizenship is not only premised on the political dimension of the relationship 
between the state and citizens, which clearly did not work well at the start of a new era in 
post-independence Zimbabwe. Instead, citizenship has a social dimension to the extent that 
it is to do with the material well-being and welfare of the citizenry, in terms of a Marshallian 
conception (Marshall, 1949). The next section examines how this component of citizenship 
emerged in post-independence Zimbabwe. 
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3.4.1 Economic Structural Adjustment Programme and its Citizenship Consequences in 
Post-independence Zimbabwe 
Another manifestation of the citizenship crisis that has directly triggered mass exodus 
in Zimbabwe originates from the state’s failure to look after its citizens, what is often refers 
to as social citizenship (Marshall, 1949; Isin, 2002; Bellamy,2008). The creation of a welfare 
state through a robust social policy represented one of the tools widely used by the nationalist 
government in Zimbabwe, and indeed in many other post-independence African countries, to 
redress the socioeconomic injustices of the past given decades of underdevelopment, poverty 
and socioeconomic stagnation in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kpessa et al, 2011). In addition to 
redressing the social injustices of the past and making citizenship meaningful, social 
provisioning was also regarded as an effective strategy for building national cohesion, 
solidarity and a shared sense of belonging among people from diverse backgrounds within 
the nation (Kpessa et al, 2011). For this reason, nationalists therefore continued echoing this 
legacy after independence in ways that evoked a shared sense of national solidarity around 
their material deprivation transcending pre-existing ethnic, tribal and other particularistic 
affinities (Kpessa et al, 2011). We will see how effectively this worked in subsequent 
paragraphs, but let me conceptualise the link between citizenship and welfare first. 
It is important to note that this use of the welfare state for advancing national unity 
in Zimbabwe and other post-independence African countries was not without any conceptual 
and empirical bases. In a Marshallian conception of citizenship, those who belong in the 
national community as citizens are entitled to welfare and other material benefits and 
opportunities (Marshall, 1949). In other words, those who belong in the national community 
look up to the community for their welfare and material well-being – this has often been 
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termed social citizenship (Isin, 2002; Marshall, 1949).  It is in this vein that citizenship has 
always carried a socioeconomic dimension for Zimbabweans due to the historical material 
deprivation and impoverishment endured by the majority of the citizenry under colonial rule. 
The realisation of socioeconomic benefits and livelihoods is therefore often associated with 
membership in the nation, without which citizenship becomes meaningless (Freund, 2007; 
Mkandawire, 2010; Kpessa et al, 2011). This logic underpinned the struggle against colonial 
rule; and it is therefore not surprising that the need for socioeconomic redress and social 
justice remained one of the key priorities of the nationalist government at independence.  
Soon after 1980, nationalist political parties therefore continued to tap into existing 
socioeconomic grievances of the majority black people, in order to build horizontal solidarity 
among the disadvantaged black majority on the basis of shared grievances and aspirations 
(see Freund, 2007; Dorman et al, 2007; Kpessa et al, 2011). And nationalist leaders recognised 
the need to improve the general welfare of everyone through the provision of public services 
like education, healthcare, housing, clean water and sanitation et cetera for free. It therefore 
sought to use welfare as one of the strategies for advancing the nation-building agenda and 
making citizenship substantive for the majority of black Zimbabweans who had been 
previously denied it by the erstwhile colonial regime. Social policy also tends to encompass 
an in-built communal aspect encompassing shared needs, demands and values around which 
people from diverse backgrounds rally (Kpessa et al, 2011). It was also believed that the 
delivery of public services by the state would generate loyalty to the state among the citizens, 
thus improving the vertical relationship between the state and citizens (Kpessa et al, 2011). 
Moreover, some well-developed welfare systems flourished in social democratic 
states in Western European and Nordic countries, where social provisioning was recognised 
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as one of the key pillars of modern citizenship in Marshallian terms (see Kpessa et al, 2011; 
Marshall, 1949). In these societies, an intimate connection between social policy and national 
identity had been established and nationalists accepted that the same model would work in 
their emerging post-independence (Kpessa et al, 2011). The fact that welfarism had also been 
used in some advanced multinational nations like Canada and Britain for forging national 
cohesion, also led African nationalists to believe that it would work in their post-
independence African societies divided along the lines of ethnicity, class, race and region 
(Kpessa et al, 2011). A strong welfare system was therefore instituted and became an integral 
component of national development strategies adopted in different African countries as a 
result (see; Kpessa et al, 2011; Mkandawire, 2010; Murisa and Chikweche, 2015). This helped 
to an extent in advancing substantive citizenship and redress the socioeconomic disparities 
emanating from uneven development during the colonial era. 
It was in this context that Zimbabwe’s first development plans after independence – 
especially Growth with Equity implemented in 1981 - emphasised the provision of healthcare, 
education and other social services to all Zimbabweans across ethnic, regional and class 
distinctions (Government of Zimbabwe, 1981; also see Sachikonye, 2003; Murisa and 
Chikweche, 2015). Overall, however, a new chapter appeared to have been opened in the 
history of Zimbabwe by 1980 – the economy was doing well, public services were being 
delivered efficiently, Zimbabweans from different backgrounds co-existed without any 
manifest conflict, and there was relative peace and security for the first few years of 
independence. However, apart from the ‘Gukurahundi’ conflict, this narrative of a tranquil 
and prosperous post-independence Zimbabwe concealed latent historical tensions based on 
race, class and ethnicity (Herbst, 1990; Mlambo, 1997). It also ignores structural forms of 
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inequality carried over from the colonial era, which would mark the contours of citizenship 
struggles post-1990. 
3.4.1.1 The Neoliberal Turn and Economic Citizenship in Zimbabwe 
The crisis of national citizenship in Zimbabwe has also had a socioeconomic dimension, 
given how welfare and socioeconomic opportunities form a key element in Marshallian 
citizenship (see Marshall, 1949). I highlighted earlier how most post-independence 
governments had sought to use welfarism as a strategy for consolidating the new nation as 
well as cultivating social citizenship in post-independence Zimbabwe. Although this strategy 
worked well during the early years of independence in Zimbabwe, welfarism as an approach 
to nation-building and citizenship did not work as effectively as it had in social democracies 
and multinational countries in the global north (see Kpessa et al, 2011). The emphasis on the 
free provision of social services generated increased expectations and demands which many 
Africans failed to meet over time (Kpessa et al, 2011). The provision of free welfare also 
proved unsustainable over time due to escalating costs, inefficiencies in public management 
and lack of corresponding economic growth in many post-independence African countries 
(Murisa and Nyaguse, 2015; Kpessa et al, 2011). The general social impact of these 
development policies was devastating for the majority of ordinary Zimbabweans. 
The implementation of the devastating Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ESAP) in Zimbabwe further weakened the capacity of the already fragile state to deliver 
public services to citizens in many ways (see Mlambo, 1997; Kpessa et al, 2011). Such 
programmes were also adopted in many impoverished African countries, with disastrous 
consequences for ordinary citizens. For example, the emphasis on public spending reduction 
through cuts in social spending and subsidies left limited resources for social services; while 
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the privatisation and commercialisation of state owned entities, some of which had played a 
critical role in the delivery of public services, left many Zimbabweans worse off (Murisa and 
Nyaguse, 2015; Mlambo, 1997). The implementation of ESAP was accompanied by many 
adverse socioeconomic effects some of which Zimbabwe continues to grapple with to this 
day. I therefore want to suggest that some of these hardships that continue to drive people 
out of the country started when Zimbabwe adopted austerity programme conceived by the 
Bretton Woods institutions in the early 1990s (Mlambo and Elhiraika, 1998; Bond and 
Manyanya, 2002; Murisa and Nyaguse, 2015). This is based on the realisation that the 
majority of Zimbabweans have left the country in search of employment and socioeconomic 
opportunities, with the Zimbabwean economy in a state of comma thanks to economic 
mismanagement and ESAP (see Gaidzanwa, 1999; Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1998; Muzvidziwa, 
2001). This clearly shows the link between obtaining economic conditions induced by ESAP 
and emigration. Those who emigrated as a result of ESAP, coupled with the imperial, 
liberation war and ‘Gukurahundi’, form another distinct fragment of the Zimbabwean 
diaspora.   
The implementation of a neoliberal economic programme in the form of ESAP had 
many other inimical effects on key aspects of national belonging and citizenship, particularly 
the relationship between the Zimbabwean state and its citizens, as well as on horizontal 
relationships among the people themselves in the country. As I indicated earlier, the social 
impact of ESAP also deprived meaningful social citizenship to the majority of the historically 
disadvantaged Zimbabweans both in urban and rural areas. According to Marshall (1949), 
those who belong in the national community must be entitled to welfare benefits in order to 
secure their material wellbeing. ESAP also weakened the delivery of public services, thus 
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dealing a major blow not only to substantive and material components of social citizenship 
such as employment and socioeconomic opportunities, but also subjective senses of 
belonging (Kpessa et al, 2011).   
Another effect of ESAP was that many Zimbabweans began to feel a sense of being 
abandoned and neglected by the state, which has a duty to guarantee the welfare of citizens 
in terms of citizenship theory (Marshall, 1949; Isin, 2002). This disenchantment gradually 
culminated in the withdrawal and disengagement from mainstream of the citizenry from 
political life by a large section of ordinary Zimbabweans. (Murisa and Chikweche, 2015). The 
emergence of the informal economy for instance represents one of the many ways 
Zimbabweans gradually disengaged from the state. Furthermore, the sentimental and 
emotional attachment which binds the state and its citizens which often undermined by the 
lack of strong social policy (see Kpessa et al, 2011), seems to have also been weakened by the 
decline of the welfare state in Zimbabwe.  
The emotional and material detachment of the citizenry from the state was also 
aggravated by the emergence of other parallel private and non-state actors jockeying with 
the state in the provision of welfare goods and services, thus competing with the state for 
loyalty of the citizenry (Mkandawire, 2010; Kpessa et al, 2011). For instance, Kpessa et al 
(2011) observes how some NGOs took over some of the responsibilities of the state in social 
provisioning, while some of these entities cultivated an ethos of self-reliance and localism in 
ways that weaned the citizenry from the tentacles of the state. In addition, some sections of 
the citizenry looked to particularistic entities such as the family, clan and tribal community 
for livelihood support in ways that provided a fertile ground for the resurgence and 
reinforcement of particularistic affinities at the expense of national cohesion (Kpessa et al, 
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2011). It is apparent that the affective and sentimental glue that binds the nation together 
was severely weakened by the neoliberal onslaught on public services in Zimbabwe, with far-
reaching implications to the emerging relationship between the Zimbabwean state and its 
citizens both living within and outside its territory.  
Politically, even before a political party emerged out of the labour movement, ESAP 
result in increased state-citizen tensions and greater contestation within the ruling ZANU PF 
party itself. There was an emergence of opposition political formations in urban areas, 
predominantly built around a critique of the government’s ESAP programme at both 
ideological and policy levels. The prominent one was the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), 
which was largely subscribed by students and workers; and independent candidates such as 
Margaret Dongo representing Harare South in the mid-1990s (New African, 1992; Mlambo, 
1997). This emergence of new political formations marked the growing fracturing in the 
relationship between the state and citizens in post-1990 Zimbabwe, which saw urbanites later 
coalescing around the Movement for Democratic Change in 1999.  
The collapse of the welfare system was also accompanied by intensified social unrests 
by the labour movement in the urban areas and growing contestation with the state (Mlambo, 
1997; 2001). This resulted in the formation of Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 
Zimbabwe which was formed in 1999 (Mlambo, 2001; Raftopoulos and Sachikonye, 2001; 
LeBas, 2011). The emergence of this outcrop of political formations would not only become a 
source of social division and fragmentation but also redefined the relationship between the 
state and society which rapidly turned adversarial in post-2000 Zimbabwe. 
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 In the above context, it is not difficult to appreciate how the collapse of the welfare 
system triggered by Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), directly created migratory 
flows in many African countries not excluding Zimbabwe. These prompted scholars like Ben 
Turok to observe that:  
The declining living standards and hardships have triggered a crisis of legitimacy of the 
African state and regimes (resulting in) general social turbulence. This is because the 
regimes have failed to “deliver the goods” as expected by the citizenry, raising 
questions of who benefits’ (Turok, 1987: 16). 
 The collapse of the welfare state in the 1990s arguably marked the genesis of other 
socioeconomic turmoil in post-independence Zimbabwe that would trigger the massive 
emigration of different categories of Zimbabweans in the 2000s. Since the implementation of 
ESAP, Zimbabwe has remained on a socioeconomic downward spiral since then, although it 
is easy to believe that the current socioeconomic problems are of a recent creation (see Bond 
and Manyanya, 2002).  In terms of consequences, the implementation of ESAP, for instance, 
was marked by growing contestation between the labour movement and the state; and it is 
in this context that the labour-affiliated MDC party was formed in 1999 at the height of this 
socio-political and economic abrasion in Zimbabwe (Mlambo, 2001; LeBas, 2011; Bond and 
Manyanya, 2002).  
Another perhaps more profound consequence of ESAP was that it drove another 
fragment of the Zimbabwean nation out of the country in search of welfare and livelihood 
opportunities, in addition to the liberation war and ‘Gukurahundi’ diaspora that had left 
Zimbabwe earlier in the nation’s history (see McDonald et al, 2000). The inability of the 
Zimbabwean state to ‘deliver the goods’ meant a failure of one key nation-building strategy 
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and social citizenship, which in turn was accompanied by another wave of emigration to 
places like the UK and Australia towards the end of the millennium. In addition, the collapse 
of the welfare and the implementation of ESAP elevated the importance of socioeconomic 
conditions as one of migratory and displacement pressures in Zimbabwe.  
Many Zimbabweans left for different destination countries within the region and 
overseas to countries like the UK, for better socioeconomic and livelihood opportunities. This 
speaks to the deprivation of what Kessler-Harris (2003) refers to as economic citizenship, 
defined in terms of the opportunities, entitlements and privileges necessary for ordinary 
people to achieve independence and autonomy in their everyday lives (Kessler-Harris, 2003; 
Isin, 2008; Thomas, 2002). The economic order that accompanied ESAP made it difficult for 
ordinary people to survive due to unemployment, growing inequality and collapse in public 
services, which in turn explains massive exodus predominantly of those in urban areas (see 
Gaidzanwa, 1999; Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1998; Muzvidziwa, 2001).  In addition to the fragment 
that left during the 1990s in response to ESAP, the socioeconomic turmoil that continue to 
see the exodus of many Zimbabweans today has some of its roots in the adoption and 
implementation of ESAP in the early 90s. It is therefore not coincidental, in this context, that 
many Zimbabweans continue to emigrate due to unrelenting and devastating socioeconomic 
hardships in recent years. The crisis of citizenship in Zimbabwe does not only have roots in 
neoliberal economic policies implemented in the 80s and 90s, which severely undermined the 
socioeconomic dimension of citizenship. As I have noted, Zimbabweans displayed their 
citizenship agency and responded in a number of ways, including the informalisation of the 
economy and emigration. The next section looks at other manifestations of weak citizenship 
and resulting patterns of emigration.  
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3.4.2 State-Citizen Relationship in Post-2000 Zimbabwe: Dynamics and Consequences 
The socioeconomic and political crises that Zimbabwe faced for the past two decades 
tested the national belonging of Zimbabweans in various ways. An estimated three to four 
million Zimbabweans emigrated from the country in different directions at the height of the 
socioeconomic and political problems (see McGregor and Primorac, 2010; Sachikonye, 2011). 
Consequently, an estimated 3-4 million Zimbabwean nationals therefore left Zimbabwe since 
2000 (McGregor & Primorac, 2010; Sachikonye, 2011). They emigrated towards different 
destinations, with popular destinations being countries within the Southern African region 
(see Alao, 2012; Tevera and Crush, 2010; McGregor and Primorac, 2010).  For example, at one 
point, it was estimated that more than 1.5 million Zimbabweans lived in South Africa alone, 
and figures are thought to have continued to rise as the crises deepened over the years in 
Zimbabwe (Tevera and Crush, 2010). The reasons behind the mass exodus of Zimbabweans 
are too complex to explore deeply here, but some of the obvious ones relate to growing 
socioeconomic hardships, political repression, socio-political instability and the perceived 
opportunities in particular destination countries (Alao, 2012; Sachikonye, 2011; McGregor 
and Primorac, 2010).   
The key trends of Zimbabwean emigration were as follows: firstly, there was a stream 
which departed when the Zimbabwean government embarked on what was referred to as 
the ‘Third Chimurenga’ when the controversial land reform programmes were implemented, 
which was followed by socioeconomic hardships and socio-political instability (Muzondidya, 
2011); another mass left after the disputed harmonised elections of 2005 and the 
implementation of ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ (drive out rubbish), a forced slum clearance 
programme implemented by the Zimbabwean government resulting more than 3 million 
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people being negatively affected directly and indirectly in socioeconomic terms (Solidarity 
Peace Trust, 2006; Vambe, 2008; Mlambo, 2008; Sachikonye,2011).  
The effects of Murambatsvina have been documented including how it destroyed 
livelihoods of Zimbabweans in the urban areas and the fracturing of the nation, among other 
socio-political effects (Vambe, 2008; Mlambo, 2008; Solidarity Peace Trust).  This intervention 
has been associated with the departure of another fragment of Zimbabweans, who left the 
country primarily in search of more secure habitats and livelihoods, leaving behind a fractured 
nation (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2010). Therefore, ‘Murambatsvina’ contributed to the 
fragmentation of the Zimbabwean nation, with another fragment of the Zimbabwean 
diaspora detaching from and leaving the nation in response to deprivation of livelihood 
opportunities (See Solidarity Peace Trust, 2005; Potts, 2008). This latter effect of 
Murambatsvina is often underemphasised by observers and commentators on Zimbabwe’s 
post-independence crisis. 
The last major stream of migrations followed the controversial and violent elections 
of 2008 when more than 200 people lost their lives through political violence perpetrated by 
the ruling ZANU PF and security agents (Sachikonye, 2011). At present, the political and 
socioeconomic situation in Zimbabwe that forced the majority of the Zimbabweans out of the 
country, continues unresolved again following the disputed 2013 elections (Chan and 
Gallagher, 2014). Therefore, Zimbabwean migrants generally tend to fear not only the 
deterioration of socioeconomic conditions back home, but also socio-political instability and 
politically-motivated violence among other conditions making return migration difficult for 
many of them scattered across the world. 
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3.4.2.1 Third Chimurenga and its Impact on Citizenship in Post-2000 Zimbabwe 
Contestations over constitutional and governance reforms also triggered another 
crisis resulting in the further deterioration and tensions between the Zimbabwean state and 
citizens. There had also been calls from various sections of the Zimbabwean society for reform 
of the old constitution adopted at the Lancaster Conference at the end of the armed 
resistance to colonial rule. Some of these calls had been coming from opposition political 
parties and civil society organisations such as the National Constitutional Assembly. In May 
1999, Mugabe established a constitutional commission to spearhead the constitutional 
reform process, and a draft constitution was developed (Raftopoulos, 2001; Mlambo, 2008). 
The draft constitution was decided upon through a national referendum in which 
approximately 54% voted against the draft, while 45% voted for it (Sachikonye, 2013; also see 
Raftopoulos, 2001; Manby, 2002; Mlambo, 2008). While ZANU PF campaigned for the draft 
and mobilised its supporters to vote for it, civil society organisations and opposition parties 
campaigned against it; and there had been some incidences of violence before the 
referendum (Manby, 2002). The rejection of the draft constitution alarmed ZANU PF. What 
made ZANU PF unsettled was how opposition political formations and civil society 
organisations had managed to mobilise the electorate so effectively to vote against the 
wishes of ZANU PF. The socio-political climate changed rapidly since the referendum and 
ZANU PF became increasingly savage in the way it dealt with civil society, opposition and part 
of the ordinary citizenry perceived to be opposed to ZANU PF.  
The subsequent parliamentary elections that followed in the same year 2000 were 
marred by violence, intimidation and denigration of opposition candidates through the state 
media during the campaign period (Manby, 2002). Political violence continued in 2001 
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towards presidential elections scheduled for year 2002; and it was reported that 48 people 
were killed before, during and after the elections (included those who were killed during land 
invasions) (Manby, 2002; Meredith, 2009). Subsequent harmonised elections in 2005 were 
similarly characterised by violence, harassment and intimidation of perceived supporters of 
opposition parties, mostly in the urban areas (Meredith, 2009). In short, the implementation 
of ESAP accompanied by the formation of the MDC again in 1999, the constitutional 
referendum in year 2000, and the start of violent farm seizures by the state in 1999, ushered 
in a new era of national polarisation and fragmentation.  
Consequently, these events and their aftermath witnessed the exclusion and 
marginalisation of different categories of the Zimbabwean nation predominantly on the basis 
of political affiliation and class (Raftopoulos, 2001). Marginalisation also had a spatial 
dimension, with urban dwellers frequently becoming targets of repression and violence in the 
context of social activism and protestation against the devastating effects of ESAP 
(Raftopoulos, 2001; Chan, 2003; Sachikonye, 2011). It is important to recognise, therefore, 
that this was not a new trend. This tendency to marginalise and delegitimise any targeted 
sections of the citizenry before they are ‘dealt’ with (often violently), also occurred during the 
1980s (Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2009). During the 1980s, the basis for this kind of exclusion was 
ethnicity, region and political affiliation, while class, race and political affiliation became 
prominent in post-2000 Zimbabwe. This logic fits well with the emerging post-2000 
relationship between the state and ZANU PF on the one hand, and civil society and opposition 
political formations on the other hand.  
After independence, although Mugabe and ZANU espoused the imperatives of 
reconciliation and national cohesion, their desire was for certain parts of the population 
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(particularly the whites) to stay out of politics and ZANU PF would leave them alone (see 
Meredith, 2009). What this entailed was that white Zimbabweans were being denied the right 
to participate equally in Zimbabwe’s political life and denial of opportunities to express their 
political preferences and choices, which are both key citizenship principles (see Isin, 2008). In 
this configuration, white Zimbabweans were to be partial citizens enjoying only economic 
citizenship, but with limited and qualified political citizenship. Their citizenship was partial 
and qualified in the sense that they would only retain their superior economic citizenship as 
long as they would participate under ZANU PF or did not participate in opposition political 
formations.  
However, when white Zimbabweans began to equally express their right to participate 
in the political life of the country the same way as other citizens, the ZANU PF and the 
state saw their move as a betrayal, and subsequently started treating them disdainfully 
(Meredith, 2009). The state and ZANU PF therefore decided to punish the white segment of 
the Zimbabwean nation, for their perceived recalcitrant tendencies of supporting the MDC 
(Meredith, 2009). Sporadic and violent farm invasions, and property seizures, ensued as early 
as 1999 spearheaded by war veterans (Zimbabwe NGO Human Rights Forum, 2001). In these 
circumstances, the government officially announced the ‘fast track land reform programme 
in 2001 (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2001). Some white commercial farmers were 
tortured and with over a dozen reportedly killed in the process; and the majority were 
displaced from the farms (Meredith, 2005; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2005). 
Similarly, most farmworkers working on those farms were also targeted in the harassment 
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and violence, with four reportedly killed while others lost their employment and became 
destitute (Manby, 2002; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2005; Mlambo, 2008).28  
Another significant event occurred in 2005 when the government embarked on a slum 
clearance programme (Mlambo, 2008; Raftopoulos, 2008). This programme known as 
Operation Murambatsvina (Operation Drive out Rubbish) saw the demolition of properties 
and built structures that ‘violated’ town planning provisions (Vambe, 2008).29 Consequently, 
many people were left homeless while informal traders were affected adversely (Vambe, 
2008). Although some ZANU PF members, ex-combatants, military and government officials 
had their structures destroyed in the process (see Sadomba, 2011; 2013), the backdrop and 
circumstances under which the intervention occurred make it easy to believe that it had other 
unstated aims. It is believed, for an instance, that the real and unstated aim of the programme 
was to flush out urbanites, perceived to be majority supporters of the opposition (Meredith, 
2005). The timing of the programme also made it is easy to believe that it aimed at punishing 
urban dwellers (mostly in slums and shantytowns) for their perceived rebellious voting 
behaviour in the previous elections (Meredith, 2005). 
 Another important development since around 2006 relates to the calls for the 
indigenisation of the economy, following what ZANU PF considered to be a successful land 
reform programme (Meredith, 2009). Although some view it as a new policy in ZANU PF, calls 
for indigenisation of the economy has been on the party’s (and Mugabe’s government) 
agenda since the early 1990s (Raftopoulos and Moyo, 1994). The key message has been that 
ZANU PF was the party of the people with a mandate to empower Zimbabweans hence the 
                                                          
28 The violent land seizures and farm displacements form part of the ‘Third Chimurenga’. 
29 It is important to note that not all demolished structures violated urban and town planning regulations. For example, in Bulawayo, 
Victoria Falls and Harare, approved structures were reportedly destroyed in the process. 
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next phase of the struggle was to bring wealth to the people (hupfumi kuvanhu). A law was 
passed in the form of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act - obliging foreign-
owned companies to cede 51% of their shares to black Zimbabweans (Government of 
Zimbabwe, 2008; Moore et al, 2013).  
Again, this measure largely targeted whites and other foreign investors while at the 
same time benefitting top government officials and party-connected entrepreneurs on the 
basis of patronage. The indigenisation efforts have recently intensified as part of the current 
Zimbabwe Agenda for Socioeconomic Transformation (ZIMASSET) policy blueprint adopted 
after the end of the GNU (Government of Zimbabwe, 2013). This resulted in the exodus of 
investors was accompanied by worsening unemployment, in turn causing a significant loss of 
income and livelihoods for the majority of working people.  
3.4.5 Understanding Contemporary Patterns of Emigration from Zimbabwe: 2008 and 
Beyond  
In citizenship theory, the state is charged with managing the collective affairs of the 
entire national community, including its resources (Isin, 2002). The assumption underpinning 
this notion is that the state is benevolent, accountable and has the interests of the entire 
community at heart. Another underlying premise of this view of modern citizenship is that 
those who govern do so by the consent of the citizens, thus giving them democratic legitimacy 
(Isin, 2002; Bellamy, 2008). This, however, has not been the case in Zimbabwe. The right of 
citizens to choose who governs them as a principle of liberal political citizenship, however, 
has been historically undermined in presidential elections in Zimbabwe. This is evidenced by 
constant electoral contestation and efforts by the ruling party to retain state power using 
violence, electoral malpractices and other methods.  
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 This was the case again in 2008, when the ruling ZANU PF made efforts to subvert the 
will and preferences of the majority of the citizenry using violence, intimidation and other 
tactics (Sachikonye, 2011; Meredith, 2009). For example, harmonised elections occurred in 
March 2008, with a less contested and less violent parliamentary election in which the MDC 
won majority of the seats. The 2008 presidential election was initially peaceful though tense, 
and Morgan Tsvangirai won 47.9% of the ballots while Robert Mugabe got 43.2% 
(Muzondidya, 2011; Sachikonye, 2011; Meredith, 2009). Although he won the election, 
Morgan Tsvangirai failed to win an outright majority which would allow him to form a 
government hence a run-off election was agreed. It would take place on 28th June 2008.  The 
campaign process however was excessively violent resulting in the killing of more than 200 
MDC supporters. Tsvangirai withdrew at the last minute from the presidential race.  
The outcome of this election was highly contested with allegations of rigging and 
manipulation of the voters’ role, intimidation, violence and other electoral malpractices 
(Sachikonye, 2011; Masunungure, 2008; Meredith, 2009). The involvement of the security 
forces in the perpetration of violence, harassment and intimidation, coercing people to vote 
for ZANU PF, also marked a fundamental departure from democratic norms and principles 
(Sachikonye, 2012; Masunungure, 2008). This resulted in international condemnation of the 
entire election process, the nullification of the outcome and the formation of a government 
of national unity between ZANU PF and the two MDCs. Although there were tensions and 
contestations in the coalition, the GNU period from 2009 to 2013 was marked by relative 
socioeconomic stability (Chan and Gallagher, 2015).  
This GNU period also witnessed the drafting and passing of a new constitution and the 
enactment of progressive political reforms culminating into the 2013 election, in which ZANU 
124 | P a g e  
 
PF extraordinarily did not rely on violence but covert intimidation, harassment and arrests of 
political opponents (Chan and Gallagher, 2015). This relative stability in government and 
change of political strategy by ZANU PF gave an impression of a reformed ZANU PF to the 
electorate, with devastating implications for opposition parties at the 2013 polls (Chan and 
Gallagher, 2013). Although ZANU PF won the election, there were largely unsubstantiated 
concerns relating to lack of electoral transparency and allegations of rigging of the ballots 
(Chan and Gallagher, 2015).  
The trend has been that of intimidation, harassment and manipulation of the process 
and outcome, including the tendency for violence to occur before, during and after the 
elections. In other words, there tends to be violence during election season in Zimbabwe, 
which often leads to subsequent displacement and waves of emigration of those affected by 
the ills associated with the electoral process and undesirable outcomes. Elections in 
Zimbabwe have, therefore, not worked in the interest of nation-building as evidenced by the 
existence of election-related socio-political divisions that have emerged across the 
Zimbabwean society. Zimbabwe has historically been a polarised society and these divisions 
have often become more defined and manifest during election times.30 However, this 
phenomenon has become more complicated since the tenure of the GNU but this dynamic 
seems to have changed with political orientation having become more fragmented, 
ambivalent and fluid since the 2013 elections, beyond the traditional ZANU PF /MDC binary 
(Chan and Gallagher, 2015).31  In other words, although polarisation of society on the basis of 
                                                          
30 Party-political polarisation did not start with ZANU PF and the MDC; instead, it has a long history. For example, it played out during the 
1980, 1985, 1990 and subsequent elections.  
31 Chan and Gallagher observe how traditional opposition party supporters have developed mixed feelings towards the dominant political 
parties, unsure which to support. For lack of a viable alternative, others ended up voting for the MDC during 2013 elections.  
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political affiliation, post-2013 political developments are showing signs of a shift from 
polarisation, to more complexity, fracturing and fluidity.   
The above events help illustrates how socio-politically divided the Zimbabwean nation 
had become after 2008; and this phenomenon represents a significant migratory pressure 
which directly led to the flight of thousands across the country’s borders. In other words, 
electoral contestation in Zimbabwe goes to show that choosing who governs, as a 
fundamental component of citizenship in its liberal sense, has been a highly contested 
process, culminating in the displacement and flight of another significant fragment of the 
Zimbabwean nation, particularly victims of political violence, intimidation and harassment in 
their local communities.  In the next few paragraphs, I will identify some of those adversely 
affected by the crisis of belonging and citizenship since the year 2000 (most of whom resorted 
to emigration) and how they may have been so disadvantaged.  
3.5 Concluding Discussion: Patterns of Exclusion and Inclusion in Post-Independence 
Zimbabwe? 
One of the key features of citizenship struggles in post-independence Zimbabwe 
described in preceding sections of this chapter has been the creation of winners and losers at 
any particular epoch of the nation’s history. One of the cumulative effects of socio-political 
and economic developments since independence in Zimbabwe is that some sections of the 
nation benefited materially while others were deprived of the opportunities, rights, 
entitlements and access to national resources. This was largely perpetrated by the state at 
various times and by various means since independence (Sachikonye, 2011).  Before 
independence, those who largely benefitted from their membership in the colony were 
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obviously the whites on the basis of their race; but this dynamic has been rapidly changing 
since independence.  
In the immediate aftermath of the armed struggle, when for the first few transitional 
years, everyone was optimistic about independence and there were signs that the new 
Zimbabwe would benefit all who belong in it. This dream however only lasted until 1983 when 
Gukurahundi ensued (Raftopoulos, 2013). During that time and soon afterwards, it was the 
majority Shona-speaking people in Mashonaland region some of whom seemed to benefit 
because of their ethnic identity and region.32 Hostilities ended however with ZAPU and ZANU 
signing the unity accord in the year 1987. 
  Dynamics shifted again and it appeared there would be another attempt at real 
national unity between the different segments of the Zimbabwean nation. It was not until the 
adoption of ESAP, the 1992 drought, awarding of the $50 000 gratuities to liberation war 
veterans and the decision to intervene in the DRC war, with devastating fiscal implications, 
that another phase of deprivation began this time caused not by overt conflict but along 
socioeconomic lines (Mlambo, 2008). The social impact of the Zimbabwe crisis has been the 
most visible and devastating on the majority of Zimbabweans (Murisa and Nyaguse, 2015). 
And the dynamics of material deprivation during this era largely followed a class dimension 
with working class urbanites having borne most of the brunt of structural adjustment 
programme – this segment of the Zimbabwean society was left worse off largely in terms of 
their material conditions due to biting socioeconomic hardships. The bourgeoisie as well as 
the ruling elites who were dependent on the state for material benefits by way of patronage, 
                                                          
32 Shona-speaking people were in the minority compared to rest of the nation made up of people in other regions - Manicaland, 
Masvingo, Matabeleland North and South regions combined. 
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corruption and nepotism, largely benefitted during this episode of the post-independence 
national crises.  
The turn to the new millennium was also met with growing despair and despondency 
due to worsening socioeconomic hardships in Zimbabwe (Mlambo, 2008). The Zimbabwean 
state, through its system of patronage and partisanship, became the dominant employer, 
allocator of opportunities and bearer of opportunities for upward mobility for those that tow 
the party line (Ake, 1992; Hyden, 1983). For example, ZANU PF party elites, senior 
government officials, securocrats and some supporters benefitted from various state 
resources including land grabbed during the chaotic land reform exercise, while others 
grabbed companies as part of the ongoing indigenisation and empowerment initiative in 
recent years (Moore et al, 2015; Meredith, 2009; Manby, 2002). Similarly, those who fought 
in the liberation struggle continue to pledge their allegiance to ZANU PF and Mugabe and in 
so doing continue to claim special treatment and benefits by presenting their grievances and 
demands for top positions in government and state-owned firms, diplomatic posts, farmland 
and mining concessions. 
The majority of Zimbabweans however seem to have lost more significantly and in 
different ways. For example, the ways in which the Zimbabwean state and the ruling ZANU 
PF party ascribed and imposed the political identity of enemy of the country/enemy within in 
alienating ways, partly explains the fracturing of the Zimbabwean nation (Meredith, 2009). 
In ZANU PF discourses, political enemies are often linked to the past chief detractor - Britain 
- as a way of delegitimising their claim to Zimbabweanness. Some sections of the population 
were therefore labelled and identified as ‘sell-outs’, ‘puppets’, ‘agents of regime change’, 
‘unpatriotic’ and ‘treasonous’ (see Tendi, 2010; Chiumbu and Muswemwa, 2012). The 
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victimisation and targeting of different categories of those perceived ‘enemies of Zimbabwe’ 
not occurred only in the opposition political formations and civil society, but across the entire 
society in ways that further divided an already differentiated nation. Furthermore, those 
living in the urban areas, particularly in the high density, low income areas perceived to be 
opposition party strongholds were targeted for violence and intimidation for being sell-outs 
and supporters of the regime change agenda (Mlambo, 2008). They were also deprived in 
terms of service delivery and housing opportunities such as land allocation for building 
purposes.  
The youth were also alienated for being born frees, not having participated in the 
struggle and for tendency to support the opposition parties, while intellectuals were alienated 
for nurturing democratic political ideas. Furthermore, because of their race, historical 
antipathy and perceived support for the opposition, white Zimbabweans were delegitimised 
by being labelled ‘enemies of the state’ and therefore alienated from the nation by being 
associated with colonial rule and the British (Meredith, 2009; Tendi, 2010; Chiumbu and 
Musemwa, 2012). As such, they were expected to have a political voice in the post-
independence national dispensation and attempts to participate in political life was brutally 
repelled by ZANU PF through land seizures after 2000. 
Similarly, ethnic and other minorities were abandoned by the state under the 
leadership of ZANU PF for being perceived different, strangers or disloyal to the nation 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). For example, Zimbabwe also hosts a sizeable immigrant population 
born and domiciled within its territory; and their ancestors and parents historically 
immigrated into Zimbabwe in search of employment from as far as Malawi and Mozambique 
(Masunungure and Koga, 2013). Legal status, which sits at the heart of citizenship in the state, 
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was denied to these sections of the Zimbabwean nation, particularly those who are 
Zimbabwean by birth (Manby, 2009). This denial of legal citizenship is premised on the 
Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act no. 23 of 1984 (Government of Zimbabwe, 1984). Without formal 
legal citizenship status were not only considered ‘alien’, but also deprived them of substantive 
benefits and entitlements associated with citizenship (see Isin, 2002; Manby, 2009). For 
example, Masunungure and Koga observe that:  
The regime disparagingly referred to the migrant population as ‘totemless aliens’, and 
via citizenship legislation, it deliberately excluded these populations from voting and 
benefiting from other government programmes like land redistribution.33 
Subsequently, this often-ignored category of the Zimbabwean population became completely 
invisible in the Zimbabwean social and political landscape due to their exclusion.  
This pattern of exclusion from meaningful substantive citizenship also applies to the plight 
of the coloured community which has been largely marginalised; which explains why 
Muzondidya (1999) referred to both immigrants and coloureds in Zimbabwe as ‘invisible 
minorities’. The material conditions of other groups deteriorated including farmworkers and 
farm managers; and urban dwellers some of whom were left homeless and deprived of their 
livelihoods as a result of a slum clearance programme famously known as Operation 
Murambatsvina (Operation Drive Out Rubbish) (Vambe, 2008; Chiumbu, 2012). All the above 
dynamics represent failed citizenship, particularly when citizenship is conceived in terms of 
the relationship between the state and citizen (See Lewis, 1998). These issues can, therefore, 
                                                          
33 See Masunungure and Koga’s paper here: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/164681/afrobriefno116.pdf  
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be viewed as manifestations of the crisis of national citizenship, which in turn drove people 
out of Zimbabwe.  
I have sought to demonstrate above that what troubles Zimbabwe could be thought of as 
a deep-rooted crisis of national citizenship affecting not only Zimbabwe but many post-
independence Sub Saharan African countries. This crisis has manifested in different political 
and socioeconomic problems, to which citizens have responded to this failure of conventional 
modes of citizenship in a variety of ways, including flight and dispersal. The multifacetedness 
of the citizenship crisis described above, resonates with the fact that Zimbabwean migration 
patterns have been mixed (Crush et al, 2015). This chapter shows how national modes of 
citizenship based on liberal understanding of citizenship have failed in post-independence 
Zimbabwe, and this failure has manifested in political and socioeconomic problems pushing 
Zimbabweans out of the country.  
It has also become evident that several fragments of the Zimbabwean nation have 
departed the country at various distinct phases of the unfolding national crisis since 
independence, including the liberation war, post-war, ‘Gukurahundi’, ESAP, land reform, 
‘Murambatsvina and 27th June 2008 elections being some of the waves of departure from 
Zimbabwe. This difference in the causes, times and circumstances surrounding their 
departure represents another set of fault lines along which the Zimbabwean diaspora remains 
fragmented outside the country. This chapter has discussed elements of national citizenship 
and how deficient these elements have been in post-independence. However, it would have 
been more interesting to see how citizenship plays at sub-national, with a particular emphasis 
on how Zimbabweans negotiate citizenship and contest exclusion at community and local 
levels. This would be a fascinating line of inquiry going forward, after this PhD.  
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 The question that, then, becomes pertinent in this study relates to whether this 
emigration has been accompanied by any new modes of citizenship; and if so, how can they 
be characterised. This is the primary question this thesis seeks to answer, and subsequent 
chapters demonstrate the fragmented ways the Zimbabwean diaspora begin to imagine and 
perform citizenship in different contexts they are hosted. It will also become clear how arenas 
of citizenship change and multiply, with different fragments of the Zimbabwean diaspora 
engaging as citizens in different arenas and at different scales. It will also become apparent 
that these differences in how diasporas imagine and practice citizenship while outside 
Zimbabwe are mediated by different sets of factors including context, past experiences, 
reasons for emigration, gender, immigration status and so on. 
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Chapter Four: Being Political in Multiple Ways: Experiences of the Zimbabwean Diaspora 
4.1 Chapter Introduction 
Citizenship is often understood as the vertical relationship between the state and its 
citizens; and citizens are formally recognised on the basis of their formal legal status which 
qualifies them as citizens (Oliver and Heater, 1994; Janoski, 1998). Citizens are not only 
recognised on the basis of their legal status, but a set of rights and entitlements also 
accompany that status (Bosniak, 2000; Bellamy, 2008). I have highlighted earlier, that 
citizenship is performed differently and one of the ways, from a republicanist perspective of 
citizenship, is through political participation (see Thomas, 2000). In other words, to be a 
citizen is to be political (see Isin, 2002). But what is not always clear is how people become 
political, especially when hosted outside their countries of origin.   
I have also demonstrated in earlier chapters how large sections of the Zimbabwean 
citizenry, most of whom decided to emigrate and are subjects of this inquiry, did not have a 
meaningful opportunity to partake in mainstream politics back in Zimbabwe (see Sachikonye, 
2011; Betts and Jones, 2016). This denial of meaningful substantive citizenship in its liberal 
sense of rights, political participation and welfare, manifested in different ways including 
denial of the right to vote, manipulation of citizens’ electoral choices, violation of civil and 
political rights, and state violence (see Betts and Jones, 2016; Dorman, 2016). This limited the 
majority of citizens’ ability to influence politics and the state in any meaningful way, which 
fundamentally amounts to a denial of citizenship. However, diasporas have been observed to 
find opportunities of contesting authoritarianism and repression across geographical distance 
(see Baubock, 1994; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Kuhlmann, 2008; also see Betts and Jones, 
2016). This chapter seeks to determine if this is indeed true by looking at the extent to which 
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these observations reflect the experiences of Zimbabweans hosted in the UK and South Africa. 
If true, this chapter will also consider the way (s) those Zimbabweans become political while 
hosted in these respective countries.  
4.1.1 Transnational Migration and Relocation of Politics 
This thesis starts by concurring that emigration is indeed accompanied by the 
relocation of politics, with the different destination countries in which Zimbabweans are 
hosted becoming new sites of Zimbabwean politics. A number of studies have shown that 
diasporas engage in political activities across geographical distance and transcending 
territorial boundaries in different contexts, including Zimbabweans in Britain (See Baubock, 
2006; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001; also see Kuhlmann, 2008; Pasura, 2008). This cross-border 
and long-distance nature of political participation, as practiced by diasporas, adds to the 
transnational nature of diaspora citizenship discussed in the introductory chapter of this 
thesis.  
There are at least three challenges with transnational forms of politics as practiced by 
diasporas in diverse contexts: firstly, the emphasis is often on overt and material aspects of 
transnational political practices such as diaspora vote, protest, lobbying and other activities 
aimed at directly influencing homeland politics, negating political subjectivities and other 
ways of being political (see Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Baubock, 2003; Kuhlmann, 2008; 
Pasura, 2008). Secondly, it is not always clear who participates and who does not, which 
conceals the fact that diasporas (diverse as they tend to be) do not partake in homeland 
politics in the same fashion.  
Another deficit of existing scholarship on diaspora politics is that it underemphasises 
how modes of diaspora political participation are mediated and shaped by an interplay of 
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context, geography and history among other factors. This thesis generates insights on these 
three and other aspects of diaspora politics, with particular reference to experiences of 
Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa. It argues that, yes, Zimbabweans may find 
opportunity to participate in political life of the homeland, but not everyone has the 
opportunity or capacity to influence the politics of Zimbabwe from afar. 
This thesis observes, instead, that different categories of Zimbabweans act politically 
in relation to Zimbabwe in different ways, which represents another dimension of the 
fragmented nature of diaspora citizenship. While some become involved in outward political 
activism and mobilisation mediated by the state, external political party structures, diaspora 
associations and non-state actors, others find other ways of being political.  This thesis also 
acknowledges the different barriers to political mobilisation, leading some sections of the 
Zimbabwean diaspora (perhaps the majority) to start engaging in other kinds of political 
activity not directly aimed at influencing the state and mainstream political processes. These 
include discursive forms of politics by way of everyday political talk (online and offline) with 
compatriots within the host country and beyond. Finally, using empirical data, this study also 
acknowledges and explains the disengagement of some sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora 
in relation to the Zimbabwean state and its politics, particularly those that start to develop 
interest in politics of the host state. 
4.1.2 Different Ways of Being Political  
The ways in which different segments of the Zimbabwean migrant population engage 
in political activity outside their countries of origin are complex and diverse. They are also 
mediated by context and many other factors, and this chapter will highlight these dynamics 
of participation and non-participation. And I want to rely on Pasura’s multifaceted 
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conceptualisation of migrant participation and non-participation, which recognises that 
political agency of Zimbabwean migrants is asserted in different ways (Pasura, 2008). Pasura 
categorises Zimbabwean migrants into four types depending on the degree of their activism, 
which I discuss in the following section. For example, Pasura observes sections of the 
Zimbabwean diaspora that do not partake in overt political activism due to their complete 
loss of interest in Zimbabwean politics, referred to as silent (Pasura, 2008). This category of 
Zimbabweans was also present in the data from this study.  
Empirical evidence supports this observation, and goes to explain this disengagement 
and disinterest in Zimbabwean politics among those in this category. Since citizenship has an 
affective and emotional component, one of the explanations for their apathy could be located 
in their senses of belonging and conceptions of home, which may have changed. In other 
words, this category of Zimbabweans may not necessarily have become completely inactive 
politically, but perhaps start developing an interest in the politics of the host country where 
they increasingly feel at home. Empirical data suggests that some sections of the 
Zimbabweans no longer solely and universally see Zimbabwe as their ‘home’ both in 
sentimental and material terms, having developed multiple affinities towards the host 
country (see Psura, 2010). This has implications on their desire, motivation and interest in 
Zimbabwean politics, and perhaps the lack of interest by this section of the diaspora partly 
suggests that they have become interested in the political life of the host country in which 
they now feel they belong. 
Pasura also identifies a section of the migrant community that are visible depicting 
those actively engaged in migrant politics (Pasura, 2008). As I pointed out, this is the dominant 
material conception of diaspora political activism, emphasising how diasporas engage in 
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different political activities aimed at influencing the politics of their home countries 
(Kuhlmann, 2008; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008). This kind of 
diaspora political mobilisation includes activities such as extraterritorial voting, lobbying, 
protest action, electoral campaigning and political party fundraising (See Kuhlmann (2008); 
Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008; Pasura, 2008).34 It is possible that some Zimbabweans hosted in 
South Africa and the UK may engage in some of these activities, but not everyone has the 
capacity to be involved in such activism for different reasons.  
How different sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora engaged politically was mediated 
by different factors. These included place of settlement, gender, immigration status, history, 
background and personal experience among several others, make it more convenient and 
desirable for some to participate than others. Similarly, participation in political activism is 
not a fixed and static phenomenon, but turbulent and fluctuating owing to different factors. 
For example, migrants may get involved in a campaign for tactical reasons, perhaps because 
they want to boost their claim for asylum; while on the next day they may not see the benefit 
of doing so. This makes it important to examine the dynamics of participation and non-
participation to determine who participates and who does not in different contexts. 
The above dynamics, therefore, potentially leave some sections of the population not 
engaging in this distinct kind of political activism. And these are often viewed as inactive or, 
in Pasura’s terms, dormant (Pasura, 2008). The dormancy of these Zimbabweans is a product 
of the dynamics of participation and non-participation alluded to above, which I will map out 
in the following empirical sections of this chapter. But, as findings of this study will show, 
                                                          
34 Itzigsohn and Villacres empirically observed this kind of political transnationalism, especially external voting, 
among Dominican and Salvadoran migrants living in the US.  
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some Zimbabweans categorised as inactive or dormant because of their inability or lack of 
desire to participate in what Flint refers to as ‘Big P’ political activism, actually partake in other 
forms of political activity, including talking about politics as part of their everyday lives (Flint, 
2003).35 In this respect, on the basis of empirical findings, I will also argue that non-
participation indeed constitutes a way of exercising political agency by those who shun formal 
politics and overt political activism, opting for other more liberating ways of being political.  
Furthermore, as I have argued earlier, the Zimbabwean diaspora comes from a history 
of exclusion, repression and denial of meaningful citizenship, as is generally accepted by 
scholars on African politics (see Ake, 1990; Azarya, 1988). Therefore, although some may 
engage in ‘Big P’ political activities, those who become disenfranchised and avoid 
participation through organised civil society (perhaps the majority of those historically and 
structurally disempowered) may opt into alternative forms of politics. This could be the case 
with Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK, most of whom have been observed to be 
disengaged from overt political mobilisation (see Pasura, 2008). 
One of the ways in which the Zimbabwean diaspora express their political agency 
takes the form of everyday, unofficial and unorganised forms of discursive political activity 
(see Scott, 1985).36 And I suggest that Flint’s distinction between ‘Big P’ and ‘small p’ 
participation in political life, as a way of better understanding the different kinds of political 
activism the Zimbabwean diaspora potentially engages in (Flint, 2003). In Flint’s terms, the 
‘Big P’ politics is concerned with the ways citizens engage formally with the structures of the 
                                                          
35 Flint characterises ‘big P’ politics as an old mode of politics centred around the state and its geopolitical 
relations, while ‘small p’ politics was not practiced by ‘card-carrying’ members of political parties. The latter is 
considered ‘new’, identity-based, mode of politics often not always based on direct engagement with the 
state.  
36 See James Scott (1985) explores everyday strategies by which marginalised people resist and contest 
repression and domination. 
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state, while ‘small p’ focusses on the micro-politics manifest in citizens’ everyday lives outside 
the parameters of the state. This kind of political activity also tends to be vernacular, 
encompassing seemingly ‘non-political’ aspects, and occurs in different online and offline 
spaces.37  
There are various spaces in which discursive political activity occurs within the 
Zimbabwean diaspora, including the home, church, workplace, at funerals and in other social 
spaces where Zimbabweans meet and engage in informal political talk. There are also online 
platforms for such activity and Pasura correctly identifies the epistemic tendencies of those 
who engage in networking and ‘cyberpolitics’ on the internet (Pasura, 2008). However, 
Pasura’s characterisation of Zimbabweans’ political activity as ‘cyber-politics’ only captures 
the platform on which it occurs which is ‘cyber’ in nature. In this study, I want to add to this 
conception by exploring and characterising the discursive nature and substance of the 
political activity the majority of ordinary Zimbabweans engage in online and offline, what I 
will also refer to as everyday political talk. Pasura’s framework is useful in several ways, 
including its recognition that migrants partake in politics in multiple ways. What also makes 
Pasura’s analytical framework useful is that it acknowledges that some sections of the migrant 
community may not actively partake in political mobilisation for different reasons. It also 
recognises that not all migrants engage overtly and actively in politics in material ways, and I 
will use empirical findings to map out the different ways by which different categories of 
migrants engage in politics, including through every day political talk online and offline. 
  
                                                          
37 See Wright et al (2012)’s work on the everyday political discourses on the internet. 
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4.2 Being Political in Different Ways: Empirical Dynamics  
An average of 30% of the participants in South Africa (25% in Johannesburg and 5% in 
Cape Town) were engaged in ‘Big P’ political activism and mobilisation aimed at influencing 
the Zimbabwean state, homeland politics in general. They engaged in different activities 
including campaigning to vote in the next Zimbabwean elections, seeking political 
representation in the legislature and involvement with external structures of Zimbabwean 
political parties. However, in the UK, an average of 25% of participants engaged in overt 
political activism and mobilisation aimed at influencing political processes in Zimbabwe, 
through protesting, marching or picketing against the Zimbabwean government. Participants 
in this category across the three research sites tended to be men aged over 40 years and, 
although the majority of them were legally resident in both host countries, they held different 
immigration statuses. Most of these participants had previously been involved in political and 
social activism prior to their departure from Zimbabwe, and some escaped from the country 
for fear of being persecuted due to their political and civic activism. They were settled in 
different parts of the three places, with some living in low-income and others in more affluent 
parts of Johannesburg, Cape Town and south-east England. 
 However, in both host countries, participants without valid immigration status or 
completely undocumented frequently reported not being involved in overt political activities. 
There was another category composed of an average of 75% who did not engage in overt 
political activism and mobilisation, but were politically engaged through the sharing of views 
and preferences about Zimbabwean politics through various platforms. Interestingly, nearly 
half of these participants (mostly under 30 and women) had never voted in Zimbabwean 
elections while outside Zimbabwe. The same sub-category of younger participants had also 
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never actively participated in any political mobilisation with a focus on Zimbabwean politics. 
In terms of ‘Big P’ political participation, these participants viewed themselves as politically 
inactive, and it would have been interesting to find out if this was just a continuation of their 
voting apathy from back in Zimbabwe. Perhaps some had never voted before and, if so, such 
enduring apathy would not be attributable to diaspora conditions. This category of those who 
did not participate in mainstream political processes could be divided into two distinct sub-
categories, as discussed below: 
Firstly, there was a category of participants who engaged in frequent and sustained 
informal discussion and debate on Zimbabwean political issues, online and offline. For 
example, a total of 80% (25% in Johannesburg and 45% in Cape Town) of participants in South 
Africa indicated their involvement in political debates and discussions on the internet and 
mobile technologies such as WhatsApp groups engaging fellow Zimbabweans living in 
Zimbabwe and other parts of the world on Zimbabwean political issues. Almost 20% of these 
participants indicated that they engaged in a discussion about Zimbabwean politics at least 
once every week with fellow Zimbabweans in Cape Town and Johannesburg. Such political 
conversations occurred predominantly with groups formed through church and work. 
On the other hand, this sub-category was noticeably larger in the UK where more than 
75% of the participants reported having engaged in political discussion and debate online. 
This was achieved through online discussion and debate, as well as following online news 
outlets for updates on the political and socioeconomic situation back in Zimbabwe. These 
participants were relatively younger and women. They were also of mixed settlement 
locations and immigration statuses, including some who were completely undocumented. 
They also tended to be of higher socioeconomic status, being formally employed, relatively 
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highly educated and living in relatively affluent parts of Cape Town and Johannesburg. This 
sub-category was larger in the south-east England compared to the those in Cape Town and 
Johannesburg. This was partly because participants in the UK reported spending more time 
on the internet than in South Africa due to the greater accessibility and affordability of 
internet and mobile technologies in the UK.  
UK-based participants were also spread evenly across South East England. Some of the 
spaces on which participants in both host countries engaged included social media platforms 
such as Twitter, YouTube and Facebook. It is also worth pointing out that participants in the 
UK almost exclusively engaged online due to cheaper and wider broadband coverage, while 
a larger proportion in South Africa relied on WhatsApp and other mobile platforms. Another 
sub-category comprised an average of 35% in South Africa (15% in Cape Town and 20% in 
Johannesburg) of those who were not participating in any visible form of political activism on 
Zimbabwean politics, but tended to express their political views, feelings and preferences 
towards the Zimbabwean state through vernacular discourses, built-in within their everyday 
conversations with fellow Zimbabweans. Such talk often occurred in different informal 
settings where Zimbabweans met, including at work, church and at home. 
 I also witnessed and took part in political conversations during my travel from Cape 
Town to Zimbabwe as part of my fieldwork, which suggests that Zimbabweans are indeed 
always thinking and talking about politics wherever they are. On the other hand, there was a 
significant proportion in the UK with 40% engaging in activities that fit in this category. One 
of the defining features of these unofficial, micro-political activities was that, although not 
happening in conventional arenas of politics, participants attached political meanings to those 
conversations. It was also evident that Zimbabweans engage in political talk various social 
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spaces including home, church, workplace and in asylum and immigration queues at the 
Department of Home Affairs among other places.  
Lastly, a small proportion of participants displayed a lack of interest in Zimbabwean 
politics, particularly those who had acquired citizenship status in the UK and South Africa. For 
example, around 5% in South Africa (6% in Cape Town and 4% in Johannesburg) indicated that 
they had totally lost interest in Zimbabwean politics for different reasons. Less than half of 
these participants cited their engagement with the mainstream political system of South 
Africa as a reason for this disengagement. Other reasons were due to uncertainty about their 
future back in their country of origin, or likelihood of return. They also displayed a lack of trust 
in politicians and mainstream politics and some of their preoccupations included chasing 
livelihood opportunities and fighting to obtain a secure legal status in South Africa where they 
felt their future was. Although some were undocumented and living precariously, most of 
them tended to have lived in the host country for not less than 10 years, and tended to have 
acquired citizenship status and felt established.  
On the other hand, a higher proportion of 20% in the UK indicated their complete 
disinterest in Zimbabwean politics, for almost similar reasons to those given by participants 
in South Africa. For example, about 15% of those disinterested in Zimbabwean politics 
reported having taken an interest in UK politics where they were beginning to feel ‘at home’. 
This latter sub-category was composed mostly of adults with indefinite leave to remain in the 
UK and British citizenship and who had lived in the UK for an average of 15 years; and they 
participated in UK politics mainly by voting in local government and national elections. The 
remaining 5% expressed total disinterest in both the politics of Zimbabwe and the UK for 
many reasons, including not identifying with Zimbabwe any more, not seeing the benefits of 
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participating in politics, and being too busy pursuing livelihood opportunities. This shows that 
indeed diasporas express their political agency in different ways, and those seemingly not 
participating or disinterested in Zimbabwean politics may be partaking in the politics of other 
polities other than their country of origin.   
4.2.1 ‘Big P’ Political Mobilisation and Its Limits 
Many studies have shown that diaspora populations find ways to mobilise politically 
in order to influence the politics of their homelands (Baubock, 2008; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 
2001; Kuhlmann, 2008; Pasura; 2008). For example, they may push for political representation 
in their home country legislatures, demand extraterritorial voting rights, join political parties 
and lobby the state (Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008; Kuhlmann, 2008; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003; 
Lafleur, 2013). The Dominican diaspora in the US also demonstrates how migrants maintain 
attachments with their home countries across geographical space, taking advantage of 
flexible citizenship measures such as dual citizenship arrangements (Itzigsohn and Villacres, 
2008; Baubock, 2008). Members of the Dominican diaspora, for instance, were observed 
engaging actively in homeland politics to the extent of running for political office, 
campaigning while based in the US and funding political campaigns back in their country of 
origin (Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008). Some diasporas vote while outside their countries of 
origin, while others travel during election time to vote in their home country constituencies 
(see Lafleur, 2013). This pattern is confirmed in the case of Zimbabweans by my findings which 
show that 30% hosted in South Africa and 25% in the UK engaged in political activism aimed 
at contesting their authoritarian and repressive state back in Zimbabwe.  
Other specific ways by which participants directly sought to influence political 
processes included campaigning for extraterritorial (diaspora) voting, protesting against the 
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Zimbabwean state at the Zimbabwean embassies and consular offices in London, Cape Town 
and Pretoria, lobbying the two host governments (UK and South Africa) to apply pressure on 
the Zimbabwean government to embark on political reforms and mobilising political party 
funding. For example, I interviewed 6 participants working as activists with Zimbabwean 
associations and NGOs such as the PASSOP in Cape Town, Zimbabwe Exiles Forum in 
Johannesburg and the Zimbabwe Association in London.  They used various strategies aimed 
at influencing relevant political actors so that they respond to the longstanding Zimbabwean 
crisis.  These included the systematic use of information through the media, website 
publications and research reports to publicise the ongoing political and socioeconomic crisis 
in Zimbabwe, in a bid to make the world aware of any such developments.  
There were also some participants who had become card-carrying members of the 
MDC-T and other opposition political parties, with a total of 18 participants in South Africa 
and 6 in the UK actively involved in the external (provincial) structures of their parties. This 
has also been the case with Zimbabweans in South Africa in recent past who have consistently 
sought to push the South African government to change its foreign policy, advocating for a 
tougher stance against ZANU PF and the Zimbabwean government.38 The above kind of overt 
political activity by Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK closely resembles what is 
referred to as ‘visible’ participation by Pasura, discussed earlier (Pasura, 2008). It is important 
to note that the degree of effectiveness of this mode of political mobilisation is ambiguous.  
                                                          
38 In 2013, the Zimbabwe Exiles Forum (ZEF) approached the Supreme Court of Appeal to file a case against 
ZANU PF and senior government officials involved in the torture of MDC activists during a police raid on the 
party’s headquarters in Harare. The ZEF sought a court order obliging the South African authorities to conduct 
an investigation that would result in the prosecution of the perpetrators of the crime, in terms of South 
Africa’s obligations to the International Criminal Court. 
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The success of these lobbying efforts depends on a number of factors, including the 
openness and inclusivity of the foreign policy-making process in the host country, particularly 
in some countries where policy-makers often invite diaspora participation on foreign policy 
issues affecting their countries. Although participants in the UK reported that the British 
government has occasionally solicited the views of Zimbabweans, it was often the ‘voice’ of 
civil society elites and organised associations that was heard. Ordinary Zimbabweans were 
often not consulted on foreign policy making on Zimbabwe. On the other hand, South Africa 
was accused of not opening up any space for the participation of Zimbabweans in its foreign 
policy-making.  
Most of the scholarship on diaspora politics appears optimistic about their capacity to 
influence homeland political processes across geographical distance (Ostegaard-
Nielsen,2003; Kuhlmann, 2008; Pasura, 2008; Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008; Lafleur, 2013). 
But, as indicated in the summary of findings above, not everyone will have an equal 
opportunity to participate in ‘Big P’ political activity for different reasons. In fact, some 
participants were better positioned and more likely to participate in certain kinds of political 
activity than others depending on their backgrounds, host country contexts, geographical 
distance and several other factors. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the dynamics 
surrounding the participation and non-participation of different categories of participants in 
‘Big P’ politics in these two contexts.  
4.2.1.1 Diaspora (Non) Participation in Historical Context 
Histories and background experiences of various categories of diaspora populations 
sometimes continue to shape the ways they participate in political life while outside the 
country. As such, how the Zimbabwean diaspora population engages/fails to engage in overt 
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political activism has to be understood in its historical context. Particularly, the tendency by 
the majority of the participants to not get involved in different kinds of outward political 
activism is traceable to the historical modes of citizenship in Zimbabwe, designed to exclude 
the majority of black Africans from participating in political and governance processes. The 
majority of the participants in this study came from a background of impoverishment and 
repression back in Zimbabwe. Therefore, of course depending on their age and positions in 
Zimbabwe’s social structure, their propensity to engage (disengage) in ‘Big P’ political activism 
may have been directly or indirectly affected by the historical processes described below.  
Participation in political life has also been historically bifurcated in post-colonial 
contexts where Zimbabweans originate, with some sections of the citizenry more actively and 
outwardly engaged in mainstream political life than others (see Mamdani, 1996; Ekeh, 1975). 
Although a lot of patchy and impromptu rebellions, protests and other forms of political 
action have occurred in different African contexts, there has not been an entrenched culture 
of political struggle among the majority of ordinary citizens since independence, at least in 
relation to Zimbabwe (Turok, 1987).  This relatively non-participant political culture is rooted 
in repressive colonial and post-colonial regimes which limited spaces for meaningful 
participation in political life, and this has been the case with Zimbabwe too. 
Exposure to years of violence, intimidation and repression by the post-independent 
state which has grown authoritarian in many countries has reinforced a sense of internalised 
powerlessness and fear among the African citizenry. Sachikonye, for example, characterised 
Zimbabwean citizens as: 
 a society traumatized by fear, withdrawal and collective depression based on past 
memories of violence, intimidation and harassment (Sachikonye, 2011: xvii).  
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The net effect of the above forces in Zimbabwe and many other African countries has been 
to make it difficult for a large section of Zimbabweans to engage actively and meaningfully in 
political life.39  
It is, therefore, not coincidental that only 25% of the UK-based and 30% of South 
Africa-based participants who reported their involvement in overt political activism, tended 
to have been historically involved with political and social activism back in Zimbabwe. Some 
Zimbabweans simply lack experience with navigating political institutions and processes, 
owing to their individual backgrounds. Where they lived, their socioeconomic status and what 
they were able to accomplish in their lives, affects their propensity to take part in political 
activism. This pattern was confirmed by a 55-year-old woman named Mai Unendoro in Cape 
Town:  
I have never taken part in any demonstration or march organised by MDC or ZCTU 
during the time of ESAP back in Zimbabwe. I was always scared of taking part in 
demonstrations because people always ended up being arrested and beaten by the riot 
police. That is what used to happen before independence when Smith was still in 
power. Nothing really changed in Zimbabwe.40   
However, it is also important to note that not all Zimbabweans have been affected by the 
dominant authoritarian and repressive form of governance practiced by the ZANU PF 
government since the 1980s. For example, some sections of the Zimbabwean citizenry, 
particularly the educated middle classes and urbanites, have often actively engaged with the 
mainstream political system in ways consistent with the principles of active citizenship.  
                                                          
39 See Ben Turok (1987) who characterises this phenomenon as universal demobilisation. 
40 Interview held at Joe Gqabi Train Station, Philippi, Cape Town on 17 February 2015. 
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Some may also have engaged in political activism out of anger and the desire to see 
political change in Zimbabwe, especially those that were directly affected by ZANU PF 
repression and violence.41 For example, Cape Town-based Mr Mapfumo, a 44-year-old former 
MDC-T ward councillor in Zaka District who was violently displaced from his home by ZANU 
PF militia and war veterans forcing him to escape to South Africa, declared:  
Mugabe and his people caused a lot of suffering and destruction to many people. I was 
one of the direct victims of political violence and I was forced to abandon my family 
when I came here.  I will not rest until Mugabe and his people are out of people. I will 
not stop fighting until justice prevails.42 
 At the same time, there has been a tendency by the ruling party ZANU PF to use intimidation, 
harassment and violence to coerce citizens into engaging in mainstream politics to support 
their party,43 but this tendency was not observed among participants in South Africa and the 
UK. In this context, it is not difficult to understand why only a relatively small proportion of 
participants in both host countries tended to be actively mobilised and visibly participated in 
different kinds of overt political activism. Whether diasporas engage in transnational political 
activism and the nature of political activity they take part in, also depends on geographical 
distance.  
4.2.1.2 The Limits of External Political Structures 
External structures of country of origin political parties, accompanied by a robust 
diaspora voting rights framework, are often viewed as a vehicle for diaspora participation in 
                                                          
41 See McGregor cited in McGregor and Primorac (2010). She discusses the post-election backlash targeting 
MDC voters and members following the victory of Morgan Tsvangirai over Robert Mugabe in the June 2008 
election re-run.   
42 Comments by participant during a focus group meeting at PASSOP offices, Cape Town. 
43 See Norma Kriger’s who systematically studied the deployment of political violence during election seasons 
by ZANU PF (Kriger, 2005). Also see Turok (1987) for a discussion on this tendency by ruling parties to force 
people into politics as a way of boosting electoral support. 
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homeland political life (Lafleur, 2013; Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008). Data from this study 
indeed supports this observation, albeit to a limited extent. The utility of Zimbabwean 
political parties as vehicles for diaspora political participation was confirmed by less than five 
percent of participants across the three sites who were either card-holding members or 
supporters of different Zimbabwean political parties.  However, their ineffectiveness can 
cause some to disengage with politics, as findings demonstrate. Participants in the UK and 
South Africa also blamed Zimbabwean political parties for being invisible, negligent and 
ineffective, for their disillusionment with Zimbabwean mainstream politics. Political parties 
(mostly MDC-T) were accused of not penetrating and reaching out to Zimbabweans settled in 
all parts of Cape Town and Johannesburg, particularly to those living in impoverished black 
townships.  
This perceived aloofness of political parties was captured by a participant named Jay 
Cee resident in Joe Gqabi (Phillipi) as follows:  
 I have never seen or heard about the MDC or ZANU PF here in Cape Town. I thought 
they were not allowed to operate in foreign countries. How can they expect us to 
support them if they do not come and talk to us and help us with our problems?44 
Jay Cee captured another perception shared by participants in Johannesburg, that 
Zimbabwean political parties and politics in general was irrelevant to the day-to-day life 
struggles endured by many Zimbabweans hosted in South Africa. For example, one 
undocumented participant named Lenny in Johannesburg complained against the MDC-T and 
other parties for not helping with the problems Zimbabweans face, especially in their efforts 
                                                          
44 Interview at Joe Gqabi, Philippi, Cape Town on 27 February 2015. 
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to become regularised and documented by the South African government. This was echoed 
by Colleta who complained that:  
They [parties] only want us to donate money to them. They don’t help us get papers. 
We have not even heard them condemning the South African government for ill-
treating us in this country. So why should we support them?   
A similar theme emerged in the UK where Zimbabwean political activists have been observed 
to mobilise donor funding for political parties back in Zimbabwe (see Pasura, 2010). 
Restrictions on external donor funding for political parties in terms of the Political Parties 
Finance Act of 2001, often presents another challenge for diaspora political structures 
operating in host countries (see Pasura, 2010). There are several other challenges that limit 
the effectiveness of external party-political structures as a vehicle for diaspora participation 
in homeland politics.  
Another issue causing frustration with Zimbabwean politics among Zimbabweans in 
the UK, however, relates to the perceived corruption and malfeasance among some party-
political activists and leaders running external party structures in the UK. For example, 
participants highlighted the role played by the MDC’s UK structures in advocating and 
assisting undocumented Zimbabweans seeking asylum over the years. The party structures 
also assisted in mobilising financial support to victims of human rights abuses and political 
violence back in Zimbabwe. These monies would, for instance, help cover legal fees and 
hospital bills.  
However, some participants who had been involved in political activism in the past 
bemoaned the lack of accountability which saw some of those funds not reaching their 
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intended beneficiaries back in Zimbabwe. MD who used to attend MDC meetings in Reading 
summed up these issues by saying:  
We don’t see any difference between MDC and ZANU PF. The only difference is that 
ZANU PF is doing its corruption back in Zimbabwe, while MDC T is doing it here. Some 
of the leaders are self-serving crooks who are only after our money, and we don’t know 
where the money goes. Some of them also take advantage of desperate fellow 
Zimbabweans, which shows that they are not different from ZANU PF. We just don’t 
know whom to trust anymore.45  
Although MDC corruption has been observed in the past, the above findings demonstrate 
how this tendency by external party activists has resulted in disengagement from mainstream 
Zimbabwean politics by some in the UK (McGregor, 2010; Magaisa, 2006).46 Apart from the 
dysfunctions within formal political formations in Zimbabwean politics, disengagement from 
mainstream politics directed at the Zimbabwean state manifest in other ways.  
4.2.1.3 The (In)Effectiveness of the Zimbabwe Diaspora Vote Campaign 
Many Zimbabweans living outside the country are effectively disenfranchised, without 
the means to travel back to Zimbabwe to register and vote in national and sub-national 
elections. This was a prominent campaigning issue judging by the media interest it often 
generates, but one in which not many participants were actively involved in, which shows the 
degree of demobilisation of Zimbabweans even on a critical political right like the right to 
vote. For example, only 8 South Africa-based and 12 UK-based, ‘politically active’, participants 
                                                          
45 Comments during focus group discussion at Camberley on 25th June 2015. 
46 Magaisa observed how party activists operating in the diaspora developed a tendency to engage in various 
forms of corruption, including demanding payments and other favours in exchange for asylum application 
support letters.  
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indicated that they had taken part in any form of campaign activity on this issue, mostly by 
signing online petitions and attending protests against the Zimbabwean government.  
Although many African countries have ensured their citizens are able to vote from outside the 
borders of their countries,47 Zimbabwe still lags behind on this matter, compared to other 
countries within the Southern African region and the African continent more broadly (see 
Whitaker and Inyanji, 2015; Lafleur, 2013). It is not difficult, therefore, to understand why 
participants both in South Africa and the UK held the dominant feeling that the Zimbabwean 
government was acting unjustly by denying them their electoral rights in their country of 
origin, given the role they play in supporting their homeland (Lafleur, 2013).48 Even in terms 
of the laws of Zimbabwe, the failure by the Zimbabwean government to develop a frame work 
for extra-territorial voting is unjust. 
The new Constitution guarantees the right to vote to every citizen of Zimbabwe,49 but 
voter registration and the actual casting of ballots only occurs within Zimbabwe (see 
Zimbabwe Constitution of 2013). The requirement for Zimbabweans based outside the 
country to travel back to Zimbabwe to register and vote is often accompanied by logistical 
and other challenges. These include prohibitive costs of travel, travel restrictions for asylum 
seekers and fear of persecution upon return. Therefore, there has been a sustained campaign 
among diasporas in South Africa, the UK and beyond to push the Zimbabwean government, 
through its Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, to allow diasporas to register and vote while 
outside the country. Notably, there were more participants in the UK involved with the 
campaign than in South Africa. Perhaps demands for extraterritorial voting are relatively less 
                                                          
47 Whitaker and Inyanji (2015) highlight how Kenya and other African countries have recently allowed their 
diaspora to vote extraterritorially.  
 
49 Section 67 (3) of The Zimbabwe Constitution of 2013 guarantees the right to vote to all Zimbabweans, 
without any restrictions based on where they live. 
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pronounced among Zimbabwean in South Africa due to its geographical proximity (especially 
Johannesburg), which allows more people to return and vote.  
Participants had a dominant perception that the Zimbabwean government was 
abusing and taking advantage of the diaspora population, only reaching out to them for their 
financial remittances and investment, but denying them political rights. For example, 
Mukoma A.M, who is a former member of the National Constitutional Assembly, now based 
in Vosloorus complained: 
 Our government just wants our remittances and investment back in the country, but 
they don’t want to allow us to vote. Yes, the new constitution gave us the right to vote, 
but that right is meaningless if they have not put in place mechanisms to allow us to 
vote from outside. Why is it that South Africans living outside South Africa can vote at 
their embassies, but we cannot?50 
This dynamic departs from the commonly held belief that home country governments extend 
extraterritorial voting rights in recognition of their contributions to homeland development 
(see Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Some host governments also allow their diasporas to vote 
outside the country as a way a nation-building strategy, but Zimbabwe seems to be oblivious 
to the importance of such progressive moves (see Vertovec, 2005). The Zimbabwe 
government’s policy of not engaging the diaspora reflects the tendency by ZANU PF to put its 
party-political interests above national ones (see Chikuhwa, 2004). In this context, the 
Zimbabwean government has also been accused of fighting to keep the diaspora off the 
                                                          
50 Interview at Abesutwini, Vosloorus, 22 March 2015. 
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electoral role as it perceives them to be supporters of the MDC and other opposition political 
formations (Betts and Jones, 2016).  
Section 67 (3) of the Zimbabwean Constitution of 2013 guarantees the right to vote to 
all Zimbabwean citizens regardless of where they are hosted.51 For example, the Zimbabwe 
government was accused of reluctance to allow diasporas to vote, while the Zimbabwean 
embassies and consulates in both countries were not being used as a platform for political 
participation. Other participants who have travelled back to Zimbabwe complained over 
travel costs, difficulties in registering to vote, accessing polling stations and other 
inefficiencies in the electoral process back in Zimbabwe. Others also bemoaned the lack of 
transparency in the voting system, leading to manipulation of the outcome. This led Jairos M 
living in Phillipi, of voting age but had never voted, to question:  
What does voting change in Zimbabwe. It is a waste of time because we all know who 
always wins elections.52 
Also, Zimbabwe’s Electoral Act controversially requires that a person be resident in the 
constituency where they are registered to vote (Feltoe and Manyeruke, 2006), hence 
Zimbabweans living outside the country with an intention to vote ought to travel back to 
Zimbabwe in order to do so.  
Furthermore, returnee Zimbabweans often face vilification, victimisation and other 
forms of reprisals at the hands of ZANU PF supporters in their local communities (Madziva, 
2010).  For example, they become subject to being labelled sell-outs and unpatriotic because 
of their flight at the height of the socioeconomic and political crisis, and this makes them 
                                                          
51 See Zimbabwe Constitution of 2013 
52 Interview at Lower Crossroads, Cape Town 24 February 2015. 
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targets when political violence resurfaces during election seasons. This susceptibility of 
Zimbabwean exiles to victimisation and its negative implications on their political 
participation was confirmed by the findings of this study. For example, a total of seven 
Johannesburg-based participants indicated how they took advantage of the geographical 
proximity and cheaper transport costs to return back to Zimbabwe and vote in the 2013 
harmonised elections. All seven reported directly or indirectly experiencing intimidation and 
harassment in their local communities and neighbourhoods for being based outside the 
country. 
One of these South Africa-based participants named Spencer (39 years old) from the 
impoverished black township of Mbare (a ZANU PF hotspot), recalled the abuse, fear and 
anxiety he suffered during the 2013 harmonised elections. He cited an incident when a group 
of ZANU PF youths accused him of being a sell-out, sympathetic to agents of regime change, 
who had been sent by the enemies of Zimbabwe to observe how the elections were going.  
Some of those who harassed him were his former childhood friends, who had become 
members of the notorious ‘Chipangano’ terror group. Accounts like this reinforce the 
disillusionment of some sections of the diaspora population with Zimbabwean politics.  
The fear of repercussions and backlash on family was also shared by participants in the UK, 
some of whom feared for their relatives left back in Zimbabwe. For example, Mukoma Donny 
expressed his fears in these words: 
My parents are still at home in Marondera. I don’t want my pictures to come out in the 
media because they will be in trouble with ZANU PF back home. I have also heard that 
CIOs know everyone who is involved in politics outside Zimbabwe. Many MDC people 
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have been arrested and tortured at the Harare International Airport upon arrival from 
England. It’s too risky.53 
This does not only confirm the notoriety of the Zimbabwean state and the ruling party ZANU 
PF as violent political entities but, more profoundly, shows high levels of fear and timidity 
instilled in the citizenry living both within and outside Zimbabwe (Sachikonye, 2011).  This, in 
turn, has an effect of compromising the determination of many Zimbabweans to engage in 
transnational political activism. In this context, the denial of voting rights and opportunities 
challenges the conventional, ‘big P’ mode of political participation espoused in dominant 
thinking on diaspora political transnationalism.   
4.2.1.4 Being a Migrant and Political (In)Activism 
The precarity that often characterises migrants’ everyday lives bears far-reaching 
implications on the ability of diasporas to partake in overt political activism. As observed by 
Pasura (2008), everyday life experiences in the host country present opportunities and 
limitations for transnational political activism among different categories of migrants. The 
ability to participate is mediated by several factors depending on where migrants live, their 
immigration status and settlement experiences, socioeconomic status and other factors. 
There was a gender dimension to the political activism (inactivism) of participants. In both 
South Africa and the UK, women participants tended to be less involved in ‘Big P’ political 
activism, compared to their male counterparts. This is in contrast with activism displayed by 
the Zimbabwe Vigil and Restoration for Human Rights, where women significantly 
                                                          
53 Interview at Liss, Hampshire, UK on 27 June 2015. 
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participated in events and campaigns (Betts and Jones, 2016). Perhaps those affiliated in this 
mobilisation have a history of activism, or for other benefits.  
Nevertheless, it was important to find out why such a sizeable proportion did not 
engage in political mobilisation. Participants cited various reasons including work-life 
imbalance with excessive work commitments in order to ‘pay the bills’, leaving them with 
limited time to be involved in social activities. Similarly, pressures to remit money back home 
also contributed to the non-involvement of many married and family oriented UK-based 
women in political activism. 
  In the UK, for instance, most women (particularly married and parenting women) 
indicated that they had limited time available to pursue politics due to childcare and other 
family commitments (Pasura, 2010). Women formally employed as nurses in the NHS and 
social care sector also blamed shift work and lack of work-life balance for their not attending 
protests and other political events and activities (see Mbiba, 2005; Pasura, 2010). This work-
life imbalance among Zimbabwean migrant workers, at times resulting in mental and physical 
health problems, has been highlighted by Joann McGregor (McGregor, 2006). However, 
participants who had attended Zimbabwe Vigil and Restoration of Human Rights in Zimbabwe 
(ROHR), indicated tactical reasons behind their participation, particularly the need to prove 
their involvement in political activism to bolster claims for asylum at the Home Office.  
The propensity to participate among different categories of Zimbabweans also has a 
spatial dimension, determined by where they live in the host country. For example, those 
living near Zimbabwe tended to be less involved in diaspora political mobilisation, because it 
was easier for them to travel back and take part in political processes back in Zimbabwe. There 
was also a widespread belief among participants in Johannesburg that members of the 
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notorious Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) were based at the Zimbabwe Consulate 
offices in Bedfordview, conducting surveillance operations across Johannesburg (see Betts 
and Jones, 2016).54 This instilled an element of fear among participants, leading some to avoid 
engaging overtly in political activism.  
Political activism also tends to thrive around places where prominent and influential 
political institutions of any given state are located. Therefore, participants living near 
metropolitan cities where key political institutions forming targets of lobbying, generally 
found it convenient to be involved in activism. Examples of such places include the Cape Town 
where the South African parliament and the Zimbabwean Consulate offices in Cape Town are 
housed; and London where the Zimbabwean Embassy in the UK and all key institutions of the 
British government are located. Perhaps this might be the reason why more participants 
(25%) in Cape Town tended to be involved in campaigning, petitioning, marching and other 
political activities directed at the South African parliament, compared to only 5% in 
Johannesburg which is slightly remotely located from Pretoria where the executive arm of the 
South African state is located. In the same vein, due to its proximity to London where key 
political institutions are located, the same proportion of participants (25%) across south east 
England were inclined to be involved in different political events and activities organised in 
London.  
A spatial asymmetry was, however, cited by participants and blamed for non-
participation by participants both in South Africa and the UK. For example, participants were 
critical of the tendency by political activists to organise political events in metropolitan cities 
                                                          
54 Betts and Jones discovered the same fears and concerns that the diaspora, including some leaders of 
opposition party external structures, was infiltrated by CIO operatives. 
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such as London, Cape Town and Johannesburg, which presents difficulties relating to logistics 
and accessibility for those living in outlying areas. This spatial bias would also exclude most of 
the undocumented Zimbabweans who develop a tendency to move to outlying parts of 
England (up-north) such as Leeds, Birmingham, Coventry, Luton and Leicester, to join their 
family and social networks (Pasura, 2006; Mbiba, 2005).55 Echoing this concern, Stephen M 
who has lived in the UK since 2002 observed:  
We get a lot of emails and WhatsApp messages inviting us to attend protests in 
London. What they don’t realise is that many Zimbabweans moved up north because 
life is cheaper there and immigration enforcement is also less severe.56 
Therefore, getting Zimbabweans dispersed across the West Midlands, East Midlands and 
Yorkshire to participate effectively remains a real challenge for diaspora activists.   
Spatial differences and biases also mediate political activism of Zimbabweans living in 
different parts of South Africa. Although Zimbabweans are dispersed across South Africa, 
most of those living without secure immigration statuses are settled, often under precarious 
conditions, in black townships both in Johannesburg and Cape Town (see Jinnah and Polzer-
Ngwato, 2012). Post-apartheid South Africa’s impoverished black townships are also generally 
held to be bastions of vibrant and radical political activism,57 hence Zimbabweans living in 
those spaces may have adopted the same political consciousness. Also, given the harsh living 
conditions and the precarity that characterises their day-to-day lives, it is not unreasonable 
                                                          
55 Pasura (2009) also observes that the dispersal of asylum seekers from London and the South East was 
enforced in terms of Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999.  
56 Interview at St Albans, 29th July 2015. 
57 Seidman (2015) highlights the vibrancy of township political organising and mobilisation across South Africa. 
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to expect this section of Zimbabweans to eagerly partake in homeland political activism 
inspired by their desire to return to a new Zimbabwe.  
However, efforts to mobilise this marginal section of the Zimbabwean diaspora have 
not been very effective for different reasons. One of these problems is the marginalisation of 
those hosted in impoverished black townships, rural and peri-urban parts of South Africa. For 
example, participants living in black townships across Cape Town such as Phillipi, Imizamo 
Yethu, Masiphumelele, Delft and Dunoon among others, complained of being left out when 
protests, campaigns and events are organised in both Cape Town and Johannesburg. For 
instance, 58-year-old Noah of Phillipi expressed his frustration in the following terms:  
We only hear about protests at Parliament in Cape Town and rallies in Bellville, but we 
cannot afford to attend. MDC community organisers and campaigners have never 
reached out to us here in the townships. That’s not a smart way of mobilising 
supporters. They should do their rallies here because many Zimbabweans live in the 
townships.58  
A member of the MDC Western Cape District named Brighton explained this dynamic, arguing 
that it was for fear of violent crime and xenophobia that the party could not penetrate some 
parts of Cape Town such as Khayelitsha, Langa and Crossroads. This also makes sense in the 
context of xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment that tends to manifest in those black 
townships, which pose security and other challenges for diaspora political mobilisation 
(Neocosmos, 2010; Morreira, 2011). Related to complexities of daily life in host country, legal 
                                                          
58 Interview at Phillipi Business Small Business Centre, Cape Town, 21 February 2015.  
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status held by different categories of diasporas also influence their differential abilities to 
partake in ‘Big P’ politics (Flint, 2003), as demonstrated in the following section.  
The likelihood of participating in Zimbabwean politics across geographical distance 
was also mediated by the immigration statuses those participants held. Although diasporans 
with secure legal statuses would engage in any kind of political activity without fear and 
anxiety, findings of this study show that those without secure legal statuses in the UK were 
more inclined to take part in transnational political activity for tactical reasons.59 Although it 
is accompanied by risks of arrest and removal from the UK, undocumented persons seeking 
asylum tended to engage in overt political activity to gain evidence to support their asylum 
claims at the Home Office. For example, many participants, mostly men, cited the same 
reason for taking part in political activism directed at Zimbabwe, so that pictures of them in 
picketing regalia could be taken and later presented as evidence to support asylum claims at 
Home Office. For example, 48-year-old MV who has been recently granted asylum status by 
the British government explained: 
I have taken part in the Zimbabwe Vigil’s protests at the Zimbabwe House a few times. 
I had to do it. I had just put in my asylum claim at the Home Office and I wanted 
evidence to support my claim that I was a political activist.60  
Conversely, those with precarious statuses and relative newcomers sometimes held the 
perception that any positive form of political change in Zimbabwe would diminish their 
chances of being granted secure immigration statuses by the British government. Some with 
                                                          
59 See McGregor and Pasura cited in Chan and Primorac (2015) who demonstrate the cleavages within the UK-
based Zimbabwean diaspora existing along immigration status lines.  
60 Interview at Cove, Farnborough on 12th June 2015.  
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refugee status held the view that pushing for political change in Zimbabwe would result in the 
revocation of their statuses on the basis of an improvement in the country of origin situation. 
Gaining secure legal status in the host country is also often accompanied by 
diminishing interest in homeland politics for some migrants, who opt to pursue greater 
incorporation into the host country. This is confirmed by findings which show that some 
participants, especially those who had been living in the UK for a long time and had 
established themselves, had lost interest in Zimbabwean politics. It is apparent from the 
foregoing discussion that not everyone engages with the mainstream political system while 
outside the country, and that there are different historical, spatial, gender and other reasons 
for their non-involvement in ‘Big P’ political activism. This, however, does not mean they have 
become totally politically inactive; they may have only substituted their interest in 
Zimbabwe’s politics, with focus on the host country.   
In addition to legal status, subjective identities also determine whether (and how) 
they diasporas partake in the politics of their homeland and host country (Fortier, 2016). The 
assumption is that diasporas will participate in the politics of the country they feel they belong 
in. As shown in preceding sections of this chapter, there many reasons for explaining the 
engagement/disengagement of Zimbabweans in homeland politics, and I want to add senses 
of belonging as another such factor. Whether people participate or not depends on what they 
feel about their country of origin in relation to the host country, based on the recognition that 
senses of belonging shape emerging political behaviours of citizens (Fortier, 2016). The 
underlying assumption in most thinking on homeland political participation of Zimbabwe 
diaspora, is that every Zimbabwean (across racial, ethnic and other divides) maintains their 
love for Zimbabwe.  
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In the above configuration, that shared sentimental attachment to Zimbabwe (‘we 
feeling’) ostensibly continues to spur some into political action for the love of country (Glick-
Schiller and Fourie, 2004; Anthias, 2006). Yet, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 6, senses of 
belonging are constantly in flux, meaning that diasporas do not always remain fixated on their 
country of origin over time. Sentimental attachment often becomes divided, multiple and, at 
times, ambivalent in ways that weaken the patriotism and loyalty to the country of origin, 
especially for those who have acquired citizenship and integrated into the host country. Also, 
those who have spent lengthy periods of time outside their country and without returning, 
tend to display weaker affinities for their home countries. Perhaps the political silence or 
disinterest by over 10% of participants in the UK and South Africa, suggests that their political 
interests have shifted to the host country over the years.  
Some may have developed multiple loyalties, with some beginning to feel ‘at home’ 
in host country, while others may have multiple, fluctuating and ambivalent feelings about 
Zimbabwe and the host country. For example, my data indicates that the majority of 
participants who held ambivalent feelings about Zimbabwe were not participating, compared 
to those who displayed senses of nostalgia and a longing to return to Zimbabwe. For example, 
TK reasoned that: 
I’m not sure what the future holds for me. Problems are still going on in Zimbabwe so 
it is not certain that I will return there.61 
This uncertainty was, therefore, used by many participants to justify their disinclination to 
engage in overt forms of political activism, particularly in South Africa.  However, some 
                                                          
61 TK has lived in the UK for more than 15 years and does not plan to return back Zimbabwe ever again. I 
interviewed him at his house in Aldershot (09th July 2015).  
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participants living precariously in the UK, with uncertain feelings towards Zimbabwe felt the 
importance of engaging in Zimbabwean politics in case their quest for citizenship in the UK 
would not materialise. It is, therefore, safe to suggest that diasporas would likely engage, not 
only in homeland politics, but in the politics of that place where they feel their ‘home’ is while 
they live outside the country.  
4.2.1.5 Other Limits of Diaspora Political Mobilisation 
The political mobilisation of diaspora populations is not always aimed at influencing 
their home country state in a peaceful and beneficial way, with some engaging and supporting 
terrorist, radicalised, extremist and violent forms of political activity directed at their country 
of origin (Obadare, 2004; Vertovec, 2005). For example, some African diaspora populations 
have tended to support and perpetuate repression, political violence, civil strife and domestic 
insurgencies in their countries of origin, with devastating consequences for peace and security 
on the continent (Obadare, 2004). In terms of this study, none of the participants in either 
host countries displayed any violent and extremist tendencies, but everyone involved in 
different kinds of political activism expressed their belief and commitment to the peaceful 
resolution of the ongoing political crisis back in Zimbabwe. It was, however, difficult to 
determine if the political party funding mobilised by some of the UK-based participants (for 
both ZANU PF and MDC-T) did not end up supporting violent, corrupt and other forms of 
political practices, in ways that perpetuate the ongoing political crisis back in Zimbabwe. 
However, a range of issues were raised by both UK-based and South Africa-based 
participants who had been involved in political activism, relating to malpractices by political 
activists leading to mobilisation efforts in the two countries. For example, one of the issues 
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raised in South Africa related to tribalism and regionalism among political activists, leading to 
fragmentation and rivalry between Ndebele and Shona activists. 
 Across three locations, white and mixed-race segments of the diaspora seemed 
relatively politically invisible because of their underrepresentation in political mobilisation 
efforts. However, mobilisation at the Zimbabwe Vigil in London represents another caveat, 
and it would be interesting to dig deeper into this apparent (self) exclusion. It would also be 
useful to compare external and internal participation for these categories of the Zimbabwean 
nation. The net effect of these dynamics is the incoherence, fragmentation and lack of 
representativeness of the mobilisation effort, resulting in the proliferation of many groups 
and entities claiming to speak on behalf of all Zimbabweans. This problem is more acute in 
South Africa. 
Issues also emerged pertaining to allegations of corruption and lack of accountability 
by leaders of the political mobilisation effort, particularly in the UK. This confirms Magaisa’s 
(2006) observations of Zimbabwean political activists in the UK. These malpractices partly 
explain the frustration, resentment and disengagement of many sections of the diaspora from 
homeland political activism. Some equated their level of distrust and suspicion directed at the 
diaspora political and civic leaders, to that traditionally aimed at ZANU PF and the Zimbabwe 
government. 
To conclude this section, it is apparent that not everyone engages in ‘Big P’ political 
activism, but only a limited proportion of participants, due to a number of dynamics discussed 
above. By concentrating on overt (Big P’) political activities, there is always a risk we will 
ignore other important ways in which Zimbabweans engage politically. It is important to 
constantly explore other ways by which diaspora populations reclaim their homeland 
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citizenship, through engaging in other forms of political activity aimed at contesting 
authoritarian and repressive forms of rule. According to data, one such alternative expression 
of citizenship relates to the discursive political activity in which the majority of participants, 
hosted both in the UK and South Africa, engaged. In other words, diasporas become citizens 
by being political, but this study shows that they act politically in different ways too. These 
include discursive ways discussed in the rest of this chapter.  
4.3 Discursive Ways of Being Political 
Political activism does not occur only through overt and, in many ways, formal political 
mobilisation against the authoritarian state. The majority of the participants in this study did 
not actively engage in ‘Big P’ political activities. However, a closer look at the data reveals that 
even those who appear passive and apathetic indeed find other, less risky, ways of expressing 
their political agency. And the rest of the chapter maps out and characterise the nature of 
discursive political activity among diaspora. It does not always follow that those disillusioned 
or excluded by various means from mainstream politics become completely inactive and 
disengaged from politics. Instead, participants mostly those that seemed passive or apathetic, 
did not only engage by way of overt praxis, but also discursively to construct and share their 
political views, sentiments and preferences with fellow Zimbabweans across geographical 
distance. In this context, over 80% of the 145 participants across the three research sites 
(Cape Town, Johannesburg and south-east England) confirmed that they frequently engaged 
in political talk with fellow Zimbabweans. These participants were of varying age ranges and 
located in different places within South Africa and the UK, and some of them simultaneously 
engaged in ‘Big P’ political activism organised by external political party structures and 
diaspora associations. 
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Discursive political activity is frequently resorted to by the citizenry when opportunities 
for participation in mainstream political and public life are limited by institutional, political 
and other factors, as is the case with Zimbabwean migrants. Therefore, findings show that 
many participants were not voting in Zimbabwean elections, not attending protests, and not 
members of any particular political party; but there was a lot of thinking and talking about 
Zimbabwean politics occurring among them. Both male and female, documented and 
undocumented, participants in both host countries held strong views and preferences in 
relation to the Zimbabwean state, but felt that they were not being asked or listened to. For 
example, participants in a focus group in Dawn Park shared this view expressed by Jabulani:  
We have very good ideas and knowledge, but the Zimbabwe government has never 
asked for our views and opinions on how to solve the country’s problems. We share 
these among ourselves every day.62 
It therefore emerged in this study that many of the non-participating Zimbabweans, referred 
to by Pasura (2008) as dormant, actually informally engaged in thinking and talking about 
politics with fellow Zimbabweans in their daily lives. Although there is a temptation to see 
these two kinds of political activity as mutually exclusive, as noted by Wright et al (2017) and 
as data shows, the two spheres of diaspora political activity sometimes complement each 
other. The next section offers a conceptualisation of the nature of these everyday political 
discourses in light of the experiences of the Zimbabwean diaspora. 
 
 
                                                          
62 Focus group meeting convened at Dawn Park, Boksburg, on 20th April 2015. 
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4.3.1 Features of Discursive Political Activity 
Discursive politics is essentially about how people attach meaning to and make sense 
of political reality in their day to day lives, aimed at contesting dominant discourses, norms 
and practices in society (see Katzenstein, 1995). It is also viewed as a strategy of political 
resistance, which makes it instrumental to historically marginalised and repressed people in 
post-colonial contexts (Fraser, 1989; Obadare and Willems, 2014. It is important to recognise 
the resentment, dissatisfaction and fear citizens often hold towards the state in post-colonial 
countries such as Zimbabwe, due to the repressive and violent tendencies of the state in many 
post-independence countries, including Zimbabwe (see Sachikonye, 2011; Ake, 1992). Talking 
about politics outside the direct remit of the state, therefore, becomes another way of being 
political and expressing political agency. 
In this vein, Claude Ake (1992) observed how this sense of antipathy and mistrust 
often leads the citizenry to see the state as a monster to be evaded and, if possible, to be 
defeated (also see Azarya, 1988). As demonstrated in Chapter three, emigration itself 
represents a political act of evading the state, and not engaging directly with it and opting for 
other informal and vernacular ways of being political, represents another way of avoiding and 
evading the state while outside the country. Therefore, citizens tend to shun formal and 
mainstream political processes opting for other ways of speaking and making their ‘voices’ 
heard (Scott, 1985). And engaging in unofficial and informal political activity in their day-to-
day lives, represents one of those ways by which many members of the Zimbabwean diaspora 
seek to contest authoritarianism in their home country. 
Another defining set of characteristics of this kind of political activity, identified by 
Wright et al (2012), is that it falls outside the immediate realms of formal politics. For 
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example, Zimbabweans, and indeed citizens in many post-independence countries, tend to 
think and talk about the state, political elites and political power often in terms of their 
capacity for violence and allocation of socioeconomic values (see Mbembe, 2001). And this 
tendency, a product of decades of repression and material deprivation during and after 
colonial rule, permeates Zimbabweans’ every day political talk in different settings. Lastly, 
discursive political activity relates to the space in which it occurs. Discursive political activity 
does not occur in created and invited spaces (Cornwall, 2004).63 Instead, citizens engage in 
these kinds of conversations in various unofficial spaces manifesting in their everyday lives, 
thus avoiding the control of their discourses by the state and other organised political 
formations. 
Discursive political activity of diasporas is also composed of the vernacular and 
expressive ways in which people engage in political talk in their everyday lives. These kinds of 
everyday discourses tend to be reciprocal, circular and reflexive, manifesting horizontally 
between ordinary people outside the ambits of the state (Wright et al, 2017). For example, 
this circular and horizontal nature of discursive political activity was confirmed by one UK-
based woman named Sis Vee who spoke in a somewhat spirited way:  
‘We don’t talk to our government anymore, but we are free and safe to talk about it 
each time we meet as Zimbabweans here in South Africa’.64 
Talking about the Zimbabwean state ‘behind its back’ suggests a couple of things about the 
relationship between the Zimbabwean state and its citizenry. Firstly, perhaps diasporas find 
                                                          
63 See Andrea Cornwall’s (2001) work on how citizens increasingly find it difficult to utilise opportunities for 
political participation created by the state. Instead, they find their own alternative platforms and spaces to 
express their political views and preferences. 
64 Interview at North Camp, Farnborough on 15 August 2015. 
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it safer to just talk about the state, than to seek its attention given its repressive, violent and 
unaccountable tendencies when it relates with the citizenry.65  
However, despite its potential as an alternative form of resistance and way of 
reclaiming citizenship, not everyone has the capacity to engage in meaningful political talk 
due to age, disability, level of education, place of settlement and cognitive limitations among 
many other factors. The content of these conversations is also mediated by various factors 
including political culture, history, socio-demographic characteristics, political backgrounds 
and experiences, and time of departure from Zimbabwe. Next, I look at some of the factors, 
particularly political culture, shaping everyday political discourses of Zimbabweans in South 
Africa and the UK. 
4.3.2 Everyday Political Talk and Political Culture 
There is no doubt that different sections of the Zimbabwean nation were subjected to 
different kinds of domination on the basis of their culture, gender, age, class and political 
affiliation for decades back in Zimbabwe. And these factors explain why some categories of 
Zimbabweans are more inclined to engage freely and meaningfully in political talk with their 
Zimbabwean compatriots than others. How ordinary Zimbabweans living outside the country 
make sense of and speak about Zimbabwean politics is culturally determined. It is shaped by 
the new values, norms and practices they had acquired before emigration and during their 
stay in the host country. For example, the strong liberal political values expressed by younger 
and educated participants who had been living for lengthy periods of time in South Africa and 
                                                          
65 See Sachikonye (2012) on how the Zimbabwean state tends to be violent and repressive on its citizens. Some 
participants even feared that talking about the state in South Africa would be met with violent responses (eg 
disappearances, assassinations and torture), based on the shared belief that CIOs had infiltrated the diaspora.   
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UK respectively, may have been shaped and reinforced by the dominant liberal political values 
of democracy, human rights, equality and social justice they found there. 
Nevertheless, past experiences and subject political cultures dominant in some parts 
of Zimbabwe probably also had an influence on how some participants perceived and talked 
about politics – or indeed whether they were discussed at all. This also explains why some 
sections are inclined to engage in this kind of activity than others. The political culture of 
Zimbabweans has been characterised as ‘subject’, with a tendency to see themselves as 
obedient subjects not active citizens (see Chikerema and Chakunda, 2014; also see Turok, 
1987). This also depended on which part of the country they came from, with those from rural 
areas more inclined to be conservative and subjected, compared to those from urban 
contexts where opposition political activism was incubated. 
Patriarchy, as an aspect of African culture, may have been responsible for making men 
more likely to engage in political talk than women. Indeed, there was a small segment of 
participants in South Africa, most of these were religiously adherent women from rural 
backgrounds, who openly declared their avoidance of political talk at home and at work. They 
did so for several reasons including the fear associated with talking negatively about ZANU PF 
and President Mugabe, while others cited moral, cultural and other reasons. One woman 
from Masiphumelele named Mai M justified her position by saying:  
I always hear my husband talking about politics whenever his friends visit at our house. 
I don’t join in the conversation because the Bible does not allow us Christians to talk 
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about politics. I also don’t like some of the bad things they say about Mr Mugabe, like 
wishing he was dead. Our culture does not allow that.66 
This supports the observation by some scholars that the political values and ideas people hold 
are partly shaped by the authoritarian attitudes dominant in societies where they originate, 
which might be true for some of these participants (see Wilson, 1973). The kind of discourses 
migrants engage in also tend to be influenced by dominant political values, norms, ideas and 
practices in the host country. The same ability to learn different political values, ideas and 
thinking about political objects was also demonstrated empirically among the Indian diaspora 
(see Kapur, 2010).67  
In the above context, as data suggests, there was also a tendency by South Africa-
based participants to emphasise how being in South Africa had made them feel comfortable 
and safe to talk about politics without fear. They also cited how they had learned a lot in terms 
of how a democratic state operates and were eager to remit those values, knowledge and 
ethos back to Zimbabwe. This was confirmed by one participant in named Mr Mapfumo who 
had lived in South Africa for nine years who stated that:  
We now know how democracy works. South Africa has taught us a lot because it is a 
democracy. This is how politics should be – free and open for everyone. People vote 
freely and there is no violence during times of elections. If South Africans are not happy 
with what the government is doing, they go out and protest freely without fear of the 
security agents.68 
                                                          
66 Interview at Masiphumelele, Cape Town on 02nd March 2015. 
67 See the work of Kapur on how the Indian diaspora remit not only finances and investment, but political 
ideals, values and other aspects of political culture learned from different regimes under which they are 
hosted outside the country.  
68 Interview with Mapfumo at PASSOP offices, Cape Town on 10th March 2015.  
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It is clear that Mr Mapfumo learned these political values, and the impartation of political 
values occurs through various agents of political socialisation in the host country (Kamrava, 
1996). For example, the democratic norms and values displayed by Mr Mapfumo may have 
been transmitted through various vehicles including the media, educational institutions and 
workplaces during his stay in South Africa. The extent to which one acquires new political 
cultures also depends on a number of factors, including length of stay in the host country, 
with long-stayers likely to learn more than relative newcomers.  
4.3.3 Everyday Political Talk in Practice 
Just to give an idea of how Zimbabweans think and talk about the Zimbabwean state 
and politics, I discuss in the next section some of their views and preferences reflecting the 
meaning they attach to various political issues, actors, processes and objects. In this section, 
I want to highlight an extract of some of the ways Zimbabweans in Cape Town and 
Johannesburg are thinking and talking about the Zimbabwean state (and the country’s politics 
in general). For example, many participants, especially the older generations, spoke of how 
invincible Mugabe and ZANU PF were and the violence the Zimbabwean security forces were 
capable of dispensing on opposing political formations. However, others adopted different 
discourses contesting these imposed and internalised ways of thinking and talking about 
Zimbabwean politics and the political establishment. For example, younger participants spoke 
of how weak the ZANU PF regime had become, and shared their visions of a new, democratic 
and prosperous, Zimbabwe. 
 In the above context, I asked participants what they felt was wrong with Zimbabwe 
and what they wanted see changing there. A 38-year-old woman named Mai Moyondizvo 
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living in Boksburg, a former vendor who left Zimbabwe after the 2008 electoral violence 
responded: 
A government that looks after its people so that they never have to think about leaving 
the country again; a government which allows citizens [and] that does not interfere 
with the day to day life of citizens.69   
The above statement shows that even ordinary participants least expected to participate in 
overt political activism also hold their own political ideas and preferences in relation to the 
Zimbabwean state. Mai Moyondizvo’s response also show that citizens who escape their 
authoritarian and repressive states do not always lack a sound conception of the state; 
instead, it confirms that they have an understanding of what is wrong with the state and how 
it can reform itself, especially as it relates to their welfare and its violent tendencies (see 
Gallagher, 2015). For example, I asked participants what came to their minds when they think 
of the Zimbabwean state and here is collection of some common phrases representing how 
they spoke about it:   
‘They don’t listen to us’ (Jason C, 48 years old, Cape Town); ‘they don’t care about us 
and seeking their help is a waste of time’ (Mai Tariro, 31 years old, Boksburg); ‘we are 
afraid of it’ (Mbuya Chabikwa, 56 years old, Phillipi, Cape Town); ‘nothing will ever 
change’ (Bhunu D, 39 years old, Cape Town); ‘things will change very soon’ (Mai Chaza, 
30 years old, Aldershot, UK); ‘We need external help, we cannot change the system on 
our own’ (Mr Webster Z, 52 years old, Farnborough, UK).70 
                                                          
69 Ibid focus group at Dawn Park, Boksburg 
70 Extracted from comments during focus group meeting at Aldershot on 10th August 2015.   
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Several qualities can be read from the above discourses. For example, it is clear that everyday 
discourses expressed by Zimbabweans are diverse and, sometimes, conflicting. It also 
confirms the above view that ordinary Zimbabweans, often considered demobilised and 
inactive, actually hold active imaginations and conceptions about the state. Although there is 
a dominant sense of pessimism and antipathy towards the Zimbabwean state, some 
participants articulated potentially useful visions and preferences in a new Zimbabwe they 
hope to see in the future. Another characteristic of their everyday political talk relates to the 
use of political humour in conveying it. 
Political activism does not only encompass a formal dimension, but has its play and 
fun side (Gallagher, 2017; Peel, 2010; Willems, 2009). Zimbabweans are renowned for their 
humour, and that sense of humour is now frequently used by Zimbabweans (both at home 
and abroad) as a form of subterranean resistance (Willems, 2009; Chiumbu and Muswemwa, 
2012; Chiumbu and Nyamanhindi, 2012; Obadare and Willems, 2014). This entails making fun 
of the Zimbabwean state, and those at its helm, with an aim to embarrass, mock and show 
contempt towards it without fear of reprisals. This kind of everyday political talk is not only a 
form of political participation on its own, but also a lubricant to other more formal forms of 
political engagement (Wright et al, 2017). Another effect of this kind of activism is the 
deepening of political consciousness among the diaspora population, while simultaneously 
making politics enjoyable (Wright et al, 2017). Political humour in the diaspora also potentially 
helps reduce the anxieties and stresses of migrant life in those different host countries, in the 
face of unresolved political and socioeconomic crises back home (Willems, 2009).71  
                                                          
71 This mode of politics has mental health benefits even for Zimbabweans back home in the face of biting 
socioeconomic hardships. 
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 Therefore, the content of their political conversations did not always focus on political 
developments back in Zimbabwe, but included the use of satire, sarcasm and comedy. For 
example, participants with greater access to the internet and mobile technologies reported 
sharing funny images, humour and jokes about ZANU PF, Mugabe and other powerful political 
actors in Zimbabwean politics, with their friends and family members online and via 
WhatsApp and SMS (see Willem, 2009; Peel, 2010; Obadare and Willems, 2014).  At the time 
of the study, there were images of President Mugabe caught sleeping at a conference, doing 
rounds on social media. Such images tend to generate a lot of online discussion and debate 
among Zimbabweans all over the world, on the need for succession in the context of 
Mugabe’s old age. This shows us how Zimbabweans display a great deal of awareness in 
relation to political developments back in Zimbabwe, but also their capacity to engage in 
serious political deliberation, despite their seemingly dormant and apathetic approach to ‘Big 
P’ political participation. 
4.3.4 Spaces for Everyday Political Talk 
Having looked at some of the typical content of everyday political talk, I now turn to 
the spaces and platforms on which it is expressed. I have already indicated that everyday 
public speech about politics occurs in informal (online/offline) social spaces among diasporas, 
wherever people can meet and interact (Graham, 2015; Wright et al, 2017). I want to adopt 
John Gaventa’s definitional framework defining ‘space’ in terms of the opportunities, 
moments and channels where citizens, including diasporas, can act to influence discourses 
(Gaventa, 2006). These spaces can be online and offline.  
Spaces for political deliberation are also not always neutral arenas for deliberation 
among equal, but they themselves are laden with power relations and contested (Cornwall, 
177 | P a g e  
 
2002). Not everyone engages in equal terms, with those that are powerful based on their 
knowledge, information, experience and personal connections tending to dominate what gets 
discussed and the tone of the discussions in these spaces. A systematic and theoretically 
power analysis of these discursive spaces would be helpful to understand the structures and 
relations that shape these spaces, and represents another fascinating line of inquiry leading 
from this work.    
As such, findings of this study show that a total of 18 older participants (over 50), often 
without regular access to the internet, found alternative social spaces and platform for 
discussing politics such in the home, at social gatherings and events such as funerals, parties 
and church services. This shows that, although many Zimbabweans seem not to participate in 
political life, they find different unofficial and informal opportunities to contest narratives 
spurned by their authoritarian state and other powerful political forces with interests in 
contemporary Zimbabwean politics. 
Some participants were prohibited by their families, church organisations and other 
such social groups from engaging in political talk for the sake of social harmony. For example, 
Pastor Matemai who leads the Boarneges Apostolic Church at Lower Crossroads in Cape Town 
explained his church’s decision to ban political conversations within church premises: 
We realise how emotionally charged and divisive political discussions can be. Our 
church members are from diverse backgrounds and hold different views, and we fear 
that politics can end up causing divisions within the church along ethnic, party and 
factional lines.72 
                                                          
72 Interview at Lower Crossroads, Cape Town on 12th March 2015. 
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There was also evidence of fear and mistrust among the Zimbabwean diaspora populations 
in both countries, which prevented some participants from engaging freely in political 
discussion in public spaces where Zimbabweans met and interacted.  
There was a notable tendency by participants to feel unsafe to engage in political 
conversations with fellow Zimbabweans for fear of transnational political violence sponsored 
by the Zimbabwean state. Participants in Johannesburg and Cape Town shared the belief that 
members of the intelligence services were deployed and attached to the Zimbabwean 
Consulate offices, their purpose being to infiltrate and perpetrate violence on opponents of 
Mugabe’s rule. Engaging in political talk also presupposes the availability of free and safe 
spaces in which to engage. Therefore, there was a tendency for participants in the UK to speak 
more freely than in South Africa. Those who felt most constrained were settled in the 
impoverished black townships, and this was presumably to do with their fear of xenophobic 
backlash from their South African counterparts. As I mentioned earlier, it would have been 
interesting to observe the power dynamics permeating through those deliberations 
empirically, but there is no space for that exercise in this chapter.  
The internet provides an opportunity and platform for Zimbabweans to interact and 
engage in political talk without geographical limitations. The fact that the majority of 
participants indicated that they regularly thought and talked about Zimbabwean politics 
online during their stay in their host country, challenges the view that ICTs have been 
accompanied by political passivity and disengagement from politics (Putnam, 2000; Wright et 
al, 2017). This is an important insight on how the nature of political participation is changing 
in this age of ICTs and transnational migration. This tendency by transnational migrants to 
engage in different kinds of cyber-political activity in cyberspace represents a growing 
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phenomenon among diaspora populations, the Romanian diaspora being one of the 
prominent cases (Trandafoiu, 2013; also see Pasura, 2008).73 The discursive aspect of 
participants’ online political activity also resonates with the epistemic tendencies observed 
among the Zimbabwean diaspora hosted in the UK, particularly their proclivity to (global) 
networking across geographical distance (see Pasura, 2008). It is interesting to note that the 
global scope of diaspora networking resonates with practices associated with global 
citizenship, in a world believed to be globalising (see Mbiba, 2005; Peel, 2010).74  
Furthermore, to the extent that Zimbabweans engage in knowledge creation and 
exchange among members of the same national community scattered across the globe, one 
might characterise these ordinary diasporas as a kind of epistemic community (See Haas, 
2016).75  Therefore, a sizeable proportion of participants viewed as passive, apathetic and 
disengaged, indeed tended to engage discursively through sharing vivid ideas and 
imaginations about different questions and matters of state, and talking about them publicly 
in their day to day lives.  
Although some scholars accuse ICTs and mobile technologies of contributing to the 
perceived disengagement of the citizenry, particularly younger people, from politics, there is 
a growing recognition that this is not the case (Wright et al, 2017; Obadare and Willems, 2014; 
Peel, 2010; Putnam, 2000). The findings of this study help refute that viewpoint in relation to 
transnational migrants. Instead, data shows that ICTs provided one of the vehicles on which 
                                                          
73 Trandafoiu (2013) examined the transnational online activities of the Romanian diaspora scattered across 
Western Europe and other places, while Kenway and Langmead (2000) define cyberspace as the transnational 
space created by the use of internet and mobile technologies. Crucially, Pasura (2008) has also observed this 
tendency by some Zimbabweans in the UK engaging in cyber-politics. 
74 ICTs transcend territorial boundaries and facilitate networking across the globe by diasporas scattered in 
different places. 
75 An epistemic community as a group of people with shared repertoire whose goals include the creation and 
sharing of knowledge. As this study has shown, a lot of shared knowledge on Zimbabwean, therefore, 
circulates among Zimbabweans on and off the internet.   
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participants engaged discursively. This kind of discursive political activity taking place online 
was more pronounced among participants in the UK, compared to those in South Africa, 
perhaps due to limited accessibility and affordability of internet and mobile technologies 
among those hosted in South Africa. For example, an average of 45% of participants in South 
Africa and 60% in the UK shared their political views and preferences with fellow 
Zimbabweans in their social networks, through information sharing, discussion and debate on 
various online and mobile platforms.  Most of these were younger participants aged below 
40 years, with relatively stable sources of income enabling them to access internet and other 
ICT devices and other costs related to accessibility.  
There is an array of online and offline spaces and platforms where diasporas meet, 
connect and engage informally, in political talk (Wright et al, 2017; Willems, 2009). For 
instance, discursive political activity is often conveyed in digital and online spaces, not limited 
by territorial boundaries and geographical distance. Alternatively, those without access to 
online platforms tended to talk about Zimbabwean politics in small groups with their 
compatriots, often with their families, in workplaces, at church and during social gatherings 
with fellow Zimbabweans. ICTs provide one of the popular and convenient spaces in which 
diasporas engage discursively in politics. Several platforms and personalities have also 
proliferated on Facebook and YouTube sharing live video broadcasts, a mixture of factual and 
satirical content, across the Zimbabwean diaspora (thanks to Facebook’s ‘go live’ platform). 
These included Magamba TV anchored by a ‘white’ Zimbabwean named Comrade Fatso and 
Bustop TV anchored by Samantha Kureya (popularly known as ‘Gonyeti’), sharing humorous 
and sarcastic videos on Zimbabwean politics.  
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Everyday political talk was not entirely uninformed or based on hearsay, but different 
sources of information were consulted before opinions and counternarratives were formed. 
One prominent social media personality with a substantial diaspora constituency and credited 
with informing the Zimbabwean diaspora on political developments online, is Ruvheneko 
Parirenyatwa, (daughter of Zimbabwe’s Minister of Health, Dr David Parirenyatwa). She runs 
what participants thought was a very informative show named Ruvheneko in which she invites 
political leaders for (Debora Patta-style)76 interviews aimed at promoting accountability and 
exposing corruption within the Zimbabwean government. This type of broadcasting is 
interactive, allowing followers the chance to convey their questions and comments via the 
‘comments’ section, during the interviews. Along similar lines, some more or less mainstream 
media outlets (such as Star FM and Zimeye) have also recently established a strong social 
media presence, in ways that open up opportunities for ordinary diasporas located across the 
globe to engage and deliberate about Zimbabwean politics.  
Participants also indicated their regular participation in WhatsApp groups in which 
they shared information on political developments and unofficial news reports. Participants 
also highlighted the existence of a UK-based online TV channel called Zimbo Live TV 
broadcasting via Facebook to Zimbabweans across the globe. Some participants cited how 
important this channel was as a source of news on political developments, as well as debate 
and discussion on matters affecting Zimbabweans back home and outside the country. The 
information gathered through these channels would, therefore, inform their ‘political talk’ 
with fellow Zimbabweans in different offline spaces.  
                                                          
76 Debora is a Zimbabwe-born South African journalist well known for her hard-hitting and aggressive question 
when she hosted ‘3rd Degree’ on South Africa TV channel called ETV. 
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It is also important, on the other hand, not to overestimate the potential for online 
political talk in light of some of the ills of the ICTs as a tool for democratic citizenship. This 
study did not deeply engage with the utility of ICTs as a tool for political engagement for 
ordinary people, but below I discuss some of the indicative findings which emerged from data. 
It is important to recognise that not everyone use ICTs for information and debate about 
politics. Some use them for entertainment and social networking purposes. For example, Abel 
M in Cape Town’s Phillipi township indicated how she disliked politics in the following terms: 
Usually it is all bad news about tragedies, violence and disagreements here in South 
Africa and elsewhere. I don’t spend my data bundles for nothing by following political 
stuff on the internet. I only go on WhatsApp and Facebook whenever it is necessary 
because it’s a cheaper way of communicating with parents and family members back 
home.77 
Zimbo Live TV as a platform for political engagement was, for example, contested by others 
viewing its broadcasting content as apolitical. Instead, there was a perception by some that 
Zimbo Live TV largely focussed on social issues and scandals. Some participants, mostly in 
South Africa, underscored their belief that ICTs were primarily for social networking, not 
politics. For example, Abel M confirmed his regular access to the internet via his mobile 
device, but emphasised his disinterest in political issues in these terms: 
 
 
                                                          
77 Interview at Island, Philippi East, Cape Town on 12th March 2015. 
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 I also frequently go on the internet using my smartphone, but I avoid reading political 
news articles and material. I just do Facebook and Instagram mostly to connect with 
friends, but I see a lot of my friends sharing political stuff on Facebook and 
WhatsApp.78 
This shows that not everyone would engage in political discussion and debate online for a 
number of reasons, including their level of political awareness, accessibility and availability of 
ICTs devices and connectivity and ICT literacy among many other barriers to the expression 
of political views publicly online and offline.  
However, as I noted earlier, the relative ease in accessing mobile technologies and 
smartphones means internet accessibility no longer represents a major barrier to digital 
political activity (see Peel, 2010; Willems, 2009). The lack of regulation also means a lot of 
hate speech and inciteful material gets shared via social media, including offensive, factually 
untrue information (fake news) and explicit content (see Wright et al, 2017). Overall, 
discursive political activity and deliberation is an effective way by which diasporas spread 
across geographical distance are able to connect and sustain political conversation and 
debate, with positive implications for democratic citizenship.  
4.4 Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter confirms that indeed politics is relocated by emigration, and diasporas begin 
to find different ways of being political towards their homeland. For example, there are 
sections of the diaspora which engage in overt (‘Big P’) political activism and mobilisation 
aimed at influencing the homeland state and its politics, but the proportion of those with a 
capacity and opportunity to partake in this kind of political activity is severely limited by many 
                                                          
78 Ibid  
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factors. These include context, history, geographical distance and immigration and settlement 
experiences among other variables mediated diaspora political participation. 
 However, the majority of diasporas often considered politically detached, turned out to 
partake in discursive forms of politics in the form of everyday political discourses. This shows 
a shift form formal and state-centred ‘Big P’ political participation, to an emphasis on its 
everyday and vernacular expressions (online and offline) in the day-to-day lives of the 
Zimbabwean diaspora population. This also suggests the changing arena of politics from the 
state, political parties and organised civil society, to unorganized, informal and everyday 
platforms (both online and offline). To sum up, the above pattern, therefore, confirms that 
indeed diaspora citizenship can be performed politically, but there are many ways by which 
diasporas become political towards their homeland beyond overt political mobilisation aimed 
at directly influencing the state across geographical distance.  
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Chapter Five: The Everydayness of Diaspora Citizenship: Citizenship as Social Practice 
5.1 Chapter Introduction 
As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, Zimbabweans constitute a transnational diaspora, 
whose connections and ties span Zimbabwe and the different countries in which they are 
hosted (also see Pasura, 2014; 2012; 2008). As a diaspora, they perform citizenship in 
different material, discursive and other ways, which include senses of belonging and different 
kinds of political activity. This chapter looks at another important way in which diasporas 
(particularly Zimbabweans) perform their citizenship, as a diaspora community. This is by way 
of everyday social practices forming part of their daily lives.  
These social practices are often transnational, being simultaneously directed at the host 
country and country of origin (Levitt, 2004). What this confirms is that diaspora citizenship is 
performed not only in relation to the host country, but also country of origin across 
geographical space. Against this backdrop, the aim of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, it seeks 
to describe the different forms this everyday citizenship takes, in contradistinction to state-
centric and status-based conceptions of citizenship shaping states’ approaches to migrant 
incorporation. However, this thesis does not underestimate the importance of state-centred 
and status-based conceptions of citizenship, and it maps out intersections between these 
everyday social practices and formal, status-based modes of citizenship.  
This chapter also demonstrates the importance of everyday social activity as a way by 
which diasporas, particularly those living in abject circumstances on the margins of host 
societies, contest exclusion and devise their own ways of seeking integration in those host 
societies. For example, some everyday practices become a tactical strategy for accessing 
substantive benefits of formal citizenship outside the state and without legal entitlement to 
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them. In other words, diasporas engage in everyday forms of struggle to realise even 
substantive and formal elements associated with formal citizenship such as legal status and 
welfare, which they would otherwise not be entitled to. Everyday social practices also become 
a way of contesting exclusion and asserting membership both in the host country and 
homeland. In all these ways, everyday social practices serve to extend and complicate the 
boundaries of citizenship and non-citizenship both in the host country and country of origin, 
as will be demonstrated in this chapter.  
5.1.1 Diasporic Citizenship as Social Practice: Conceptual Issues 
Everyday citizenship encapsulates a number of defining features. For instance, it ties 
well with Zolberg’s observation that beneath macro-political mobilisation, lies seemingly 
inconsequential micro-events which occur in people’s daily lives (Zolberg, 1972). These are 
instead important expressions of citizenship, as this study demonstrates. These specific daily 
social acts are not always overtly transformational and consequential, but also small and 
seemingly inconsequential daily mundane transactions, routines and practices, but with 
profound implications on different aspects of people’s lives (Tarrow, 2005).  
The above phenomenon resonates with experiences of transnational diasporas who 
do not only seek to fight for the survival of their nuclear families but also relatives and clan 
members back in their countries of origin.  In addition, these kinds of everyday practices 
located outside the state, formal politics and organised socio-political activism are not only 
bottom-up, but can be viewed as autonomous, empowering and liberating forms of social 
agency resulting in meaningful social change in migrants’ lives and their families. In the next 
section, I consider the utility of mundane social practices in advancing the de facto citizenship 
of non-citizen diasporas. 
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Understanding diaspora citizenship in terms of lived experiences and daily practices 
has many advantages. By occurring outside the traditional boundaries of the state and its 
citizenship system, these everyday mundane practices within the broader society also expand 
the arena in which diasporas can act as citizens (Jones and Gaventa, 2002; Isin, 2002). These 
daily social practices are sustained on the back of resources, opportunities and networks 
established within local communities, cities/urban contexts and broader society in which 
those diasporas live (see Tarrow, 2005; Stasiulis and Bakan, 1997). For example, enduring 
relationships with different societal actors such as NGOs, employers, service providers, the 
local community, and informal social and kinship networks, develop over time. These daily 
interactions and relationships, in turn, give them new roles, rights and responsibilities as 
employees, clients, consumers, taxpayers and ratepayers, and tenants among other new 
relationships that emerge out of those daily practices.  
Therefore, mundane aspects of migrants’ daily lives often considered non-political, 
such as going to work, paying taxes, renting private accommodation, going shopping and 
being members of the community who experience similar problems with other members, 
help diasporas negotiate new socio-political locations and relationships necessary for their 
survival within the host society. This affirms the role of unofficial transactions, practices and 
relationships developed between diasporas and other societal actors within the wider society 
in which they are hosted, which the state wields limited (or no) direct control over (see 
Stasiulis and Bakan, 1997). For this reason, these negotiated relationships enable non-citizens 
to achieve substantive citizenship outcomes in the same way those with formal citizenship 
status are able to do. These interactions also help them access resources, opportunities and 
other substantive aspects of citizenship, which they would not be entitled to under the terms 
of the existing citizenship regime.  
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Everyday social practices, therefore, bear important implications for citizenship of 
diasporas. Zimbabweans, as a transnational diaspora, sustain cross border ties while in the 
different countries they are hosted (Pasura, 2014; 2010; 2008). Everyday social practices 
provide strategies by which diasporas sustain transnational ties with country of origin. Also, 
through a transnational set of everyday practices, diasporas simultaneously contest 
marginalisation and reassert their membership in the country of origin across geographical 
distance (see Goldring, 2001; Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 2001). In this latter respect, some of 
diasporas’ everyday practices are designed to assert diasporas’ commitment to their country 
of origin, while also challenging their marginalisation and delegitimization by their stay-at-
home compatriots, on the basis of their prolonged absence and other grounds. These cross 
border and long-distance practices include the remittance of money and other household 
goods to their relatives and families, regular travel back to the home country for holidays and 
sociocultural events and the maintenance of other sociocultural ties with their communities 
back in the home country, outside the realms of the state. Therefore, considering that 
diasporic communities tend to have more than one country which they call ‘home’, it will be 
interesting to see how Zimbabweans’ everyday social practices tend to be directed not only 
at South Africa and the UK, but also towards Zimbabwe.  
Everyday social practices can also be viewed as tactical way by which diasporas seek 
not only to secure their survival, but to deepen their embeddedness in the host society (see 
Muzondidya, 2006). These everyday social practices can be used as a survival strategy, 
especially in contexts where they are denied access to livelihood opportunities by virtue of 
their non-citizen legal statuses. Many scholars have examined migrant survival strategies in 
urban contexts of different host countries such as South Africa, Namibia and other places in 
both the global south and north, which provides a useful empirical basis for our understanding 
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of the everydayness of diaspora citizenship, particularly as it occurs in urban contexts 
(Hungwe, 2013; Mbiba, 2011; 2012b). This study adds to this body of work empirically and 
conceptually as it looks at these survival strategies and other daily social practices and 
routines (using citizenship lenses) as acts of everyday citizenship.   
The pre-eminence of this survivalist and everyday mode of citizenship can also be 
explained by background experiences of most of the diasporas, characterised by state 
fragility, socio-economic deprivation and violence and insecurity, prompting emigration from 
those diasporas’ countries of origin (Betts, 2013). This is true of Zimbabweans, most of who 
left Zimbabwe as a way out of poverty, feeling they could not survive in the above 
circumstances, and in search of better livelihood opportunities in other countries like South 
Africa and the UK (See Dzingirai et al, 2015). This survivalist conception of everyday citizenship 
also resonates with the experiences of diasporas living on the margins of both the host and 
country of origin societies, usually without stable legal status, excluded from mainstream 
political life and with limited rights.  
Everyday citizenship also speaks to experiences of diasporas hosted in contexts 
marked by rampant poverty, unemployment and inequality, as is predominantly the case in 
South Africa (see Betts, 2013). Those identified as ‘abject’ or ‘irregular’ citizens living on the 
margin of society (see Nyers, 2011; Sharkey, 2008; Hepworth, 2012).  Empirical studies have 
observed instances Zimbabweans living on the margins of the UK society, with Zimbabweans 
resorting to informality and social networks as a source of support (see Mbiba, 2011; 2012b) 
In terms of this mode of citizenship, thriving in the face of daily life challenges, such as 
negotiating illegality of status, coping with crime and violence, negotiating access to 
livelihood opportunities and basic services without entitlement, finding work without stable 
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and valid legal status, and providing livelihood support to family members left back home, 
become crucial elements of this kind of everyday form of citizenship.  
The foregoing discussion makes it clear that everyday practices of migrants are not 
always just part of mundane daily practices, but this does not make them non-political and 
inconsequential to migrants’ daily lives. One of the net effects of mundane social practices as 
a way of performing citizenship, relates to the delinking of de facto citizenship from its narrow 
de jure conception, thus making it possible for non-citizens (in de jure terms), to start acting 
like citizens (in de facto terms) in their lives. For example, through everyday social practices, 
migrants begin to contest these imposed legal statuses by constructing and negotiating new 
relationships within the wider host society. This, therefore, renders the boundaries of 
citizenship murkier, as it becomes difficult to draw the line between those are citizens and 
those who are not. Also, as everyday social practices allow non-citizens to realise some of the 
material benefits associated with substantive, de jure, citizenship, which they would 
otherwise be excluded from by the state, it helps extend the boundaries of citizenship. 
Therefore, mundane social practices become diaspora inclusion and incorporation.   
 To demonstrate the utility of everyday social practices in advancing diaspora citizenship, 
this chapter starts by exploring how the state remains important is grantor of legal status, but 
no longer remains the exclusive arena of citizenship. This paves way for everyday social 
practices occurring in alternative arenas outside the state, which become ways of contesting 
state-centric modes of citizenship and identities. This chapter ends by discussing how 
Zimbabweans use everyday social practices to contest exclusion and assert their 
Zimbabweanness transnationally, across geographical distance, while hosted in the two host 
states – the UK and South Africa.  
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5.1.2 Limits of the State as an Arena of Diasporic Citizenship 
The state is important in citizenship, but it does not represent the sole locus of citizenship, 
as experiences of a significant section of Zimbabweans observed in South Africa confirm (see 
Laguerre, 2000). This confirms the shift in thinking away from state-centred citizenship 
discourses and practices (see Isin, 2008; Isin and Turner, 2002; Jones and Gaventa, 2002).  This 
decentring of citizenship was more defined in South Africa where nearly 85% of the 
participants in both Johannesburg and Cape Town expressed apathy, cynicism and distrust 
towards the both the South African and Zimbabwean states due to what they viewed as their 
exclusionary practices and lack of compassion. However, participants with valid immigration 
status indicated their recognition of role of the South African state, particularly in giving them 
the requisite legal status, which they deemed crucial for their survival. For example, according 
to Baba Muti (46 years old self-employed motor mechanic living in Philippi since in 2008):  
We only need the South African government to give us the papers [immigration 
documentation]. Nothing else.79  
As such, it emerged that although these South Africa-based participants did not trust the 
South African state, and therefore also found ways of avoiding, evading and cheating it. I will 
discuss this aspect later, when I examine Zimbabweans’ daily struggles to remain in South 
Africa.  
It is also clear from the above data that there was a desire for self-reliance, autonomy 
and non-interference from the South African state. For example, above 85% of the 
participants in South Africa tended to not see the South African state as having any important 
                                                          
79 Interview at Philippi, Cape Town on 24 February 2015. 
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role to play in the provision of their material needs in their day to day lives, other than the 
granting of legal status. The above tendencies bear implications on our understanding of the 
role of the state in diaspora citizenship, as I discuss below.  
This desire for non-interference and self-reliance, mirrors broader trends by which 
various aspects of South Africa-based immigrants are becoming informalised, with alternative 
arenas (often informal) being found outside the state (Von Lieres and Piper, 2014; also see 
Nyers, 2011; McGregor, 2008; Portes, 1995). The above dynamics also reflect the great sense 
of injustice felt by Zimbabweans towards the South African state, which is often thought to 
be treating immigrants unfairly by denying equal opportunities, compared to citizens 
(Neocosmos, 2010). This category of participants, especially the youthful ones, may have 
lacked experience engaging with the state either in mainstream political processes or as part 
of organised civil society back in Zimbabwe, which suggests this pattern could be traceable to 
the citizenship crisis responsible for their emigration in the first place (see Dzingirai et al, 
2015; Betts and Jones, 2016; Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2009). This tendency by Zimbabweans in South 
Africa is not without context. The above finding also mirrors broader trends in Africa where 
citizens (and non-citizens) are increasingly disengaged from the state due to its failures as a 
vehicle for meaningful citizenship, thus becoming more inclined to perform citizenship 
outside the realms of the state (see Baker, 2001). This is a trend not only for Zimbabweans 
hosted in the country, but also those left back in Zimbabwe.  
Also, due to its dominant, violent and repressive nature, the state in many Sub-
Saharan African countries is often viewed by citizens rather cynically as an object of 
oppression and exclusion to be avoided, cheated or fought at every opportunity (see Ake, 
1992; Azarya, 1988). It is also viewed as a tool for impoverishment. It is not surprising, 
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therefore, that the poverty and socio-economic deprivation that immigrants endure in South 
Africa is often blamed on the state, due to its failure effectively to manage the economy and 
distribute socio-economic benefits across society (Mkandawire, 2010; Kpessa et al, 2011). 
This is the background from which African diasporas usually come, and perhaps helps explain 
why the majority of South Africa-based participants were not keen on engaging with the 
South African state. However, not depending on the host state as a vehicle for citizenship, 
was not accompanied by total exclusion and marginalisation of the Zimbabwean community 
in South Africa, without any means to get on with their day to day lives.   
It is important to note, however, that the tendency to by-pass the state was less 
defined among UK-based participants, where the state was seen as an irreplaceable arena of 
citizenship for both British citizens and non-citizens, regardless of their legal status, as Gift 
confirmed: 
 The government makes sure we live comfortably in this country. It protects and looks 
after everyone. And if anything goes wrong the government of this country is quick to 
act.80 
This shared view in the data is, however, inconsistent with contemporary patterns in the UK 
given the draconian way the UK government deals with immigration and immigrants (House 
of Commons, 2006).  There have also been wider issues relating to structural unemployment, 
downward social mobility and institutionalised racism for immigrants in the UK (Pasi, 2013), 
which again contradict this dominant perception among participants. In this context, civil 
society has been playing a key role in guaranteeing the rights, welfare and wellbeing of 
                                                          
80 Interview at Camberley, Surrey, on 28th July 2015.  
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immigrants, including Zimbabweans (McGregor and Primorac, 2010; Pasura, 2010).81 Informal 
forms of support with access to employment and micro-enterprising on the basis of informal 
social networks (see Mbiba, 2011; 2012; von Lieres and Pier, 2014; Crush et al, 2015; Gastrow 
and Amit, 2015). Therefore, the view that the UK state guarantee substantive citizenship for 
Zimbabweans, expressed by participants is not entirely universal.  
There was also a shared belief that legal status accorded by the state and directing claims to 
the state were critical for them to attain safety, protection and wellbeing in their everyday 
lives within the UK. This observation ties with contemporary thinking which seeks to move 
away from state-centric conceptions of citizenship, to an understanding of citizenship as lived 
experience outside the direct ambit of the state, its institutions and the formal political 
process (see Isin et al, 2008; 2002; Jones and Gaventa, 2002).  
By implication, decentring citizenship helps expand the boundary of where citizenship 
is performed, which opens up opportunities for non-citizen diasporas to act as citizens outside 
the direct tentacls of the state (Miraftab, 2004; Tarrow, 2005; Nyers, 2011). This is largely true 
for diasporas in South Africa, compared to those in the UK whose practice of citizenship (and 
non-citizenship) is closely tied to the state, as shown in preceding sections of this chapter. 
This is not to suggest the lack of informal, everyday and bottom-up modes of citizenship for 
diasporas hosted in the UK, but this study shows that this is more defined in the South African 
context. This confirms the tendency by immigrants in South Africa to display a dominant 
desire for self-reliance, non-interference and autonomy, which I highlighted earlier (also see 
Mbiba, 2011; Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012; Polzer, 2012). Given the tendency by 
Zimbabweans in South Africa to shun and by-pass the host state for their wellbeing and other 
                                                          
81 Consider role of churches in dealing with mental health problems; pro bono lawyers helping navigate the asylum/immigration system; 
and NGO s campaign for respect of rights of immigrants. 
195 | P a g e  
 
aspects of citizenship, it is important to determine alternative spaces in which they begin to 
engage. 
5.1.3 Everyday Spaces for Diaspora Citizenship 
Not engaging directly politically with the state, and lack of formal recognition as a 
citizens, does not always mean total deprivation of and exclusion from citizenship for 
diasporas (Laguerre, 1998; Fortier, 2016; Isin, 2008; Oldfield, 1997; Lister, 1998; Jones and 
Gaventa, 2002). Instead, findings of this study demonstrate that indeed ordinary 
Zimbabweans appeared to achieve a lot in terms of substantive outcomes of citizenship 
outside the state, perhaps more than what their South African counterparts enjoying formal 
citizenship are able to accomplish:  
The government [South African] does not want to help us. It is difficult but we can still 
survive. We are not citizens here but we seem to be living better lives than some South 
Africans in this place.82 
The above statement indeed confirms that Zimbabweans are still able to thrive as de facto 
citizens under minimal state intervention and without secure legal statuses, validating the 
above view that citizenship can indeed be practiced outside legal status and the state (Von 
Lieres and Piper, 2014; Isin, 2008; 2008). As I pointed out, this mirrors broader trends on the 
African continent, where citizens disenchanted by the state find alternative arenas to practice 
their citizenship including civil society (see Baker, 2001; Azarya and Chazan, 1987). I now 
consider the role of organised civil society, to see if it provides an effective alternative vehicle 
for diasporas to perform their citizenship.  
                                                          
82 Interview at PASSOP offices, Cape Town, 22 February 2015.  
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Some Zimbabweans, particularly new arrivals, vulnerable individuals and those 
struggling to legalise their immigration statuses among others, routinely seek the support of 
organised civil society in their quest for rights, legal status and other kinds of support in their 
daily lives (see Polzer, 2012; Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012). This tendency was more 
defined among those in South Africa, the undocumented and those in employment; whereas 
very limited migrant NGO activity was observed in the South-East of the UK. This was probably 
a result of methodology used, with a particular focus on areas with limited charities and social 
formations working with diasporas and other categories of immigrants.  
Most of them were located in London and only two participants indicated that they 
had solicited support from an NGO. In relation to South Africa, I observed this tendency when 
I worked at a Cape Town-based organisation called PASSOP from April to May 2015. According 
to PASSOP’s statistics, an average of 30% of their daily clientele were Zimbabweans. They 
often approach the organisation with various problems for assistance, including advice on 
what immigration/asylum permits to apply for, preparing appeal submissions, negotiating 
access to healthcare, education and other public services among many other forms of 
assistance.  
Most civil society organisations in the form of NGOs working with migrants, operate 
within a rights-based framework (see Polzer, 2012; Betts and Jones, 2016). And their primary 
aim is to turn those human rights to which migrants are entitled, into a living reality. Migrants 
are entitled to some rights enshrined in South Africa’s constitutional and legal framework, 
including the Constitution, Refugees Act and Immigration Act and other relevant laws (Kriger, 
2007; Morreira, 2010; 2011; 2015). However, not all immigrants have the ability to claim and 
benefit from them and without robust claims-making, they remain lofty without any real and 
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meaningful impact in their daily lives (see Golub, 2003). Therefore, support and assistance 
from various civil society organisations with claiming rights is often sought, as is usually the 
case for other marginalised and disempowered sections of the migrant community (Jinnah 
and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012). Beyond support in negotiating the Department of Home Affairs 
(and Home Office in the UK), Zimbabweans living in precarious conditions also receive welfare 
support from churches such as the Central Methodist Church in Johannesburg led by Bishop 
Paul Verryn, welfare NGOs such as Scalabrini Centre in Cape Town and similar organisations 
in London and other parts of the UK (see Polzer, 2012).   
Lastly, my observation was that, in addition to rights issues, Zimbabweans often 
approach NGOs with a range of problems confronting them in their daily lives, at times not 
knowing whether they have a right or not. For example, some came to PASSOP with 
complaints related to the administrative injustices they would have suffered at the hands of 
the South African state. This reaffirms the intermediary role of NGOs and diaspora 
associations, mediating between the state and non-citizens, thus helping to translate rights 
into practice (Golub, 2006; Polzer, 2012). At times they came for help with engaging private 
persons and other entities outside of the South African state, denying them access to basic 
and public services, such as employers, landlords, banks, hospitals and schools.  
As indicated in the foregoing discussion, Zimbabweans indeed frequently resort to 
NGOs for support, while other NGOs’ sole purpose is advocacy for an improvement in the 
plight of immigrants in both South Africa and the UK. This, therefore, confirms the view that 
migrant civil society indeed constitutes another vehicle through which diasporas assert 
citizenship claims (Tarrow, 2005; Isin and Turner, 2002). However, organised civil society has 
its own flaws which inhibit most Zimbabweans from accessing them. These limits include lack 
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of capacity, lack of awareness about their existence and spatial bias, with a tendency to be 
located in CBDs and affluent areas, thus precluding those in South Africa’s informal townships 
(Polzer Ngwato, 2012). I will not delve too deeply into the limits of organised civil society, 
except to underscore that it represents a crucial ally of ordinary immigrants in the absence of 
sustained migrants-state engagement. Another crucial observation to make is that, despite 
its useful role in advocating, representing and supporting diasporas, not many Zimbabweans 
are dependent on NGOs, who are not widespread across South Africa and the UK anyway.  
The above tendency explains why only an average of 40% (20% in Cape Town, 15% in 
Johannesburg and five percent in the UK) of the total participants reported having resorted 
to NGOs for help at any point during their stay in South Africa and the UK. Instead, 
Zimbabweans routinely resorted to unorganised, mundane and unselfconscious, everyday 
survival strategies in their daily lives to achieve different citizenship outcomes. I confirmed 
this tendency during my observation when I spent over two months (February – April 2015) 
immersed in the township of Phillipi. For example, I observed that these strategies did not so 
much involve consulting NGOs or other representative above them, but included reliance on 
social and kinship ties and networks for assistance and support outside the state and 
organised civil society.  
Now, it is interesting to see how Zimbabweans negotiate their survival in their daily lives, 
in the context of diminished limited formal engagement with the host country state. Since 
almost all of the participants in the three research sites, south-east England, Johannesburg 
and Cape Town, highlighted the need to continue residing and working within the two 
countries as their foremost twin-priorities for their survival, the following analysis will 
examine how everyday social practices help Zimbabweans achieve those outcomes.  
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It is worth pointing out that subsequent sections of this chapter will be devoted to the 
examination of unorganised, unselfconscious and mundane aspects of their everyday lives as 
ways of enacting citizenship. The next section considers how status-based, state-centric 
citizenship intersects with everyday social practices, particularly emphasising how migrants 
use everyday social practices to contest state-imposed legally imposed exclusion through 
illegal status.  
5.2 Legal Status and Survival Among the Zimbabwean Diaspora: Empirical Dynamics 
It is worth restating that this thesis does not intend to diminish the importance of legal 
status, the same way it has not rejected the importance of ‘Big P’ political participation, as a 
way in which citizenship is realised by diasporas. It represents another way by which migrants 
become citizens. In fact, ordinary migrants often desire to be legalised and recognised in the 
same fashion the state recognises its citizens, as this is perceived to enhance their livelihoods 
and prospects for social mobility within the host society (see Morreira, 2011).  However, such 
recognition, or at least regularisation of status, is not always forthcoming from the host state, 
as evidenced by the draconian nature of immigration and citizenship laws and regulations 
both in South Africa and the UK, and the actual practical difficulties associated with 
negotiating immigration/asylum documentation application processes in both countries (see 
Pasura, 2008; Morreira, 2010; PASSOP, 2013). As is the case with political activism, status-
based citizenship has its own limits which I will highlight in this section. 
An examination of how immigrants negotiate acquisition of legal status with the host 
state, given how crucial having legal security is often considered to be by migrants 
themselves, can help to demonstrate how the state remains critical but not the sole vehicle 
through which citizenship outcomes are achieved by diasporas. The acquisition of legal status 
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represents a traditional way of defining citizenship based on legally defined identity (see 
Kubal, 2012; Bosniak, 2000). Having a secure legal status serves many purposes in the lives of 
diasporas, one of which was daily survival and attainment of better living standards in the 
host country. 
 Host states often use the immigration system as a tool for controlling immigration figures, 
reducing the number of people who enter, stay and need to be removed from the host 
country territory, as immigration is increasingly becoming politically contested and 
securitised (Kubal, 2012; Morreira, 2011). More importantly, legal permission to reside within 
the host country marks the boundaries of legality/illegality/semi-legality of non-citizens in 
terms of their legal status, making it an object of contestation between the host state and 
immigrants (Morreira, 2010; 2015; Kubal, 2012). Citizenship and immigration laws identify 
immigrants differently and this is meant to distinguish between those formally recognised 
members of that particular political community and those who are not.  
However, as I noted earlier, data shows that immigrants often attach different meanings 
to legal status, one of which is that of a survival mechanism without which their lives would 
be difficult in the host country. For example, indeed as confirmed by data, having secure legal 
status is critical for the survival of immigrants hosted in any context, but diasporas often 
negotiate access to this status using everyday strategies and resources. This was confirmed 
by nearly 100% of the participants, who felt that having valid, secure and relatively permanent 
legal status was critical for their socioeconomic wellbeing in the host country. Regularising 
presence in the host country, and ensuring one obtains status with favourable conditions 
attached to it was, therefore, viewed as the next crucial element to fix, immediately after 
entry into either South Africa or the UK. In other words, how to get the right immigration and 
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residency status is always a perplexing question that preoccupies every immigrant’s mind, at 
times long after their arrival and settlement. For example, A. M (42 years old) who had lived 
in Vosloorus for 6 years had this to say:   
Once you arrive in this country, the next important thing is to get the right papers for 
you to stay and work. This determines how successful you will be in this country.83 
Therefore, legal status is not only a way for identification or demographic control purposes, 
but is critical for survival and success in life. This, therefore, demonstrates how formal and 
informal dimensions intersect and complement each other.   
Permission to enter and reside within the host country has another critical use. It is 
often used by host states to control immigrants’ access to resources, opportunities and other 
substantive benefits associated with citizenship, ostensibly with an aim to ensure non-citizens 
do not benefit from the resources meant for citizens (see Anderson, 2013). As I underscored 
earlier, access to livelihood opportunities is always a critical aspect of survival in the host 
country for African migrants, most of who would have endured socioeconomic deprivation in 
their lives before departure (Nyers, 2011; Hepworth, 2012; Betts, 2014; also see McGregor, 
2008; Mbiba, 2011; Dzingirai et al, 2015). There was broad consensus among participants 
both in the UK and South Africa, for example, that the acquisition of secure legal status 
constitutes a gateway into opportunities and quality of life while hosted in the two respective 
countries. Related to that is the use of legal status to become integrated into the host society, 
particularly in the economic activities of the country and being able to access opportunities 
otherwise reserved for formal citizens (Baubock, 2006; 1994).  Almost every participant across 
the three research sites, mostly educated and professionally qualified, desired to have a valid 
                                                          
83 Interview at Vosloorus taxi rank on 24th April 2015. 
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and stable legal status viewing it as a stepping stone to social mobility, better employment 
opportunities, enjoyment of rights and entitlements.  
There was also a shared view that, without valid legal status allowing one to work, the 
capacity to sustain transnational practices such as sending remittances for the survival of their 
families and regular travel may become difficult to engage in, which defeats the purpose for 
their emigration in the first place (see von Burgsdoff, 2010; 2012; Crush et al, 2015). Certainly, 
this represents another critical use of legal status, particularly for those hosted in distant 
places such as the UK and Cape Town who need to travel significant distances to see relatives. 
Lastly, there was consensus that a stable residency status provided a guarantee of ‘peace of 
mind’ and ‘feeling at home’ without which mental health issues and other psychosocial 
problems would ensue:  
I’m always living in fear of being arrested and deported. That’s why I moved from 
Johannesburg to Cape Town. I don’t feel safe at all.84  
In light of the above discussion, there is no doubt that having secure legal status means a lot 
for immigrants, and their success depends on its acquisition.  It is clear that host states do not 
give due consideration to what legal status means to immigrants in different contests, 
particularly the importance immigrants place on it as a tool for their survival. The next section 
considers the everyday strategies used by Zimbabweans as part of their struggle to ensure 
their continued physical presence, terms of their stay and access to livelihood opportunities 
within the host country. 
 
                                                          
84 Interview at Lower Crossroads on 15th March 2015. 
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5.2.1 The Struggle for Legal Status in South Africa and the UK  
Having secure legal statuses is viewed as critical by Zimbabweans, but the acquisition 
of such statuses is not always easy. Debates about immigration and settlement of migrants 
are often state-centric and top-down, focussing on how the state imposes different statuses 
and conditions of residency in any particular country through the use of immigration and 
citizenship laws (Baubock, 2006). Non-citizens’ legal status often encompasses the types of 
residency permission held by a person, showing their identity, its degree of 
temporariness/permanency, what it allows the holder to do (and not to do) and conditions 
under which its validity ceases (see Baubock, 2006). The host state often uses the law and 
administrative mechanisms to determine and impose various categories of legal status 
(subject to set qualifications, criteria and application process) (see Velcamp and Shaw, 2016; 
Bosniak, 2000; 2006; Baubock, 1994). For example, some are recognised as citizens, 
permanent residents, visitors, dependents, asylum seekers and illegals among other legal 
identities and categories by which diasporas are identified. 
Formal approaches to citizenship give primacy to the host state as a granter of legal 
status, in a top-down fashion (Baubock, 1994; Jones and Gaventa, 2002). In others words, the 
state makes the laws, it determines residency permit categories and application criteria, sets 
up a government department that handles, processes and decides on applications; the task 
of the immigrant is to apply and meet the application requirements.  This way of 
understanding the struggle for legal status is too neat and technicised to capture the actual 
lived experiences of immigrants when seeking to obtain legal status from the state. The above 
way of thinking represents a somewhat sanitised representation of what is essentially a 
negotiated and contested, at times messy, hellish and conflictual, process playing out in non-
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citizens’ day-to-day lives. Therefore, the above state-centred conception of the acquisition of 
legal status problematically ignores the bottom-up struggles and claims by non-citizens aimed 
at achieving desirable terms of residency within the host country. 
Despite the existence of (sometimes very progressive) immigration and citizenship 
laws, systems and procedures setting out how to apply for different categories of permission, 
data shows that not everyone finds it easy to navigate the immigration system and 
bureaucratic entities charged with these processes both in the UK and South Africa. For 
example, a tiny minority of participants (5% in Cape Town, 8% Johannesburg and 17% in 
south-east England) indicated that they had applied for residency permits without too much 
difficulty and without the need for assistance.  This pattern mirrors what has been observed 
to be a systemic problem by civil society organisations, especially in the findings of PASSOP’s 
monitoring report in which the organisation documented the challenges faced by asylum 
seekers applying for asylum in the host country.85 Therefore, faced with the possibility of 
being returned by the host government back to Zimbabwe, where socioeconomic and political 
problems continue unabated, the Zimbabwean diaspora community devise mundane 
strategies aimed at allowing them to be able to not only reside but also survive in both South 
Africa and the UK. The concept of abject spaces is a useful way of understanding the spaces 
and strategies by which this marginalised section of the diaspora negotiate citizenship (Nyers, 
2011; also see Hepworth, 2012; Sharkey, 2008; Morreira, 2011).  
It became clear from interviews and observations at PASSOP that indeed permission 
to live and work in South Africa and the UK was not obtained easily due to a variety of socio-
                                                          
85 PASSOP conducted a study on the accessibility of Refugee Reception Centres. The report entitled ‘The Road 
to Documentation: Asylum Seekers’ Access to Cape Town’s Refugee Reception Office’, highlighted the 
difficulties faced by asylum seekers seeking asylum in South Africa. This included corruption by officials, 
inefficiency and delays and poor queue management systems.  
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legal and other challenges. For example, a total of over 70% of the 140 participants in both 
countries complained about how difficult it was to obtain a suitable permit/visa which 
allowed them the right to work, without any restrictions. One of PASSOP’s activists 
highlighted the following challenges he thought made it difficult for Zimbabweans to obtain 
legal status in South Africa: exorbitant application fees and related costs, complexity of 
application procedures, hostile staff, high rejection rate, and corruption within the 
Department of Home Affairs. These are the same issues raised by civil society organisations 
advocating for greater inclusion and integration of non-citizens into South African society 
(PASSOP, 2012; Solidarity Peace Trust and PASSOP, 2012). 
In addition to above concerns, duration of validity of those residency permits, which 
were often temporary. For example, holders of Section 22 asylum seeker permits were valid 
for three months, while ZDP permits were valid for three years. The same problem was 
reported in the UK where applying for work visas was an expensive and time-consuming 
process but their validity only stretched up to three years. It is apparent that obtaining legal 
status is not always a neat process. The next section, therefore, considers other localised, 
unofficial and mundane strategies used by Zimbabweans in South Africa, to struggle for 
formal recognition through legal status. It also discusses how non-citizens use every day social 
practices to contest imposed legal identities and residency statuses, as well as redefining the 
terms and conditions of residency outside those legally and institutionally dictated by the host 
state. 
Abject citizens adopt a variety of day-to-day strategies (outside the state and 
organised civil society) aimed at ensuring that they continue to live and work in the host 
country (Nyers, 2011; Sharkey, 2008). Even when their chances of obtaining legal status 
206 | P a g e  
 
become next to non-existent for different reasons, they still find tactics to evade and cheat 
the host state to avoid removal from the host country. Although NGOs are often viewed as 
key alternative vehicle for citizenship among marginalised sections of society, this study 
shows that not everyone indeed always gets a chance to benefit from their interventions (see 
Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012). For example, almost every participant highlighted that they 
had sought to legalise their status as soon as they arrived in South Africa or the UK, but only 
40% in South Africa and 60% in the UK indicated that they had been successful. Those 
participants have not stopped their quest for legal status, but have explored different 
strategies of becoming documented. For example, of the total 140 participants across the 
three research sites, only 20% reported that they had sought help from NGOs.  Reasons for 
not engaging the assistance of NGOs ranged from their inaccessibility due to spatial bias in 
their locations to lack of awareness about their assistance among many others.  
During my time as a participant observer at PASSOP I also observed that the number 
of NGOs providing support to migrants in Cape Town alone was negligible, without any 
reputable diaspora association for Zimbabweans dealing with issues faced by the 
Zimbabwean community. Other NGOs like the Cape Town Refugee Centre avoided helping 
Zimbabweans on the basis that they are technically not refugees as they were not believed to 
be facing any fear of persecution. These latter two issues mirror the limited capacity within 
organised civil society and marginalisation of the Zimbabwean diaspora by refugee 
organisations, observed among Zimbabweans in Botswana by Betts (2013).  
Therefore, in the context of limited (or no) state support, and limited civil society reach 
and capacity (see Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012; Polzer, 2012), the family, church and other 
Zimbabweans met at social events and gatherings, were cited as alternative sources of 
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information, advice and other kinds of support in pursuit of regularisation of stay. This 
confirms the important role of informal social ties and networks based on kinship, extended 
family, clan, friendship and nationality ties in promoting migrant settlement in different 
contexts (Muzondidya, 2006; Pasi, 2013; Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016; Mutsindikwa and 
Gelderblom, 2014).86 I now look at those unofficial and unorganised practices to see how 
diasporas make use of them to achieve their aim of residing and working in South Africa and 
the UK.  
This thesis suggests that non-citizens will use every day social practices in arenas 
outside the state, to maintain physical residency and access to benefits associated with formal 
citizenship in the host country (Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016; also see Scott, 1985). For 
example, social networks and ties constitute an alternative source of support in the quest for 
legal status. For example, based on my own observations during my two-month immersion in 
the township of Philippi (Cape Town), this free of charge, vernacular, immigration-related 
advice and assistance often included little but critical mundane things like finding where the 
Department of Home Affairs’ offices are located, how to navigate the urban environment to 
reach the offices and what modes of transport to use. At times, useful tips and advice on how 
to increase chances of success were shared informally, including how to jump the queues at 
the immigration offices, how to make an appealing claim for asylum during asylum 
determination interviews, and other ‘dos and don’ts’ of immigration and asylum applications.  
Furthermore, as I mentioned earlier, application processes are often expensive, and 
participants cited a number of costs associated with regularising their statuses in the host 
                                                          
86 Mutsindikwa and Gelderblom go further in their analysis to observe how friendship ties become more 
prominent as a basis for social capital and support among Zimbabweans in Botswana.  
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country. For example, considerable travel is often involved for those attending refugee status 
determination interviews, appeal hearings and travel to Pretoria’s Marabastad Refugee 
Reception Office (since the closure of the Cape Town Refugee Reception Office in 2012). 
Material assistance in the form of pocket money for bus fares and other needs while seeking 
to apply for legal status is also derived from networks. There were also costs associated with 
postage, application fees and related costs (such as radiography tests and criminal record 
checks by SAPS) for those applying for other immigration permits other than asylum status 
queuing during application processes.  
Social capital, based on informal social connections, was also critical in the day to day 
survival, as a way of support during times of hardships (Putnam, 2000; Muzondidya, 2011).87 
There were also concerns about the unbearable costs associated with tracking and following 
up on their submitted applications, for example, participants who were in the process of 
applying for ZDP permits bemoaned the decision by the Department of Home Affairs to 
contract VFS Global, which instructed that all applications would be made online. This 
presented challenges for those who could not afford internet and related costs.  Therefore, 
in the absence of state or NGO support, participants concurred that the family, relatives, clan 
and other social networks were usually useful sources of help and support. This indeed 
confirms the utility of everyday relationships, transactions and networks as a source of 
resources by which citizenship outcomes can be achieved by those on the margins of society 
(see Tarrow, 2005; Sharkey, 2008; Nyers, 2011; Hepworth, 2012).  
                                                          
87 Muzondidya observes that social capital is built on trust, solidarity and sense of togetherness and 
community. Putnam also observes the importance of reciprocity in sustaining social capital. 
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Furthermore, abject and irregular forms of citizenship practiced through everyday 
social practices are sometimes aimed at contesting illegality and marginalisation. Some 
Zimbabweans resort to fraudulent tactics in a bid to continue living in South Africa, confirming 
the view that migrants find it difficult always to comply with the law (Von Lieres and Piper, 
2014). In some instances, participants cited cases in which some Zimbabweans designated 
illegal and liable for deportation had resorted to fraudulent documents, bribery and other 
corrupt practices (as a way of cheating the state) as an option for legalising their status. In 
this context, Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw (2016) blame the South African government’s 
restrictive immigration and citizenship laws and regulations for compelling immigrants to find 
ways of purchasing immigration documents through illicit means just to stay legally in South 
Africa. This above tendency to obtain ‘fake’ legal status fraudulently reflects a similar trend 
that has been observed of Zimbabweans with a reputation of buying fraudulent South African 
identity documents in the Johannesburg area (Mawadza and Crush, 2010; Alfaro-Velcamp and 
Shaw, 2016). This has been more rampant in that part of South Africa due to its proximity to 
the head offices of the Department of Home Affairs in Pretoria where applications are 
processed, making it easier for officials with access to the applications to engage in corrupt 
and fraudulent practices.  
These were desperate measures taken mostly by completely undocumented persons 
struggling to find employment and guarantee their survival in South Africa: 
 It is difficult for us who failed to get the ZDP permits in 2010 because applying for the 
normal work permits is hard. They require a lot of things plus you can go for years 
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without getting the result. That’s why we have to find other ways of getting the papers 
from the black market.88  
 While in Phillipi, I personally observed that information was shared via WhatsApp and word 
of mouth among Zimbabweans on how to obtain fraudulent documentation and the contact 
information of those producing them, most of whom were of Nigerian and Congolese origin. 
This illustrates that social capital transcends nationality boundaries based on what may be 
termed inter-‘national’ solidarity across diasporas of different nationalities. Others had links 
with Department of Home Affairs officials selling permits in a corrupt way. Such desperate 
and extreme measures help confirm that the quest to stay within the territory of the host 
country can be heavily contested and struggled for. Also, Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw (2016) 
correctly observe that non-citizens are sometimes pressured by the prohibitive citizenship 
and immigration laws and practices of the host country to end up engaging in such desperate 
measures, especially given the importance they place on legal status as an instrument for 
their survival. 
This tactic of cheating the state by way of working illegally was not only confined to 
South Africa, as it was also used by some in the UK, albeit at a smaller scale. For example, only 
four participants had applied for asylum reported knowing their fellow asylum seekers 
working illegally with employment agencies in the care industry. This would enable them to 
support not only their families but also to be able to remit money to their relatives who 
depend on them. These participants indicated that they were not allowed to work while their 
applications were still pending with the Home Office, and this caused a lot of anguish and 
hardship among affected persons. Clearly, apart from avoiding being physically removed from 
                                                          
88 Interview with 26-year-old L.M at Philippi on 09 March 2015. 
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the host country, Zimbabweans also used different everyday tactics to gain access to 
employment and other livelihood opportunities so as to guarantee their survival, and that of 
their families and relatives left back in Zimbabwe.  
The above instances show that the terms and conditions under which non-citizens 
immigrate and reside within host countries are not only set by the state through the law, but 
they are constantly challenged and redefined through everyday practices of non-citizens 
themselves. I now look at other ways in which yet another category of Zimbabweans, those 
who had completely given up on trying to regularise their stay, use everyday practices to 
maintain physical presence within the host territory, given how presence within territory 
represents a crucial element of citizenship (see Bosniak, 2000; 2006; Baubock, 2006).  Illegal 
diasporas also find other ways of maintaining physical presence within host country territory, 
forming part of their everyday lives, in order to continue accessing all other aspects of 
citizenship.  
5.2.1.1 Evading the Host State as a Way of Contesting Illegality 
In principle, the state is responsible for putting measures in place aimed at ensuring 
those living within its territory hold regular legal statuses, without which they are physically 
removed (see Bosniak, 2000; Morreira, 2010; Nyers, 2011; Kubal, 2012). To punish and deter 
others from living in the host country illegally, deportees are often held in degrading and 
dehumanising conditions, as has been reported to be the case at Lindela Immigration 
Detention Facility outside Johannesburg (Solidarity Peace Trust and PASSOP, 2012).  This is 
not always the case, in reality, as undocumented diasporas adopt various everyday strategies 
aimed at contesting and resisting their arrest and physical exclusion from the territory of the 
host state (see Morreira, 2011; Kubal, 2012). Evading the host state is often used by 
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undocumented persons, liable for arrest, detention and deportation, as a way of contesting 
illegality of status, thereby continuing to stay illegally within the host state. This kind of 
everyday resistance often takes the form of little, subtle moves designed to resist the legal 
requirement to leave the country (see Scott, 1985; Kubal, 2012). The precarity of lives of this 
section of the diaspora, compared to other segments who would have settled relatively 
securely and integrated into the host society (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Portes, 1995).89 
 Therefore, without relying on the state or appealing to organised civil society for 
assistance, ordinary Zimbabweans (and undocumented immigrants in general) use a variety 
of tactical practices are often used to avoid detection and resist removal from the territory of 
either of the two host countries (see Kubal, 2012; Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016). Again, 
this tendency resonates with Claude Ake’s observation that the African citizenry, with its 
history of being dominated and repressed by the state, views the state as an instrument of 
injustice and repression that is to be fought, cheated or evaded (Ake, 1992). This strategy was 
often relied on by Zimbabweans not meant to be physically resident in the host country in 
terms of the law due to immigration exclusions (with expired permits, failed applications, 
undesirable persons and criminals).   
In terms of data, the evasion and tricking of the host state was more prevalent in South 
Africa where almost 50% of the participants were living precariously, without secure 
residency permission or completely undocumented. Interestingly, participants who were 
undocumented and liable for deportation rationalised their actions of remaining in South 
Africa illegally, viewing their actions as legitimate reactions in the circumstances. They also 
                                                          
89 This tendency for different categories of the diaspora to achieve differentiated integration could be explored 
and understood more deeply using Porter’s concept of segmented integration.  
213 | P a g e  
 
tended to blame the South African government for its restrictive immigration and citizenship 
policies and practices which rendered them illegal (also see Neocosmos, 2010). Therefore, 
there was a dominant feeling that they were justified in not complying with the law and 
avoiding deportation. For example, M.B (a 42-year failed asylum seeker, living in the township 
of Samora, Phillipi) reasoned as follows: 
 I have lived without papers for nearly 4 years. My asylum claim was rejected but 
everyone knows the situation is bad in Zimbabwe. Where does the South African 
government want me to go? I will keep staying under the radar forever and if they 
deport me I will come back the same day.90 
M.B’s statement clearly illustrates how illegal status is contested and redefined through 
practice. It is also apparent that related imposed practices such as deportations are also 
challenged using everyday practice by those considered illegal, apart from seeking pro bono 
legal assistance to challenge it in court and NGO advocacy. For example, M.B is not only 
contesting illegality by ‘staying under the radar’ but also through his commitment to 
returning, which is perfectly feasible considering the geographical proximity of Zimbabwe.91 
This approach to contesting illegality is also much more elusive for the South African state as 
it exposes the porosity of the South African border, and the costs to the taxpayer of deporting 
Zimbabweans some of whom repeatedly find their way back into South Africa. 
Apart from not leaving the country voluntarily at the expiry of their documentation, 
various tactics were used to avoid detection, arrest, detention and deportation in South 
Africa. These everyday strategies and tactics used by those living underground were informed 
                                                          
90 Interview at Philippi on 09th March 2015. 
91 Focus group discussion at Mr A.M in Stock Road, Cape Town on 19th March 2015. 
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by understandings of the urban spaces and South African way of life enabling migrants to 
blend into the community. These strategies were also based on an understanding of the 
modus operandi of the immigration enforcement authorities.  
In the above context, I spent some time with undocumented persons in Philippi during 
my fieldwork, trying to understand how they thrive ‘illegally’ within South Africa. The 
following discussion highlights some of the strategies they shared with me: settling in areas 
where immigration enforcement was less intense, and speaking in local languages in public 
spaces to avoid being suspected of being immigrants, the vastness of South Africa meant they 
would not be caught easily, living in overcrowded and overpopulated black townships where 
authorities find it difficult to navigate due to crime, lack of street names and physical 
addresses. For instance, 32-year-old W.M living in Marcus Garvey boasted that:  
We know that they would never find us here. Home Affairs target only those living in 
nice places, not us here. They will never find us because we just look like our fellow 
South Africans, plus there are no house number[s] and street names in this place, which 
makes it hard for them to locate us. Immigration enforcement people are also scared 
of being attacked by muggers and robbers who cause havoc in this community.92  
This perception was also shared by participants in Johannesburg, where immigration 
authorities frequently conducted regular and intense immigration raids and checks within and 
around the CBD.  
Not all places were considered safe in Cape Town, however, with the story being different 
for townships like Capricorn (Retreat, Cape Town) notorious for immigration raids.  The above 
                                                          
92 Interview at Marcus Garvey on 22 March 2015. 
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dynamics confirm the observation of Piper and Von Lieres (2016) in relation to their work on 
immigrant informal traders in Cape Town, which highlights how immigrants often find it 
difficult to live within the law all the time.  Living underground also challenges the status-
based approach to citizenship based on the law which commands that M.B is not supposed 
to be in South Africa. However, contrary to what the law says and on the basis of a different 
logic, he remains physically and socially present within the country by other means than the 
law itself and the state which made it. This kind of action represents a way of contesting the 
status of being illegal and the attached condition of having to be arrested, detained at Lindela 
Detention Facility, deportation and being declared an undesirable person barred from 
entering South Africa for five years. In the context of this study, although the law renders 
them illegal and liable for removal from the host country territory, everyday tactical practices 
enable them to contest arrest, detention and deportation within South Africa. The rest of the 
chapter explores other strategies by which Zimbabweans contest marginalisation and claim 
inclusion back in their country of origin, across geographical distance.  
5.3 Everyday Transnational Social Practices in Situ  
Everyday social practice, as a way of being citizens, has a transnational dimension too, as 
is the case with other modes of citizenship. Diasporas assert their commitment and 
membership in their homeland, which is a critical element of citizenship, through a range of 
social practices in their daily lives in places they get hosted. As I have highlighted earlier, and 
as others have also observed, Zimbabweans use their identities as a way of contesting 
marginal identities and labels back in South Africa (see Muzondidya, 2006). Similarly, they 
engage in mundane practices designed to assert their national identity in situ, often with 
fellow compatriots, to demonstrate their Zimbabweanness. The marginalising identities and 
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discourses discussed above are contested by expressing and sustaining different aspects of 
their Zimbabweanness in their everyday lives in the contexts they are hosted.  
Based on my personal observations in the field and experiential knowledge as a 
Zimbabwean, most of these social practices were also performed through informal social 
networks based less on kinship, family, clan and other sociobiological ties. Instead, 
recognising the dislocation in the family that occurs out of transnational migration resulting 
in the reconfiguration of social ties within the diaspora, other new forms of social ties based 
on regional origin, ethnicity, shared immigration statuses and membership in social groups 
such as churches (see Pasura, 2014).93 Zimbabweanness as an assertion of national identity 
also forms the basis for social relations, with people ending up sharing accommodation, falling 
in love and networking on the basis of their being Zimbabwean. It is important to observe that 
the effect of social practices done through these social networks and ties is not only to ‘prove 
a point’ that they are Zimbabwean enough, but simultaneously result in the realisation of 
meaningful and material outcomes. 
These mundane everyday practices often include going to Zimbabwean churches, parties, 
funerals and other social events with other Zimbabweans living within the same local 
community. In the context of material deprivations such as South Africa, helping each other 
in times of trouble, especially when a fellow Zimbabwean passes, was also a key way in which 
they maintained their Zimbabwean identity while outside the country. Everyone was 
expected to make financial contributions [kubvisa chema] to cover funeral costs, in the 
context of lack of support with body repatriation by both the South African/UK/Zimbabwean 
                                                          
93 Pasura (2014) illustrates the reconfiguration of social ties from blood ties to other new social relations within 
the diaspora. This is understandable when considering the fact that some diasporas have no other family 
members joining them out of Zimbabwe. Also, Zimbabwean[‘Zimba’] identity becomes prominent as a form of 
national identity, providing a basis for social relations to form.  
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governments. Repatriation of dead bodies denotes an important way by which Zimbabweans 
claim and assert their Zimbabweanness while outside the country. Where a person is buried 
is given a deeper symbolic meaning in relation to senses of belonging, place and authenticity, 
which those deprived of legal status and related substantive citizenship turn to as an 
expression of their continued commitment to the nation. As Chabal (2009) observes, being 
buried in one’s ancestral land gives a sense of collective belonging, a sense of origin and being 
at home, which matters for identity (see Mbiba, 2010). Sociocultural rituals, for example, 
followed during times of bereavement and burial of a dead person tend to be of symbolic 
importance. They are often taken as a representation of the Zimbabwean diaspora’s 
continued commitment to the Zimbabwean way of life, even if they are hosted in the context 
of other cultures and ways of doing things.    
Living outside the country is accompanied by many other types of challenges, and 
sociocultural networks become a source of support. For example, in the absence of publicly 
provided counselling and related support to bereaved (especially in South Africa), 
Zimbabweans often take it upon themselves to help each other in the spirit of compatriotism. 
This was done through the traditional, Zimbabwean ways of paying condolences [known as 
kubata mawoko], as a way of providing support and comfort in times of emotional stress and 
grief caused by refusal of immigration applications, death of a relative back in Zimbabwe, 
broken families and other social problems uniquely experienced by diasporas.  This kind of 
assistance is also provided by the state and available to citizens during times of distress. 
However, those with irregular and illegal immigration statuses tend not to be entitled to any 
such assistance.  
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Being safe and secure from violent crime, was another crucial element of survival for 
Zimbabweans both established and newcomers. In the absence of effective crime prevention 
and community safety interventions in black townships by the South African government, 
informal social networks of Zimbabweans emerged as an important alternative in ensuring 
the safety and security of fellow Zimbabweans in South Africa. For example, tactical advice 
was shared on how to stay safe and avoid becoming a victim of crime, especially in the South 
African context. This kind of informal advice included avoiding speaking Zimbabwean 
languages and English language in public, importance of speaking like and dressing like a 
South African, being imposed to avoid attracting unnecessary attention of petty criminals and 
avoiding hanging in informal taverns [shebeens] which South Africans frequent (see Von 
Lieres and Piper, 2014).  
Host governments and organised civil society in some countries such as Canada, tend to offer 
a lot of support during the process of settling in the host country (see Vineberg, 2012). This 
kind of assistance in the UK often depend on the visa conditions of the immigrant, with many 
participants indicating that they were not allowed any recourse to public funds when they 
arrived. Almost all participants recalled being assisted by relatives. The South African 
government offers minimal (perhaps none) settlement assistance to new arrivals with an 
intention to settle in the country; family members and informal networks of Zimbabweans 
therefore often play a crucial role in receiving newcomer relatives and family members at 
Cape Town and Johannesburg bus stations. They also helped with orientating their newcomer 
relatives in the host country, advising them on little but critical things like how to open a bank 
account, where recruitment spots for casual jobs are located, applying for immigration 
documentation and other aspects of tactical integration, which would allow them to partake 
in transnational life as quickly.  
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Outside the family, Zimbabweans often engage in their own civic and social spaces 
such as churches, social clubs for women, associations (for example, the Zimbabwe 
Association) and workplaces, especially in the UK where some care agencies predominantly 
employ Zimbabweans. For example, the Zimbabwe Association in London provides a platform 
to share and be proud of their Zimbabweanness by engaging in a variety of activities, including 
sewing, knitting and cooking lessons for women in which they do Zimbabwean fabrics and 
menus respectively. These spaces give them a platform to continue sharing Zimbabwean 
values, traditions and practices among themselves, while simultaneously also responding to 
the material need to tactically integrate into the host society.  
Sociality represents another way by which those not realising citizenship act as citizens, 
particularly young people, as I have discussed in the literature review (see Maffesoli, 1989). 
One might want to question whether such social practices are matters of citizenship, which 
has been traditionally defined in terms of legal status, rights and political participation. I 
maintain that citizenship is enacted in many ways, as observed by Thomas (2002), and these 
everyday social practices represent another important way by which diasporas continue to 
identify with the way of life of their country of origin. This is the essence of what Isin (2008) 
described as recasting the social in citizenship, emphasising how citizenship is not only 
performed through politico-legal activities but through mundane practices in people’s 
everyday lives.    
Sociality and related everyday practices, therefore, could be another way by which 
Zimbabwean diasporas, many of whom have limited chances of enacting their citizenship 
through rights claims and participating in political process, assert their citizenship from afar. 
This includes maintenance of Zimbabwean lifestyles and other elements of diaspora social 
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life, including their consumption patterns. For example, I observed many Zimbabweans 
engaging in mundane practices such as eating Zimbabwean foods and cuisine, listening to 
Zimbabwean music, speaking indigenous languages, supporting Zimbabwean sporting teams, 
and attending music shows by Zimbabwean artists frequenting places like Leicester, 
Dunstable and Luton in the UK; and Cape Town and Johannesburg. It is clear from the 
foregoing discussion, that transnational practices become an unselfconscious way of 
contesting marginalisation not only within the host country but also back in the country of 
origin. Besides, various other substantive citizenship outcomes in terms of livelihoods, 
welfare and safety, are achieved out of those mundane and seemingly inconsequential social 
practices.  
5.3.1 Everyday Strategies for Contesting Marginality Within Host Country 
Sections of the diaspora living on the margins of the host society encounter enormous 
structural forces of exclusion in the community, workplaces, property and labour markets, 
educational institutions among other spaces (see Nyers, 2011). For example, in addition to 
being a tool by which the state regulates who stays and who is physically removed from 
territory, legal status is a form of identity aimed at determining who is included and who is 
not, in terms of citizenship and the nation. For example, Brubaker refers to it as a tool for 
social closure, marking the boundaries of who is part of a nation and who is not in terms of 
identity (Brubaker, 1992). As I noted earlier, the host state also plays a key role in shaping 
identities and statuses assumed by diasporas while outside their countries, and one way it 
does this is through the imposition of various legal statuses on immigrants.  As a result, some 
of these categorisations and labels (such as ‘refugee’, ‘immigrant’, ‘illegals’, ‘aliens’ and 
‘deportees’ among others), provide a foundation for other forms of exclusion endured by 
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immigrants in the host country. In addition to state-imposed legal identities, xenophobic 
sections of the native population also often ascribe marginal labels to non-citizens, such as 
‘foreigners’ (Makwerekwere), ‘immigrants’, and ‘aliens’ among others, as a way of 
representing their exclusion and alienation from citizenship. However, although the host state 
uses residency permits as a way of legally imposing a boundary between those who are legal 
and those who are not, findings of this study show that non-citizens contest this 
marginalisation through a range of daily practices.  
 However, status-based approaches to citizenship tend to ignore the capability of 
people self-identify as citizens or on-citizens, with an emphasis being on legal status, rights 
and political participation (Jones and Gaventa, 2002; Isin, 2002). Therefore, besides 
responding through social practices, diasporas also react to imposed marginal identities by 
articulating alternative self-identities and self-representations, manifesting in their daily lives. 
However, the above findings show the utility of everyday practices, identity claims and self-
representations by non-citizens, as a strategy to contest this exclusion and to claim greater 
access to citizenship within the host country. Through everyday social practices within their 
communities and the broader society, diasporas are able to contest these forms of 
marginalisation by asserting claims for greater recognition within the host country through 
tactical practices and vernacular identity claims-making (see Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011).94 
These claims and subjectivities also form the basis for more substantive demands for greater 
access to rights, entitlements and opportunities ordinarily reserved for those with formal 
citizenship within the host state.  
                                                          
94 Hopkins and Reicher (2015) characterise this as an aspect of ‘everyday citizenship’. 
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The above tactical and unofficial claims are often couched in vernacular discourses. 
The construction of vernacular identities and self-representations on the basis of a shared 
pan African identity, contributions made to society, shared historical past (such as colonial 
relationship between Britain and Zimbabwe), geographical neighbourliness, length of stay in 
the country, serve to contest imposed illegality by the state. As I noted earlier, undocumented 
persons often rely on these claims to rationalise and normalise their precarious settlement 
and residency in the host country, and how they continue to ‘cheat’ and ‘evade’ the host 
country authorities in order to continue staying within the territory of the host state. This 
indicates that legal statuses and categories imposed by the host state do not always 
correspond with the lived realities of diasporas and how they identify themselves in different 
contexts. 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates how Zimbabweans in both South Africa and 
the UK use various strategies to negotiate their identities, statuses and negotiate new social 
locations within the host society, on the basis of their lived experiences in their everyday life. 
Negotiating new identities, beyond the imposed legal status, help position diasporas as an 
integral part of the host nation as they start identifying with the host country through 
contributing to the wellbeing of its society, adopting aspects of its way of life, length of stay 
and shared pan-African identities.  It is also clear that a lot of these mundane practices that 
non-citizens partake in, become a basis for claims for greater formal recognition and secure 
legal status, beyond traditional qualifications for formal citizenship such as birth, ancestry and 
naturalisation.  
Therefore, everyday social practices, transactions and relationships forged by 
diasporas, help contest alienation and marginalisation resulting in the obscuring of the 
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boundaries between citizens and non-citizens within the host state. The importance of 
everyday social practices, as a way of negotiating inclusion, is also observable in the 
transnational relationship between diasporas and their homeland. The following final section 
demonstrates the utility of everyday social practices in asserting their membership and 
contesting marginalisation back in their country of origin, across geographical distance. 
5.3.2 Everyday Social Practices from Afar 
The tendency for migrants to pursue dual citizenships has been observed in terms of 
legal status (see Baubock, 2006; Bosniak, 2000), but this section demonstrates how the same 
logic of dual and multiple citizenship is performed through everyday social practices. The 
assumption is that migrants direct their social practices to that country which they consider 
themselves citizens. I have already discussed how Zimbabweans rely on everyday social 
practices to negotiate incorporation in the host countries they are hosted, but their 
embeddedness is only tactical to the extent that it is designed to enable them to maintain 
different forms of transnational ties with Zimbabwe. For this reason, Zimbabweans are 
appropriately characterised as a transnational diaspora community whose ties span the host 
and sending country (Pasura, 2008; Levitt, 2001). Although some scholars observe that 
immigrants leave their countries with an intention to permanently integrate and assimilate in 
the host country (Bulcha, 1988; Brubaker, 2003; Jopkke and Morawska, 2003), this study 
proves that indeed Zimbabweans become transnationals because not all of them seek to 
completely detach from their home country and become fully embedded in the host country. 
However, some are forced by exclusionary social forces not to integrate, resulting in a 
segmented diaspora with different segments of the diaspora population differentially 
integrated (see Portes, 1995). 
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Instead, many of them engage in everyday forms of citizenship in a tactical way, just 
to enable them to sustain cross border and long-term attachments with compatriots back in 
Zimbabwe. These everyday practices, therefore, ‘serve a higher purpose’.95 For example, 
various survival strategies including struggling for legal status and livelihood pursuits among 
many other survival strategies discussed earlier, are designed to give them capacity to 
maintain cross border and long-distance activities asserting their commitment to Zimbabwe. 
In this configuration, most of the mundane practices the Zimbabwean diaspora engage in 
serve to better position them in the host society so that they are able to effectively partake 
in various transnational ties, networks and practices. It is often assumed that countries of 
origin will reach out to their diasporas and seek to incorporate them in the nation in pursuit 
of nation-building (Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 2004; Basch et al, 2004; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 
2003).  However, Zimbabweans often encounter different forms of marginalisation not only 
in countries hosting them, as observed by many scholars (Muzondidya, 2006; Pasura, 2008); 
but also, back in their country of origin. This following section explores how Zimbabweans 
seek to maintain their Zimbabwean citizenship, not by way of legal status but through 
everyday practices across territory and geographical distance.  
The Zimbabweanness of the Zimbabwean diaspora, which forms the basis for efforts 
to marginalise from substantive political and socioeconomic process back in Zimbabwe. In this 
context, although most of them maintain their legal status as Zimbabwean citizens, de facto 
incorporation in their country of origin is not granted and automatic, but has to be claimed, 
struggled for and asserted, as this study shows. This happens through what Levitt terms the 
transnational social field, encompassing practises, networks and ties connecting the home 
                                                          
95 Interview with JC at Stock Road Station 22nd March 2015.  
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country and country of origin (Levitt, 2004). I observed a number of such mundane social 
practices during my observations in Vosloorus and when I travelled by bus observing the 
cross-border activities of travelling Zimbabweans.  
Some of the transnational practices by which Zimbabweans asserted their 
commitment to Zimbabwe included: sending financial remittances to provide household 
support to their families back in Zimbabwe with money for food, school fees for children, 
payment of medical bills for their ill relatives and funeral assistance. Remittances of money 
and household goods continue to be sent from afar, as a way of providing direct support and 
assistance to families and relatives. This is crucial in Zimbabwe where, although it would have 
been the duty of the state to look after all citizens, the state has abrogated its duty to 
guarantee the welfare of its citizens. 
  Also, interestingly, Zimbabweans often avoid official channels and money transfer 
companies such as western union and MoneyGram, due to their strict requirements to see 
proof of immigration status, which a significant proportion do not hold (von Burgsdoff, 2012). 
They also often require those sending money to provide proof of addresses, which tends to 
negatively affect those living in the townships where some informal houses do not have street 
names and addresses. Above all, they tend to charge exorbitant amounts per transaction, 
which repels most of the customers towards informal money transfer agents. The majority of 
participants in South Africa, however, indicated that they had relied on informal transport 
providers (omalaitsha) for the remittance of goods and money. Although they charge 
relatively less, the safety and security of goods and money sent with them is often not 
guaranteed (Muzondidya, 2006). This leads most Zimbabweans to remit household goods and 
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money using trusted relatives, friends and other social connections at work or church, as 
observed by Tevera and Chikanda (2009). 
Regular travel back to Zimbabwe also represents an expression of commitment to the 
nation and offers diasporas a chance of physically reconnecting with Zimbabwe in different 
ways. After speaking to travellers on my way to Zimbabwe from Cape Town, I also learnt that 
travel back to Zimbabwe was not just for fun or holidaying, but a show of loyalty and 
performing responsibilities to their families, including attending family events such as 
funerals, traditional marriages and other sociocultural activities. For example, participants felt 
a greater sense of being rights-bearing citizens during the travel process, particularly not 
having to justify their presence as is the norm back in South Africa.   
The act of crossing the border from the South African to the Zimbabwean side of the 
border not only represents a chance to reconnect with territory, but also carries a symbolic 
meaning in terms of citizenship. I asked a participant named Mai Ndoro travelling from Cape 
Town for the first time in three years, and her responses were interesting. For her, crossing 
the border back into Zimbabwe symbolised being at home, feeling safe, and feeling like an 
authentic Zimbabwean. I also observed a great sense of excitement and relief among 
travellers on the Zimbabwean side of the border, which was displayed during interactions 
with border control, Zimbabwe Revenue Authority officials, bus staff and among travellers 
themselves. These above dynamics show that the ordinary everyday act of travelling back to 
the home country may be used by diasporas to claim their place within the home country 
nation, thereby challenging their marginalisation. 
The above kinds of practices also serve to contest the rhetoric by the Zimbabwean 
government, that diasporas were not contributing to the development of the country by not 
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paying taxes and physical absence from the country’s territory. Furthermore, in Marshallian 
terms, some of the support and resources transfer through remittances serve to fill the gap 
left by the Zimbabwean state ever since the Zimbabwean crisis ensued, as part of its 
citizenship obligations to guarantee the welfare of citizens (see Kpessa et al, 2011; 
Mkandawire, 2011; Marshall, 1949).96 Although Zimbabweans were not remitting money 
through official channels, most of it directly assisted families and households with income 
support, social security for the elderly and disabled, children’s welfare, food security and 
poverty alleviation, aspects which the state would have been responsible for (see von 
Burgsdoff, 2010; 2012). In fact, households benefitting from diaspora remittances tend to be 
better off in terms of welfare, compared to those without the same support in Zimbabwe 
(Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2006; Crush and Pendelton, 2009; Chikanda and 
Tevera, 2009). To underscore the importance of diasporas to the country, I would add that 
indeed if it was not for these kinds of seemingly insignificant support from the diaspora, the 
socioeconomic crisis that continue to grip Zimbabwe could have led to implosion.  
At the same time, many Zimbabweans tend to be ambivalent about the possibility of 
their return and what a future Zimbabwe holds for them (also see Mortensen, 2013). What 
also adds to the pressure to sustain transnational connections and practices is the fear of 
being ashamed to return empty handed (see Mortensen, 2013). This pressure is reinforced by 
relatives back in Zimbabwe. Demands and expectations of support by relatives also 
necessitate the sustenance of everyday transnational practices and ties, especially in the 
context of socioeconomic hardships, poor service delivery by the state and collapsed welfare 
                                                          
96 T H Marshall (1949) recognises the importance of welfare guarantees as an element of substantive 
citizenship. Kpessa et al (2011) and Mkandawire (2010) observe how many sub-Saharan African countries have 
not been keeping up with their citizenship obligation of looking after their citizens, since the adoption of 
devastating structural adjustment programmes in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
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system. However, participants in both the UK and South Africa shared the view that some of 
their relatives were putting them under excessive pressure to remit money and household 
goods for their support. In some cases, relatives back home were misusing the remitted 
money and abusing remitted household belongings sent back by their family members living 
outside the country.     
At the same time, many Zimbabwean diasporas recognise the precariousness and 
uncertainty associated with being integrated in the host country, fearing future exclusion, 
rejection and even expulsion. This tendency emerged in South African where participants felt 
they were under pressure to prepare for life back in Zimbabwe in anticipation of the 
worsening of the socioeconomic and political situation in South Africa, compared to those in 
the UK who were relatively under less pressure to invest and prepare for return back in 
Zimbabwe. According to B.D who is 28 years old and lives in Lower Crossroads:  
Our life in this country is not easy here in South Africa. Things can change any time. So, 
everyone is under pressure to make some developments back home in case the 
situation goes bad in South Africa. It will be embarrassing to return back home empty 
handed.97  
Specific risks faced by South Africa-based participants included fears of changes in 
immigration policies resulting in revocation of immigration permits and mass deportations, 
loss of employment, xenophobic violence and unexpected socioeconomic downturn and 
political crisis. 
                                                          
97 Interview at Cape Town on 14 March 2015. 
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Therefore, fostering closer transnational identities, ties and networks also represents 
a future survival strategy and contingency plan, given the risks associated with migrant life in 
South Africa. The anxiety and ambivalence associated with return migration seems to push 
diasporas to have to engage in different forms of everyday struggles to generate financial 
resources not only for remittances purposes, but also to invest back in properties, livestock, 
residential land and other forms of accumulation, to avoid being ashamed upon their eventual 
return. Clearly, they have to keep cross-border socioeconomic ties with Zimbabwe, so that 
they can find somewhere to start from in the event of their eventual (voluntary/involuntary) 
return. As such, the sustenance of closer transnational ties with Zimbabwe may be 
interpreted as a futuristic and contingency strategy of guaranteeing substantive citizenship 
upon return. The foregoing discussion suggests that everyday social practices constitute a way 
of asserting commitment to the homeland, besides by way of political participation, rights 
claims and legal status. The next section considers how Zimbabweans also contest their 
alienation back in Zimbabwe by asserting their Zimbabweanness in the places where they 
tend to be hosted.  
5.3.2.1 Contesting Homeland Marginality from Afar  
Diasporas rely on seemingly inconsequential everyday social practices to challenge 
their delegitimization and marginalisation from their homeland by their hostile state and 
other political actors within and outside their home state. This is the case with Zimbabweans 
hosted outside the country. Zimbabwean diasporas tend to be vilified and demonised as 
enemies of the state by ZANU PF leadership, and unpatriotic sell-outs not doing enough to 
contribute to the development of the country (Tendi, 2010). For example, they are often 
blamed for deserting Zimbabwe at a critical time:  
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We have lived here for a long time and we have missed out on land allocations, 
residential stands and small business loans distributed by the government. MDC 
people also blame us for being cowards having abandoned the struggle against ZANU 
PF.98  
Zimbabweans outside the country have also historically been accused of not paying taxes, as 
claimed by one government official recently, hence this is used as justification for their 
exclusion from governance processes (Muzondidya, 2008; 2010).99 They also tend to be 
viewed as contributors to the economic problems facing Zimbabwe, being blamed for using 
their skills outside Zimbabwe for the benefit of other countries (Tevera and Chikanda, 2009; 
Gaidzanwa, 1999). Zimbabwean diasporas are often viewed as a national embarrassment 
doing menial and dirty jobs like care work in the UK and other places, as Mugabe has 
repeatedly said in the media.100  
There is also a tendency for the Zimbabwean state and other stay-at-home sections of 
the Zimbabwean nation, particularly those of a pro-ZANU PF and anti-western political 
worldview, to marginalise diasporas by questioning their loyalty to the nation. The 
Zimbabwean state and some compatriots who remained in the country also often assume 
that the Zimbabwean way of life of their compatriots living outside the country becomes 
contaminated due to their cultural encounters with other peoples, making them not patriotic 
enough (Tendi, 2010). These bases for marginalisation were summed up by a UK-based 
                                                          
98 Interview with KM at Stockroad Station on 22nd March 2015. 
99 Emmerson Mnangagwa, Deputy President, vowed that diasporas not paying tax would lose their citizenship. 
100 Mugabe scolded Zimbabweans emigrating to South Africa and the UK during his Independence Day Speech, 
18th April 2006.  
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participant experienced an ordeal at the hands of ZANU PF supporters when she visited her 
relatives in Ushewokunze settlement (Harare South):  
They asked me where I was coming from. One of them told me how I had become 
British and not Zimbabwean anymore.101   
 The net effect of these perceptions and discourses are often to delegitimise the membership 
of the Zimbabwean diaspora within the Zimbabwean nation, portraying them as unauthentic 
citizens who are not Zimbabwean enough. However, everyday citizenship represents a 
strategy by which the Zimbabwean diaspora contest this marginalisation back home. And the 
next section looks at their efforts to contest marginalisation, but also to claim inclusion 
through everyday social practices.  
5.4 Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate how citizenship is not only a top-down, politico-
legal, status-based area of practice, but essentially an organic process of everyday social 
practices. Seemingly unselfconscious social practices, often viewed as non-political, in fact 
bear profound citizenship implications, including the attainment of substantive citizenship 
and extension of the boundaries of inclusion/exclusion. Firstly, results discussed in preceding 
sections, show that the state is not the sole arena for diaspora citizenship, often supplanted 
by organised civil society and even more flexible informal social and kinship networks based 
on the norm of reciprocity. Although it represents a critical ally, organised civil society has its 
own limits as a vehicle for diaspora citizenship, as I have demonstrated. This leaves diasporas 
to their own devices, contesting exclusion and fighting for inclusion by way of everyday 
                                                          
101 Interview at Feltham with CS on 29th August 2015.  
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struggles. Another major outcome of mundane citizenship is that it results in de facto, 
bottom-up integration into host society, apart from imposed, state-led integration and 
hegemonic social cohesion initiatives. Instead, everyday social citizenship allows diasporas to 
integrate on their own terms, while allowing them to simultaneously maintain attachments 
with their country of origin.  
Another net effect of the above discussed everyday practices of diasporas, is that they 
blur the boundary of who belongs in the political community and who does not, both in the 
host country and country of origin. Similarly, it is evident that the definition of who is a citizen 
and a non-citizen is contested, not entirely imposed by the state through laws, legal statuses 
and related state-centred practices. Legal identities and statuses are also defined, contested 
and changed through localised daily activities within the host society, involving diasporas 
themselves. It is also evident that mundane social practices provide a useful strategy at 
diasporas’ disposal for contesting exclusion transnationally, not only in the host country but 
also back in the country of origin. As such, it helps foster transnational citizenship by allowing 
diasporas to tactically integrate in the host country, while also sustaining cross border and 
long distance with the host state.  
   Everyday citizenship also provides a helpful strategy as a mode of citizenship for 
diasporas, with particular reference to its utility as a way of survival in hostile and exclusionary 
host country contexts. Everyday citizenship, therefore, also enables non-citizens to access 
resources, opportunities and benefits associated with substantive citizenship which they 
would otherwise not be entitled to, thus pushing back the boundaries of their exclusion. This 
aspect of the findings, particularly in relation to experiences of South Africa-based, shows us 
that while migrants are often blamed for being benefit mongers taking away opportunities 
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meant for citizens, achieving livelihood security for them is a product of daily struggle, 
resilience and tactful survival strategies. And at times, locals lack the same levels of 
determination, resilience and tactfulness, which explains why immigrants oftentimes appear 
relatively more successful than locals. 
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Chapter Six: Affective Dimensions of Diaspora Citizenship 
6.1 Chapter Introduction  
Diasporas continue to find different ways of expressing their citizenship in both their 
homeland and host country, and these may also be subjective and non-material (see Fortier, 
2016). Material forms by which diasporas act like citizens encompass the different modes of 
political participation and mundane social practices discussed in Chapter Four and Chapter 
Five respectively. This chapter explores the subjective components of diaspora citizenship, 
particularly the sentimental and emotional attachment (detachment) of Zimbabweans in 
relation to Zimbabwe and the different countries they are hosted.  
I have also demonstrated, in Chapter three how different manifestations of the 
citizenship crisis in post-independence Zimbabwe have left different sections of the 
Zimbabwean nation with a sense of rejection and exclusion (see Dorman, 2016; Ndakaripa, 
2013; Kpessa et al, 2011). Both colonial and post-independence Zimbabwe have experienced 
overlaying displacements of various sections of the population across time and space, one of 
the consequences of which has been a kind of emotional crisis that has left many in constant 
search for ‘home’ (Hammar, et al, 2010).  This sense of dislocation has also accompanied most 
of those who decided to emigrate at different times, out of Zimbabwe’s historical and extant 
citizenship crisis (Glenn et al, 2011).102 This shows that the citizenship crisis has not only 
manifested in material ways but also subjectively and inter-subjectively.  
This makes it critical to determine what happens to their senses of belonging. The 
point of departure of this chapter is that diaspora citizenship is also felt both subjectively and 
                                                          
102 Glenn et al (2011) describe dislocation in terms of a perpetual search for home by migrants and displacees 
that often accompanies migration. 
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inter-subjectively; however, such feelings and sensibilities become fractured as different 
categories of the Zimbabwean diaspora begin to feel differently about both Zimbabwe and 
the countries hosting them. These senses of belonging also often become ambivalent, 
uncertain and fluid owing to an interplay of different factors including context, immigration 
and settlement experiences among many others. This suggests a shift occurs in how 
citizenship is conceived, particularly in relation to diasporas, from an overemphasis on 
material, politico-legal aspects, to other subject and intersubjective elements, as I 
demonstrate conceptually below.  
Until recently, the analysis of the ways by which citizenship is enacted has traditionally 
focussed on material aspects such as rights, legal status and political participation (Fortier, 
2016; Thomas, 2002). As I have demonstrated earlier conceptually, in the literature review 
and in preceding empirical chapters, this understanding of citizenship is of limited 
applicability to the everyday life experiences of the majority of Zimbabweans. Instead, there 
is also growing recognition that the sentimental and emotional components of citizenship 
constitute a legitimate object of study in the multidisciplinary field of citizenship studies 
(Fortier, 2016). The notion of affective citizenship also recognises how citizens do not only act 
in a legal-rational manner, but also feel and care about politics and other aspects affecting 
their relationship with the state (See Jones, 2005; Ahmed 2004; Clarke et al. 2006; Marcus et 
al. 2002; Redlawsk 2006; Westen 2007).103  
It is critical to stress, however, that focus on the emotive and affective aspects is not 
new in the study of politics and citizenship, and I do not wish to rehearse these longstanding 
                                                          
103 Hung (2010) refers to them as ‘citizens with tears’, depicting the strong emotions and sentiments that 
accompany the practice of citizenship. 
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conceptual debates in this thesis (see Fortier, 2016).104 Nevertheless, as I will demonstrate 
empirically in subsequent sections of this chapter, emotions and sentiments constitute an 
important dimension of diaspora citizenship, given impediments often associated with 
claiming and enacting citizenship in material ways, as I indicated in preceding chapters. This 
resonates with experiences of abject citizens (Nyers, 2011; Hepworth, 2012), whose 
experiences on the margins of society invoke a mixture of sentiments and emotions. 
Nevertheless, this thesis maintains the view that affect and emotions constitute one of the 
ways through which migrants assert their citizenship while outside their countries of origin. 
In addition, given the fragmented and transnational nature of diaspora citizenship, those 
senses of belonging become multiple and fluid owing to context and other variables shaping 
them, as will become apparent later in this chapter. 
6.2 To Be Citizens is to ‘Feel at Home’: Diasporic Citizenship as Sense of Belonging  
The concept of senses of belonging offers another frequently used and analytically 
tested lens with which to understand the affective dimensions of citizenship alluded to above, 
in the context of migration. Anthias (2006) defines belonging as ‘the sense of being accepted 
or being a full member’; and ‘a sense of intimacy’ and love for that particular community 
which they see as their ‘home’ (Anthias, 2006; Cohen 1985; Yuval Davis 2006; Redlawsk, 
2006). Another analytically more useful and elastic understanding of a sense of belonging is 
that of feeling ‘at home’, which entails a symbolic space of ‘familiarity, comfort, security and 
emotional attachment’ (Yuval-Davis, 2006:2; Jones and Kryzanowski, 2008). This latter 
conception, therefore, helps explore what migrants ‘feel’ about any particular community, 
precisely whether they feel included or excluded.   
                                                          
104 Fortier (2016) explores debates surrounding the role of emotions in politics more generally. 
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‘Home’, therefore, can be conceived primarily in three ways – feeling at home back in 
country of origin, host country or both (Anderson, 1983; Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 2004; 
Bulcha, 1988; Harrell-Bond, 1986). It is also possible that diasporas may begin to feel more 
affiliated and identify with the broader supranational and global community, by way of 
cosmopolitan senses of belonging (Beck and Cronin, 2006; Appadurai, 1996; Soysal, 1994). 
This thesis, however, holds that migrants often do not become universally and homogenously 
attached to one particular community at any particular time, but develop more complex, 
fragmented and transnational affinities (see Laguerre, 2000). This is consistent with the 
experiences of Zimbabweans living outside the country who have been characterised as a 
fractured, transnational, diaspora (see Pasura, 2008). In this context, this chapter maps out 
the complex affinities and emotional attachments (or lack thereof) developed by a selected 
sample of 145 Zimbabwean migrants hosted in two contexts - South Africa and the UK.  
The primary aim is to determine whether they ‘feel at home’, while outside the 
country. I want to suggest that the affinities and sentimental attachments of the Zimbabwean 
diaspora do not become universally directed at either the host country or Zimbabwe. Instead, 
they become transnational and fragmented, directed at more than one community. This 
fluidity and multiplicity characterising their feelings and sentiments is shaped by the interplay 
of various factors including context, geography and immigration status, among them. As I 
indicate in later sections, senses of belonging displayed by Zimbabweans are also gendered, 
with women often holding and displaying different feelings about both Zimbabwe and host 
countries, compared to their men counterparts. The rest of the chapter explores these 
dynamics.  
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6.2.1 Multiple Senses of Belonging: When Home is More than One 
Country 
Findings of this study indicate that indeed Zimbabweans feel attached to more than 
one country at any given time, which confirms their fractured nature as a community (see 
Pasura, 2008). For example, a section of the participants in both the UK and South Africa 
indicated how they had begun to feel comfortable and ‘at home’ in both host countries. This 
feeling was somewhat stronger among participants in the UK compared to South Africa, with 
18% of the participants in Cape Town and 15% in Johannesburg reported starting to feel at 
home in South Africa. For example, UK-based Zimbabweans displayed a greater tendency to 
feel at home in the host country, as evidenced by over 25% of participants who felt part of 
the British society, having significantly reduced their ties with Zimbabwe. UK-based 
participants cited a variety of reasons for feeling at home in the UK including historical 
connections between Britain and Zimbabwe, which gave them a sense of entitlement. 
 There was also a perception that the UK was homelier than Zimbabwe in terms of 
safety, access to livelihood opportunities and welfare guarantees, and a general perception 
that the British state and society were caring, compassionate and more inclusive. In contrast, 
in the context of South Africa, different bases were highlighted by those feeling comfortable 
in South Africa, including shared African identity, shared histories of struggle against racial 
domination, oppression and other forms of racial injustices of both Zimbabwe’s and South 
Africa’s pasts. Geographical proximity of the two countries and belonging in the same 
Southern African region, were also used as bases for feeling at home in South Africa, even by 
those legally considered non-citizens and without valid immigration status.  
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Diasporas indeed endure exclusion and marginalisation in countries that host them, in 
some cases to the extent of reinforcing their commitment to their homeland (see Zeleza, 
2003; Pasura, 2008; McGregor, 2010). This marginalisation occurs in everyday life on the 
professional job market, housing sector and other socioeconomic spaces (Mbiba, 2005; 2011). 
And the concept of blocked mobility helps us understand structural, institutional and other 
conditions perpetuating this phenomenon in diaspora-hosting societies (see Mbiba, 2005; 
2011; also see Portes and Rumbault, 2005). This tendency is displayed by South Africa-based 
participants who expressed a greater shared sense of exclusion, compared to their UK-based 
counterparts. For example, a significant proportion of Zimbabweans in South Africa generally 
expressed feelings of disgruntlement and frustration with their being in South Africa, and 
therefore tended to be more inclined to look back to Zimbabwe as their ultimate home to 
which they would eventually return. For example, nearly 35% in Cape Town and almost 40% 
fell in this category. These participants displayed senses of patriotism and love for their 
country across geographical distance, albeit not living within its territory (see Anderson, 1983; 
Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 2004).  
It is worth stressing that this significant sense of attachment to Zimbabwe by South 
Africa-based Zimbabweans was reinforced by resentment emanating from their perceived 
exclusion, victimisation and lack of recognition that they experienced in both countries. Some 
of these participants also reported that they were eagerly following the political and socio-
economic situation back in Zimbabwe, anticipating a political and socio-economic change 
before their eventual return to a new Zimbabwe. This sense of anger, frustration and betrayal, 
therefore, pushed some of the participants to start developing nationalist sentiments. In 
contrast, none of the participants in the UK reported exclusively feeling the desire to return 
to Zimbabwe, even though had been living irregularly and in precarious conditions over time.   
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The above dominant sense of ‘homelessness’ and dislocation predominantly affected 
those in South Africa without secure legal statuses, unskilled, women and those living in black 
townships under conditions of squalor (see Glenn et al, 2011).105 A dominant collective feeling 
of being strangers within the South African society was displayed by these participants, which 
they attributed to pervasive xenophobia, denial of secure legal status, rights and livelihood 
opportunities by both the South African state and native population. While the tendency was 
for those who displayed this sense of rejection to look back to Zimbabwe in search of their 
real home, new arrivals (most of whom had witnessed violence and abuse back in Zimbabwe), 
were not eager to look back to Zimbabwe and thus felt in a state of limbo and ambivalence, 
akin to what Glenn et al (2011) referred to as a perpetual state of ‘homelessness’ and 
dislocation without a country to call home.  
This study also identified that exclusion is not only experienced by diasporas hosted 
in countries in the global south, but also in the north as evidenced by senses of belonging of 
Zimbabweans in the UK. The dynamics of inclusion and exclusion were, however, slightly 
different to those in South Africa where nearly half of the participants felt rejected. This was 
based on their experiences and difficulties experienced when trying to obtain secure legal 
statuses. These experiences resonate with the blocked mobility experienced by diasporas, 
including Zimbabweans, living in the UK (see Mbiba, 2005; 2011; also see Portes and 
Rumbaut, 2005). In the UK, participants tended to feel marginalised on the bases of their 
insecure legal statuses and perceived lack of professional mobility among professionals on 
the basis of race, class and socioeconomic status.  Older participants (for example, over 40s) 
generally bemoaned various other aspects of life in the UK, including what they viewed as a 
                                                          
105 Glenn et al (2011) observe how migrants often lose a sense of ‘home’, becoming disoriented and dislocated 
as a result of migration. This is what they metaphorically refer to as being ‘homeless’.  
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lack of social life, the prevalence of social problems such as divorce and mental health issues, 
disruption of social ties and networks, and subtle forms of exclusion from professional and 
socioeconomic opportunities on the basis of their race, nationality, class and way of speaking 
(accent) (see McGregor, 2008; Pasura, 2010; Mbiba, 2011; also see McNevin, 2011; Nyers, 
2011).106  
To support above observations, S.F, awaiting outcome of asylum application from 
Home Office confirmed that:  
If you do not speak in English with a British accent, then you won’t get a job or any 
career opportunity. I’m a qualified quantity surveyor from Zimbabwe, but I’m now 
doing care-work.107   
The key contrast, however, between these UK-based, excluded, participants and their South 
Africa-based counterparts was that the former displayed remarkable senses of hope and 
optimism that their fortunes would improve with time, while the latter section tended to 
despair and start looking back to Zimbabwe for better opportunities.  
In contrast, UK-based displayed a tendency of remaining content with their continued 
presence in the UK in recognition of a variety of perceived benefits associated with continued 
stay such as safety, comfort and the fact that their ‘bread is buttered’ in the UK.108 Other 
reasons for not turning back to Zimbabwe to rediscover their old home, primarily because 
they did not want to return to socio-economic hardships during the height of the Zimbabwean 
crisis, resulting in their flight in the first place. This was coupled with a feeling that there was 
                                                          
106 Blocked mobility is a useful concept for a deeper understanding of different forms of exclusion manifesting 
in these spaces. 
107 Interview at Guildford on 22 July 2015. 
108 Remarks by a respondent named M. C during an interview in Aldershot (5 August, 2015). 
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no hope of socioeconomic recovery and political change in Zimbabwe following decades of 
socio-economic and political malaise. The above inclusion/exclusion dynamics make it 
difficult to generalise as to where Zimbabweans’ home really is. In other words, it is not always 
a question of whether diasporas become included or excluded in both the host and home 
countries, but where they feel at home may actually become more than one country in a more 
complex way, as it will become clear in subsequent sections. 
6.2.2 Fragmented Senses of Belonging 
Senses of belonging displayed by participants also suggest that Zimbabweans indeed 
constitute a transnational diaspora, as observed in the UK (Pasura, 2008; McGregor, 2010). 
However, this transnationalism is based only on the subjectively constructed senses of 
belonging of Zimbabweans, in addition to the material manifestations of migrant 
transnationalism in much of existing scholarship on the Zimbabwean diaspora. For example, 
the majority of participants both in South Africa and the UK displayed affinities spanning the 
host country and the country of origin, which confirms the transnational nature of the 
Zimbabwean diaspora (see Pasura, 2008; Muzondidya, 2006; also see Levitt, 2004). This was 
evidenced by nearly 45% in Cape Town and just over half in Johannesburg, who displayed 
simultaneous, multiple and constantly varying affiliations to both host country and 
Zimbabwe. This category of South-Africa-based participants also displayed a great sense of 
uncertainty and ambivalence as to where exactly they belonged. 
  The same pattern emerged in the UK, where nearly half of participants had mixed 
feelings with regard to where they thought they belonged. Instead, most of these participants 
remaining attached to Zimbabwe while simultaneously seeking more or less permanent 
integration in UK society.  The feeling of uncertainty and anxiety was more pronounced 
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among undocumented persons liable for arrest, detention and deportation. This fear of being 
physically removed from the host country and forcibly returned aggravated this sense of 
ambivalence, especially in the context of absence of clarity as to when and how longstanding 
socio-economic and political problems in Zimbabwe would be addressed. Results of this 
study, therefore, show that some migrants stay connected to communities from which they 
emigrated, but also simultaneously begin to feel at home in the host country (see Levitt, 
2004). In this respect, diasporas’ desire to integrate into the host country does not always 
preclude their efforts to maintain cross border and long-distance attachments with their 
homeland. This, therefore, challenges the notion that home-country ties weaken with 
emigration as immigrants ostensibly become assimilate; instead, the above discussed findings 
show that senses of belonging become more complicated, with diasporas feeling part of more 
than one society.109 The next section illustrates how different senses of belonging displayed 
by Zimbabweans in this study intersect, reinforce and (in some instances) contradict with each 
other. 
The notion that diasporas become universally attached to one particular country 
(whether host or home country), is not entirely applicable as illustrated in the following 
discussion. To see how this occurs, it is important to map out the intersections and 
interrelationships between different senses of belonging displayed by Zimbabweans in this 
study. This was evident both in South Africa and the UK. In South Africa, participants tended 
to rely on various bases to justify their feeling of being part of the South African society, 
including (as I have discussed earlier) a shared sense of Africanness, geographical proximity 
and shared geographical space as Africans. This resonates with what has been referred to as 
                                                          
109 Integrationists tacitly assume complete detachment with country of origin and desire to integrate 
permanently in host country. 
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a cosmopolitan consciousness, which is used to legitimise their presence and integration into 
South African society (see Landau and Freemantle, 2004). In this regard, cosmopolitanism 
meets local emplacement and embeddedness, which suggests congruency between migrant 
cosmopolitanism and integration as different modes of belonging. This finding also confirms 
that indeed the local and the global are not divorced; instead, they serve to complement each 
other in ways akin to some form of glocalisation (see Landau and Freemantle, 2004; Beck and 
Cronin, 2006). 
In the same vein, data suggests that integration into the host country and the 
sustenance of long distance affinities and attachments towards country of origin are not 
always mutually exclusive. This is evidenced by the simultaneity between the desire to 
become integrated and sustenance of emotional and material attachment with Zimbabwe.  
This supports the notion that the more integrated in the host country diasporas become, the 
more likely they are to maintain long distance ties with their countries of origin more 
effectively (Portes, 1999; Levitt, 2004). This, therefore, challenges notions, for example, that 
migrants become completely integrated, begin to engage in long distance nationalism, or 
become cosmopolitan in any universal way, as I discussed earlier as part of the conceptual 
framework for this chapter. 
 I have also highlighted the tendency of those feeling excluded and rejected, especially 
by South Africa-based participants, to develop more intense emotional connections with 
Zimbabwe. In this manner, exclusion fuels distance national attachments with the homeland 
in the form suggested by Benedict Anderson, which, in turn, demonstrates how senses of 
belonging feed into each other and reinforce each other (see Anderson, 1983). In other words, 
yes, diasporas sustain long distance emotional attachments with their homelands, but such 
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sections of the diaspora do not just start feeling connected to their homeland out of nowhere. 
Instead, such affinities are often bolstered by other sets of emotional dispositions, in this case 
by senses of rejection within countries hosting them.  
In some instances, the tendency by those who had acquired British/South African 
citizenship suggest, greater integration may also contradict with and limit their long-distance 
attachment with homeland. The above category of diasporas often ends up completely 
severing substantive, material ties with homeland, beginning to feel at home in the host 
country. The above observations make it difficult to generalise about diaspora senses of 
belonging, apart from the fact that they are not universal and are not always directed to one 
particularly country. The rest of this chapter maps out the different dimensions of the 
fragmented nature of diaspora senses of belonging, with a particular emphasis to the 
different factors which mediate their fracturing in the two contexts. 
6.3 Mapping Fragmented Senses of Belonging: Dynamics and Patterns 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion how difficult it is to categorise and generalise 
the feelings and emotional orientations of participants, in light of the variation and complexity 
characterising them. Not every participant felt the same towards Zimbabwe and South 
Africa/UK. Instead, their emotional dispositions were quite multiple, mixed and fluid, while at 
times ambivalent and contradictory. This variegation of senses of belonging among 
participants in both the UK and South Africa, was mediated by the interplay of different 
contextual, socio-demographic and spatial factors among other independent variables.  
Senses of belonging do not emerge out of a vacuum, but are shaped by the context in 
which those diasporas are hosted. For example, there is an evident tendency by participants 
living in South African townships to display senses of belonging marked by uncertainty, 
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ambivalence and anxiety. This could be a result of several factors. For example, South Africa 
is still struggling to redress the legacy of apartheid and other contemporary societal 
challenges manifesting in the form of socio-political instability and socioeconomic problems 
(see Neocosmos, 2010). These participants tended to regret their decisions to settle in South 
Africa, and were ashamed of their living conditions. For example, one participant, named 
Luckmore from Lower Crossroads (Phillipi), bemoaned in these terms:  
Phillipi is like hell on earth because of crime, violence and conditions of living. I would 
not invite my relatives from Zimbabwe because they would feel sorry for me.   
 I also heard the local Xhosa elders who are members of the street committee the other 
day complaining that we foreigners are responsible for all the problems in this 
township. I am now always living in fear that they will one day attack us.110  
This tendency by local South Africans to be antagonistic, blaming immigrants for all the 
problems facing their communities, was also observed by Misago (2016). This trend has also 
been present in the UK, perpetuated by right-wing political forces opposed to 
multiculturalism operating within British society (Hickman et al, 2012).  
Safety and security constitute a critical element of citizenship and belonging, and 
whether one feels safe and secure depends on context too. As Yuval-Davies proposes, 
belonging entails feeling ‘at home’, ‘safe’ and ‘comfortable’ (Yuval-Davies, 2006). However, 
what makes people feel ‘at home’ in any particular place is not easy to understand and cannot 
be generalised. Different categories of people are motivated and contented (or depressed) 
by different triggers in different circumstances. Data suggest that the majority of participants 
                                                          
110 Interview at Philippi on 10th March 2015 
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in South Africa do not ‘feel at home’ in that particular country for many reasons, crime being 
a key issue. For example, to support Luckmore’s fears and anxieties discussed above, I also 
witnessed a violent crime incident (burglary and armed robbery) just after midnight on a 
young Zimbabwean woman living next to my intermediary, while conducting my fieldwork in 
Lower Crossroads. I interviewed the victim several days after the incident and she complained 
at how the South African Police Service had handled the incident:  
When I called 10111 to report the crime, the lady who answered my call kept speaking 
to me in isiXhosa, which I don’t understand. They responded 2 hours after I reported, 
yet the Phillipi East Police Station is less than a mile away. They are just good at 
arresting us foreigners for immigration offences but they cannot do their job of 
protecting the community.111 
These sentiments also suggest a general sense of distrust and resentment among immigrants 
directed towards the South African state, particularly the South Africa Police Service (Masuku, 
2006). This tendency by the SAPS to direct their resources towards the arrest and detention 
of undocumented immigrants at the expense of effective and non-discriminatory policing, has 
been highlighted by other researchers and scholars in South Africa and other contexts (see 
Klaaren and Ramji, 2001).  
Host governments’ restrictive immigration and citizenship policies, coupled with host 
populations’ increasing hostility towards immigrants both in South Africa and pre-Brexit UK, 
were cited by many participants as the causes of the fear and anxiety. This dominant anxiety 
mirrors a broader ‘culture of fear’ and the rise of the ‘neurotic citizen’ in migrant-hosting 
countries (see Isin, 2004: 217-219). This dominant feeling of fear and anxiety is thought to be 
                                                          
111 Interview at Stockroad SAPS station on 18th March 2015. 
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affecting citizens of migrant-hosting countries in the context of growing threats of terrorism 
and adverse impact of globalisation (Isin and Nyers, 2011). However, the above aspect of the 
findings shows how migrants have also been affected by this pervasive sense of fear and 
anxiety, in contexts of xenophobic violence and discrimination among other structural and 
institutional forces of exclusion operating in South Africa and many other migrant-hosting 
countries in the global south. The next section discusses different contextual and other factors 
shaping these fragmented senses of belonging, particularly trying to explain why different 
sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora feel differently about the host country and homeland.  
6.3.1 The Welfare State and Migrant Senses of Belonging 
Zimbabweans in the UK, compared to their South Africa-based counterparts, also felt 
more comfortable and satisfied with their lives in the host country. This can be explained by 
contextual and other factors. It is important to note that feeling safe, secure and at home, is 
not only defined in terms of the absence of physical violence, but encompasses other aspects 
of wellbeing considered important by different categories of diasporas. Perhaps the concept 
of human security provides a more useful way of understanding the multidimensionality of 
security, encompassing all aspects of human life, including welfare, livelihoods and survival, 
which are critical for migrants coming from contexts of impoverishment and socio-economic 
deprivation, as is the case with most participants in this study (see Jinnah and Polza-Ngwato, 
2012).  
The above pattern contrasts the pattern I observed among South Africa-based 
participants who tended not to depend and rely on the host state for their welfare, livelihoods 
and wellbeing. This is presumably because of the country’s relatively nascent welfare system 
which excludes undocumented and other categories of immigrants (see Jinnah and Polzer-
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Ngwato, 2012). For example, Eunice cited the existence of social assistance programmes as 
part of South Africa’s welfare system, but she lamented the exclusion of immigrants and their 
children from accessing them. For example, she indicated how her disabled child had been 
denied access to the disability grant from the South African Social Security Authority by virtue 
of their being non-South African and undocumented. This mirrors wider problems where 
vulnerable immigrants find it almost impossible to access social assistance in South Africa, 
even if they hold valid immigration documentation (see PASSOP, 2013; Jinnah and Polzer-
Ngwato, 2012).112 This, therefore, tends to weaken senses of belonging of those immigrants, 
at times pushing them to look outside the state for assistance with these and other aspects 
of their everyday lives, as I have demonstrated in Chapter 5.  
In contrast, the majority of participants in the UK felt a sense of being secure and 
comfortable owing to the country’s relative socio-economic prosperity and welfare 
guarantees from the welfare state. For instance, 48-year-old Dee compared her feelings 
towards Zimbabwe before and after coming to the UK: 
It was very hard in Zimbabwe after ESAP. We had to pay for all the school fees and 
hospital bills, but here I feel happy because health and education are for free. 
Remember Zimbabwe used to be like this. Everything was for free.113  
The role of the UK’s welfare state (including the NHS and free primary and secondary 
education) was accompanied by a shared sense of belonging in this study, particularly parents 
with children of school-going age and adults with chronic health conditions indicated how 
they felt protected and cared for thanks to the UK’s welfare state. The availability and 
                                                          
112 See PASSOP’s report (2010) based on its ground-breaking research into the challenges faced by disabled 
immigrant children and other vulnerable immigrant groups integrating into the South African society. 
113 Interview at Camberley on 22nd August 2015.  
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accessibility of social housing made UK-based participants, particularly those with valid and 
secure immigration status, feel comfortable and ‘at home’ in the UK. Although most 
participants displayed a cynical attitude towards the claiming of financial benefits from the 
Department of Works and Pensions, everyone expressed a desire to be allocated a council 
apartment in the South East of England.  
This tendency confirms the link between the accessibility of welfare goods and 
services, and loyalty to the state and national solidarity (see Banting and Kymlicka, 2017). 
However, some participants indicated how much they detested claiming welfare benefits, 
citing the embarrassment and sense of inferiority associated with ‘life on the dole’, while 
those with temporary work, study and dependent visas had no recourse to public funds at all. 
This contradicts the perception by some sections of British society that immigrants come to 
the UK principally to claim benefits. Instead, most of the participants shared the belief that 
being granted the right to work was more important as it would allow them to be self-reliant 
and autonomous, than the right to claim benefits. Part of the explanation for this tendency 
among migrants from sub-Saharan African countries (including Zimbabweans) to shun some 
aspects of the welfare state relates to the deeply entrenched ethos of self-reliance with 
longer origins, cemented by the effects of neoliberal economic policies and other factors in 
recent decades (Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012). Also, as I indicated earlier, only those 
participants in the UK with the appropriate formal legal status have recourse to public funds.     
6.3.2 Spatial Variations in Senses of Belonging 
Socio-spatial variations in participants’ senses of belonging were evident in both South 
Africa and the UK. This thesis is committed to transformative qualitative methodologies as 
explained in the methodology chapter, which explains why it used a purposive sample to 
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deliberately target those living in impoverished and crime-ridden black townships such as 
Philippi in the City of Cape Town and Vosloorus in the City of Ekurhuleni for more sustained 
periods of immersion in these respective communities. These places have been historically 
affected by many social problems due to the legacies of apartheid, spatial inequality and other 
contemporary challenges associated with the rapid growth of South African cities (Landau et 
al, 2013). The Western Cape Province, where 80 participants were selected, is one of the most 
crime-infested parts of South Africa. Participants shared the view that crime was indeed a 
menace in their local communities, which made them feel a perpetual sense of anxiety in fear 
of being attacked. This fuelled a deep sense of exclusion, hopelessness and anxiety about their 
future prospects in South Africa, prompting some of them to look back to Zimbabwe in 
anticipation of a better and prosperous future. 
However, there was a marked variation in senses of belonging among participants 
with higher levels of education and immigration status, who felt Johannesburg was better 
than Cape Town. This perception was shared by participants in Dawn Park (a middle-class 
suburb in Boksburg) who felt that that Gauteng was more welcoming to immigrants because 
people from different racial, national and ethnic backgrounds live in the city. Those who held 
this view also thought Johannesburg was a land of opportunity for many black people, 
compared to Cape Town and other cities across South Africa.  
The dominant perception in relation to the above dynamic was that black 
professionals, irrespective of nationality, stood better chances of making it up the 
professional ladder than those in other parts of the country. As one participant, a Computer 
Scientist named G.M who completed his studies at the University of Zimbabwe in year 2001 
and works for an IT firm in Johannesburg, put it: 
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 black professionals do better in Johannesburg than in Cape Town, as long as you have 
the right immigration papers.114 
This notion that immigrant professionals had greater opportunities in Gauteng was, however, 
rejected by Cape Town-based participants as confirmed by a freelance journalist, B.C argued:  
Cape Town is a land of opportunity because that is where the rich people are. You are 
likely to find a professional job here than anywhere else in South Africa.115  
Spatial differences may only partly explain these variations in perceptions, but these 
perceived differences may be a product of differences in urban scales and levels of economic 
development, rather than location. Senses of belonging also varied depending on place of 
settlement within Cape Town and Johannesburg. Participants living in affluent parts of both 
Cape Town and Johannesburg were inclined to feel ‘at home’ in South Africa owing to the 
relative safety and security under which they live. Participants living near international 
transport hubs also had a tendency to display a stronger attachment to Zimbabwe, compared 
to those in outlying areas.   
Variations in senses of belonging are also shaped by geographical distance from 
Zimbabwe, particularly in relation to the degree of proximity to Zimbabwe, of where 
participants were settled. The degree of emotional attachment to Zimbabwe of participants 
in Gauteng was not as intense as that displayed by participants both in Cape Town and the 
UK. This was aptly illustrated by A.M, who said: 
 Living in Johannesburg is not different from living back in Zimbabwe. If I decide to 
travel right now to spend time with relatives during the forthcoming Easter holidays, I 
                                                          
114 Interview at Dawn Park, Boksburg on 29th April 2015.  
115 Interview held at PASSOP offices on 4th March 2015.  
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would get to my rural home in a couple of hours’ time. If I die today here in Joburg, it 
will not be difficult for my friends to take me back to Zimbabwe, where I would want 
to be buried.116   
As findings indicate, participants in Johannesburg showed how easy and convenient it was for 
them to maintain cross-border connections with Zimbabwe, compared to those in the UK and 
Cape Town (some of whom had not returned to Zimbabwe for decades). Many of those living 
further away also displayed a great sense of emotional attachment and nostalgia about life in 
Zimbabwe.  
Participants also tended to show how they were occasionally affected by a 
pathological feeling of ‘homesickness’,117 particularly when a close family member dies in 
Zimbabwe and they are unable to attend the funeral due to immigration-related or financial 
constraints. Norma118, who lost her father in 2014, recalled how she felt: 
I really miss Zimbabwe. I have not gone back to Zimbabwe since 2001, so many family 
members and relatives have died over the years and I have not managed to attend any 
of the funerals. I had no money and I am on asylum so I could not travel back to 
Zimbabwe for my father’s funeral. I felt lack of control and helpless.119  
However, the role of geographical distance in shaping senses of belonging is mitigated by the 
use of ICTs, particularly social media and mobile communication technologies. Participants 
both in Cape Town and the UK reported how they had become more connected with their 
                                                          
116 Interview held at PASSOP offices on 4th March 2015. 
117 Hack-Polay (2013) notes how some migrants suffer from emotional and personality disorders such as 
nervousness, (and presumably mental health issues) as a result of protracted displacement. 
118 Interview at Camberley, UK on 25 June 2015. 
119 Interview at Camberley, UK 10th July 2015. 
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social networks back in Zimbabwe, but their accessibility is limited to those with stable 
incomes and gainfully employed.  
6.3.3 Socio-demographic Differences and Fragmented Senses of 
Belonging 
Senses of belonging were also differentiated at family and individual levels according 
to gender, age and other socio-demographic profiles of the participants in both the UK and 
South Africa. For example, older, male and married participants had a tendency to feel more 
attached to Zimbabwe and an eagerness to return, while women were more cautious and 
reluctant. Most women also felt more ‘at home’ in both the UK and South Africa for several 
reasons highlighted in the findings earlier, including greater access to livelihood opportunities 
and financial independence, rights and legal protection, and a general sense of equality with 
their male counterparts.  
On the other hand, married men tended to be disgruntled and frustrated with this 
pattern, which most of them perceived as culturally inappropriate. Participants’ perceptions 
were also segmented according to their marital status and their perceptions were quite 
mixed. However, the interests, welfare and future of their families significantly influenced the 
view and orientations of married participants. For instance, there was no consensus among 
participants on whether continuing to stay outside Zimbabwe was best for their families or 
returning to Zimbabwe. These tensions emerged in one of the interviews with the M.T family, 
in which there were (emotionally charged) disagreements over their future in the UK. The 
wife argued: 
I’m currently working towards completing my nursing degree at the University of 
Surrey and I will never return to Zimbabwe. I also will not be spending any more money 
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investing back there. There is nothing left for me there and most of my family members 
passed away, and some are here in the UK. And even if I die here, I will be buried 
here.120 
The husband strongly objected to this sentiment, maintaining his desire to invest in Zimbabwe 
and return when he retires in eight years’ time. Mr W.M (the husband) acknowledged that 
these differences were causing a strain in their marriage. This ambivalence was also evident 
among participants in South Africa, where participants were uncertain about the future of 
their families in both South Africa and Zimbabwe in light of mounting socio-economic 
hardships South Africa.  
Another contour of fragmentation which was more pronounced among participants 
in the UK, followed the lines of age. Generally, younger participants (under 40) displayed a 
tendency to feel ‘at home’ in the UK, compared to older participants who felt closely attached 
to Zimbabwe. In some families I observed, there were open rifts between children (some of 
whom left Zimbabwe at very young ages or were born in the UK) and their parents who felt 
Zimbabwean and wanted to practice their Zimbabwean way of life in the UK. For example, 
tensions were evident in the M.R family in Camberley. Their two daughters M.N and KN aged 
23 and 18 respectively) came to the UK more than 11 years ago. They attended Collingwood 
High School in Old Dean and attended the University of Wolverhampton. Such contradictions 
also presented a potential source of different domestic problems, including family conflict 
and breakdown.  
Variations in senses of belonging also follow lines of gender. Data also indicate how 
senses of belonging are differentiated according to gender, coupled with marital status. For 
                                                          
120 Interview at Bordon, UK, on 22 June 2015. 
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example, married men displaying a general tendency to feel positively towards Zimbabwe 
than women.  There was also a remarkable difference by gender in priorities which affected 
how settled migrants felt. Married women displayed a tendency to be concerned about the 
current needs and wellbeing of children, while men often based their sentiments on the need 
to build and accumulate property in Zimbabwe. However, the sense of feeling ‘at home’ in 
the host country was not as pronounced as with women in the UK. Men, on the other hand, 
still tended to maintain a consistently stronger emotional attachment to Zimbabwe than 
women. However, men in South Africa displayed a greater sense of uncertainty than in the 
UK, perhaps owing to declining socio-economic fortunes and uncertain immigration prospects 
as the ZDP permits expire in 2017. 121    
Some of the women, particularly those who were married, explained their pessimism 
about Zimbabwe by recalling the difficult conditions under which they were initially left 
behind by their spouses. This dynamic was slightly different in the UK, where most of the 
women emigrated first and invited their husbands to join them at a later stage. Those who 
had stayed longer in Zimbabwe before joining their partners complained about the burden of 
raising children on their own in the context of ongoing socio-economic hardships in 
Zimbabwe. For example, Mai Chikonamombe in Cape Town openly declared: 
Baba Andy [father of Andy] left me alone with the children back in Zimbabwe and I 
suffered on my own. Now that we are all here and I am now working for myself as a 
Domestic worker in Rondebosch, he now starts to talk about returning to Zimbabwe. I 
don’t want to suffer again in Zimbabwe.  
                                                          
121 These are special immigration permits issued to 375 000 Zimbabweans in 2010 and renewed in 2014-15. 
They will expire in 2017 and the South African government has not announced its decision on whether they 
would be renewed or not. 
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This sentiment was shared by many other female participants, who felt returning to 
Zimbabwe would be accompanied by suffering. Most of the female participants in South 
Africa also cited how difficult it has generally been for them to come to join their spouses, 
having had to overcome discouragement from relatives; difficulties getting travelling and 
immigration documentation; anxieties and risks associated with travelling on their own with 
children; and fear of being in South Africa based on stories they had heard about violence and 
crime. On the other hand, this dynamic was more complex in the UK, where both men and 
women tended to complain of having experienced hardships during the migration and 
settlement experience.  
However, the general tendency for women to feel more secure and comfortable in 
the host country than in Zimbabwe was more defined in the UK. Another reason why women 
tended to be more comfortable in the UK related to the predominant feeling of being 
empowered through opportunities to work and earn their own incomes. For instance, 12 out 
of 18 women respondents indicated that they only became gainfully employed upon their 
arrival in the UK, which give them greater economic freedom and ameliorated their material 
conditions as well as expanding their life choices.   
Women participants also expressed a sense of insecurity and uncertainty regarding 
the future of Zimbabwe and their prospects in the event of returning there. Above all, many 
women tended to express their uncertainty by asking what would happen if things do not 
work when they return to Zimbabwe. The general disaffection with Zimbabwe, and the 
reluctance to return, therefore largely emanated from the livelihood and insecurity most of 
them were anticipating upon their return. This was mostly thought of in terms of the 
availability and accessibility of basic education, healthcare and other public services for their 
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families. For instance, a woman named Loveness [Mai Tinotenda], who lives in Lower 
Crossroads in Cape Town, raised her concerns in the following terms:  
Where do we start and how are we going to come back again to South Africa if the 
situation becomes bad again in Zimbabwe?  
As a result, most women thought they would be better off staying on in South Africa than 
going back, which is a similar sentiment expressed by those in the UK. 
Most of them had the perception that South Africa offered better employment and 
other livelihood opportunities compared to Zimbabwe, where some of them only worked in 
the domestic domain as housewives. Therefore, some had become employed, and in some 
cases breadwinners, for the first time in their lifetimes, giving them power to choose how to 
spend their incomes and what to buy for themselves as well as their own families (not 
husbands’ families). This was echoed by Mai Admire in Vosloorus who asserted that:  
I had never worked before in my entire life. I only started working for myself when I 
came here, and I now work as a domestic worker in Brakpan. I now have the freedom 
to use my own money to satisfy my own needs and to look after my relatives back in 
Mt Darwin [Zimbabwe]. 
Although such perceptions were shared by many married women participants, not all of them 
were formally employed and were employable due to lack of basic skills, abilities and 
competencies. Other women participants thought South Africa was good for them because 
they enjoyed relative legal protection from domestic and gender-based violence. This theme 
emerged predominantly among research participants in Masiphumelele [Cape Town], where 
a number of human rights NGOs were operating in the area. For this reason, traditional 
gender relations were becoming reconfigured thanks to the existence of an elaborate human 
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rights framework (including gender rights) in South Africa, some which they did not enjoy 
back in Zimbabwe.  
This general reluctance to share men’s emotional commitment towards Zimbabwe did 
not go down well with most of the male participants in both South Africa and the UK. For 
example, many respondents indicated that divorces had become prevalent among 
Zimbabweans living in the UK and part of the problem was to do with women becoming more 
powerful than the men. Many male respondents complained about changes in gender roles, 
with some men saying they were now expected to carry out household chores, childcare and 
other tasks traditionally assigned to women. These dynamics were cited to explain the 
tendency for men to long for the life they had lived in the past in Zimbabwe and to continue 
yearning for their ultimate return to their country of origin.  
6.3.4 Levels of Education and Socio-economic Status 
Whether participants felt at home in Zimbabwe or South Africa/UK also varied 
according to levels of education and socio-economic status. Participants with higher levels of 
education (with at least a tertiary qualification) putting them in higher earning occupations 
and enabling them to move up the social ladder, tended to think positively about their 
experiences living in both the UK and South Africa. This feeling was heightened among those 
who had acquired stable immigration status, irrespective of the length of time they had 
stayed in both countries. In South Africa, most of those who spoke positively about their life 
experiences and future prospects in South Africa also tended to reside in affluent suburbs of 
both Johannesburg and Cape Town.  
Institutionalised and structural barriers to upward social mobility experienced by 
diasporas in the UK by other scholars, also triggered frustration and resentment in South 
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Africa (Mbiba, 2005; 2011). Levels of education produced mixed senses of belonging among 
Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK. For example, while participants in both South Africa 
and the UK frequently shared a sense of satisfaction and self-realisation while in both the UK 
and South Africa, unemployed participants with higher levels of education and socio-
economic status expressed senses of frustration and anger towards the host country. Most of 
these seemingly successful and prosperous participants also voiced their frustration that both 
South Africa and the UK had not offered them equal opportunities for professional and social 
mobility.  
This sense of exclusion among professionals and highly educated Zimbabweans was 
more defined in the UK because many participants had completed tertiary qualifications 
before arrival but were employed in the social care and healthcare sectors. These UK-based 
participants also perceived that their educational and professional qualifications were not 
being fully recognized because of their race, class and accents. As a result, most of these 
people had settled for social care and nursing jobs in the NHS, resulting in their de-skilling in 
ways that further compromise their employability and opportunities for upwards professional 
mobility. This indeed confirms that diasporas encounter enormous barriers which militate 
against their upward social mobility, and one of the consequences of this is greater sense of 
anger and frustration among those segments of the Zimbabwe diaspora. 
The disaffection by educated participants in South Africa emanated from the tendency 
to place a ‘citizens only’ condition on many employment opportunities, by employers in both 
the public and private sectors. Some participants also held teaching qualifications but were 
not allowed to work without immigration status. These participants queried why the South 
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African government had not recognised teaching as one of the Critical Skills122 under its 
immigration policy, given the crisis in South Africa’s education system. This was captured by 
Bernard, who is a freelance journalist:  
South Africa does not recognise how important our skills are because we are 
foreigners. Many of us Zimbabweans with skills are doing general jobs or unemployed 
at all, which is very frustrating. They reserve most jobs for ‘citizens only’, yet the 
government admits that South Africa faces a skills shortage. 
Most participants, therefore, felt they were being denied access to employment 
opportunities due to their nationality. Although a small minority seemed happy for having 
made it up the professional and social ladder, the majority had begun looking back to 
Zimbabwe for more accessible investment and other economic opportunities where they 
thought they legitimately had access to more rights and opportunities than in South Africa 
because they were citizens. Therefore, mixed feelings were revealed by different categories 
of highly qualified and educated participants in both the UK and South Africa. 
6.3.5 Being a Migrant and Sense of Belonging 
Different categories of Zimbabweans experience migrant life differently, and these 
experiences shape emerging senses of belonging. There were also variations in participants’ 
perceptions related to the immigration experiences and circumstances. Zimbabweans have 
left their country for multiple reasons, leading Crush et al (2015) to describe it as mixed 
migration. Research participants indicated their multiple reasons for leaving Zimbabwe, 
including political persecution, socio-economic hardship, forced displacement as part of a 
                                                          
122 South Africa’s Immigration Act of 2002 provides for a special work permit for holders of qualifications 
considered critical to South Africa. This type of permit provides a pathway to permanent residency and 
citizenship. Holders of this permit become eligible for permanent residency as soon as it is issued to them. 
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highly controversial urban renewal programme (Operation Murambatsvina) and family re-
union among other reasons (see Mlambo, 2008). These varied reasons for migration shaped 
emerging senses of belonging among different categories of participants. For example, those 
who were forced out of country by socio-economic hardships were more flexible about their 
prospects of return to Zimbabwe compared to those who were direct victims of political 
persecution. Those who left for socio-economic reasons tended to sustain close contacts with 
Zimbabwe, including through regular travel back to the country.  
On the other hand, the situation was more complicated for victims of direct political 
persecution. For example, participants who (or whose close relatives) had suffered torture at 
the hands of ZANU PF expressed greater senses of fear, hatred and total disaffection towards 
Zimbabwe, compared to those without such background and experiences. These participants 
indicated that they had been granted protection in either South Africa or the UK and vowed 
never to return to Zimbabwe. Those who had acquired permanent residency/indefinite leave 
to remain and citizenship in South Africa or the UK, and had settled for lengthy periods had 
established themselves securely. They felt at home and had completely detached from 
Zimbabwe, in a way consistent with integration and assimilation (Bulcha, 1988; Thomas, 2002; 
Hack-Polay, 2016). Among those who had emigrated for political reasons with an aim to seek 
asylum, there was another tendency by some, particularly those whose family members were 
still in Zimbabwe, to maintain a keen interest in political and socio-economic developments 
in Zimbabwe. This shows the importance of reason for migration and emerging senses of 
belonging among Zimbabweans.  
Participants in both South Africa and the UK indicated in their responses that they had 
left Zimbabwe not only for different reasons but also at different times, using different routes, 
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entry points, modes of transport and travel documents. They also subsequently obtained 
different categories of immigration permission to stay in the country with different conditions 
as well as varying duration of validity.  All these differences influenced their emerging feelings 
towards both the country of origin and host country. For example, to demonstrate the 
importance of time of departure as a variable, UK-based participants who left Zimbabwe 
before 2002, when Zimbabweans were still allowed into the UK without visas, and before the 
socio-economic and political problems intensified in Zimbabwe, tended to be nostalgic and to 
hold more positive feelings about Zimbabwe, compared to those who had left after 2008 
when, as some believe, the Zimbabwean crisis reached its zenith (see Crush et al, 2015). 123  
Another source of ambivalence and uncertainty related to the immigration status 
participants had acquired while in the UK or South Africa, particularly its degree of 
temporariness/permanency. The segmentation associated with different immigration 
statuses was accompanied by variation in senses of belonging. Two key factors about 
immigration status which shaped perceptions of participants, included the rights and 
entitlements and degree of permanency associated with each. For example, both South 
Africa-based and UK-based participants with immigration statuses allowing them unrestricted 
rights to employment and permanent leave to remain, tended to feel more comfortable and 
‘at home’ compared to holders of other categories of immigration permission.  
Participants in both South Africa and the UK placed strong emphases on the 
importance of having stable and secure immigration status. To underscore the importance of 
a valid immigration permission in order for one to realise the benefits of being in South Africa, 
A.M remarked during an interview that:  
                                                          
123 See Godfrey Tawodzera’s work entitled: Food Insecurity In A State Crisis (2016), in which he marks 2008 as 
the height of the socioeconomic and political crisis in Zimbabwe. 
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to have a valid immigration is to have a livelihood in South Africa… You cannot benefit 
from any opportunity even if you are qualified for it.124   
Most of these participants viewed secure legal status as a gateway to a better quality of life 
and welfare security in the UK, as Beatrice (50 years old) observed:  
I have been in the UK for more than 15 years. I can tell you that having stable legal 
status is a stepping stone to socio-economic benefits and opportunities. As soon as you 
are granted an indefinite [leave to remain in the UK], you can be anything you want to 
be here in the UK.125  
Beatrice owns a house in Camberley and attributed her eligibility for a mortgage to her 
acquisition of British citizenship. And most of the participants on different legal paths to full 
citizenship expressed a remarkable sense of hope and pride about their futures in both 
countries. 
On the other hand, there was a correlation between temporariness of immigration 
status and ambivalence and uncertainty in terms of senses of belonging.  South Africa-based 
and UK-based participants without stable and permanent immigration statuses tended to 
display unstable and ambivalent senses of belonging. And those with rejected applications, 
expired documents and those who were completely undocumented were the most anxious 
and cynical about their stay in the UK or South Africa as they were facing arrest, detention 
and deportation. In the UK, violators of immigration rules and regulations by overstaying, 
working illegally and illegally making recourse to public funds, were also nervous, not knowing 
what the future holds for them. 
                                                          
124 Interview at Stockroad station on 23 March 2015 
125 Interview at Camberley on 15 August 2015.  
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 It is also important to point out, in addition, that what aggravated the uncertainty and 
anxiety of this latter category of participants was the lack of resolution of the socio-economic 
and political crises in Zimbabwe, which meant they had no option of looking to return home. 
And the severity of the anxiety and uncertainty expressed by some of the participants 
potentially made them susceptible to mental health issues and other social problems during 
their continued stay in the UK or South Africa. Holders of other immigration statuses 
expressed senses of uncertainty and various degrees of anxiety, but most of them were 
hopeful and positive in anticipation of obtaining the right to reside permanently (these 
included work visas, student visas and dependent visas (UK); section 22 asylum seeker 
permits, Section 24 Refugee Status, work permits, study permits, visitor’s permits, Zimbabwe 
Dispensation Project (ZDP) permits (South Africa).126 It is apparent in the foregoing discussion 
that legal status marks a major contour of fragmentation among Zimbabweans living in the 
UK and South Africa. 
The following example serves to further illustrate the effect of temporariness of 
immigration status on senses of belonging.  Although those with temporary residence 
permits, including Section 22 asylum-seeker permits and ZDP work, study and business 
permits were more positive about their current life experiences, they tended to feel uncertain 
and insecure about their future in South Africa because their statuses were only temporary. 
While some displayed high expectations and looked forward to expeditious political and 
socio-economic change in Zimbabwe, they were not certain that such change would happen 
and were unsure what the South African government would decide regarding the renewal of 
their immigration documents upon their expiry. As a result, many participants in both 
                                                          
126 The Zimbabwe Dispensation Project was a special initiative by the South African government in 2010 aimed 
at issuing work study and business permits to undocumented Zimbabweans living in South Africa since 2010. 
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countries reported feeling a kind of emotional limbo, not knowing what to feel about 
Zimbabwe and the host country.  
6.4 Dynamics of Senses of Belonging: Fluidity, Multiplicity and Ambivalence  
Senses of belonging were slightly more complex among participants living precariously 
in both South Africa and the UK. However, data also indicate that not every undocumented 
participant was unemployed and unhappy with being in South Africa. For example, some had 
managed to secure employment in the formal and informal sectors, while others had become 
formally employed before their temporary immigration and asylum-seeker documents 
expired. Nevertheless, despite being employed while undocumented, participants in this 
category cited their vulnerability to abuse and discrimination, including being subjected to 
unfair labour practices without any legal recourse because they would be avoiding contact 
with both the South African or UK public authorities for fear of arrest, detention and 
deportation.  
Those who had been living illegally in both countries for relatively lengthy periods of 
time, wished they could return to Zimbabwe, while others were actually somewhat regretful 
that they had taken the decision to come to South Africa in the first place. With the political 
and socioeconomic situation back not getting any better at the time and facing arrest, 
detention and deportation for living in South Africa illegally, these participants displayed a 
great deal of uncertainty and anxiety about their future both in Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
It is also important to note, however, that not all those undocumented participants were 
anxious about their continued stay in either South Africa and the UK; and this incredible sense 
of hope under conditions of adversity was more defined among participants in South Africa. 
Some, especially the relatively new arrivals and youth, displayed a sense of hope that they 
would get settled with time and were continuing to explore options of getting their presence 
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regularized in order to start enjoying the benefits associated with being in their host country. 
This was illustrated by JB in Vosloorus: 
We have no papers [valid immigration] and life in South Africa has been tough, but we 
will soldier on. We will keep trying, maybe things will get better for us here in South 
Africa. Turning back to Zimbabwe is not an option because life is harder there.127   
 
For some of these participants, looking back was simply not an option in light of the 
experiences of poverty, hunger and violence they had endured in Zimbabwe. 
Another cause of variation in senses of belonging related to immigration statuses was 
to do with the rights, entitlements and opportunities entitled to participants who held 
different categories of permits. Although holders of any kind of permit were allowed to work 
(except those with study permits), their immigration and asylum permits had different other 
conditions setting out their entitlements. Those with permits issued under the Zimbabwe 
Dispensation Project could work and study in the same manner holders of any other category 
of permit would, but some banks did not recognize their permits. Similarly, holders of Section 
22 asylum-seeker permits indicated their difficulties opening personal bank accounts.  On the 
other hand, holders of Section 24 refugee permits – those who had been granted refugee 
status – had more rights than holders of the former two categories. They had many 
entitlements and rights except voting, owning a business, could not qualify for a mortgage 
and were not allowed to take up employment in the national security and private security 
sectors, among other conditions. Documented Zimbabweans, together with holders of 
Section 22 asylum permits above, were prohibited from travelling back to Zimbabwe, which 
                                                          
127 Interview at Abesutwini, Vosloorus, 19th March 2015. 
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caused a lot of resentment. Those with permanent residence had more rights and 
entitlements, almost the same as those of citizens, except the right to vote. Those who had 
been granted permanent residence and refugee status had access to most of the material 
benefits accessed by citizens and therefore felt more ‘at home’ in South Africa than those 
with other categories of permits and those without documents at all.  
Another key feature of defining senses of belonging of participants relate to the 
transience and instability characterising them. The cumulative effect of this acute uncertainty 
and ambivalence evident in participants’ senses of belonging was a sense of ‘not knowing 
where one belongs’ and perpetual in-betweenness, observed by Wodak and Krzyzanowski 
(2007) among migrants hosted in some European countries. Data indicate diaspora 
perceptions shift dramatically following new socio-economic and political developments and 
events both back in Zimbabwe and South Africa, at times causing a great deal of ambivalence 
and uncertainty among many participants regarding where exactly they thought they 
belonged. 
 Although participants both in South Africa and the UK felt alternating and fluctuating 
emotions and sentiments at different times, participants in South Africa reported more 
turbulent and unstable senses of belonging. This fluctuation was aptly captured by the 
following remark by Mr SN in Phillipi, Cape Town: 
Things are always changing here. Today I am happy but tomorrow I might be sad if 
something bad happens here or in Zimbabwe. [For example] today I am happy because 
my ZDP immigration permit has just been renewed by the Department of Home Affairs. 
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[However] maybe I will be sad again when it expires because I do not know what will 
happen at the time.128  
This points to the fact that senses of belonging are not fixed and stable, but constantly in flux 
depending on events and key developments in the host country, back in their country or origin 
and beyond. The concept of critical moments may be useful in understanding these 
fluctuations and variations in senses of belonging in response to key developments and events 
(Mbiba, 2012, Lefebvre, 1996). Critical moments are transformative occurrences in people’s 
everyday lives which disturb existing equilibriums and certainties, and by so doing expose 
hidden tensions in society and individuals; and such moments produce changes that are 
positive and negative, desirable and undesirable (Mbiba, 2012).  
 Findings of this study, therefore, illustrate how senses of belonging held by 
participants were upset and disturbed by sudden contextual changes, triggering positive and 
negative changes in their sentiments and emotions. According to TC in Johannesburg, 
 Things are always changing. Today I feel happy and feel at home here in South Africa, 
but maybe the situation is going to change tomorrow making me feel like I want to go 
back to my country. We are always unsure what will happen and where we gonna end 
up tomorrow.129 
Some of the key national events and developments both in Zimbabwe and South Africa 
triggering shifts in participants’ senses of belonging included elections in either country with 
a possibility of changes in governments; changes in immigration and other laws directly 
affecting their settlement in South Africa; and the eruption of widespread xenophobic 
violence. Participants, for example, shared the view that their senses of belonging have 
                                                          
128 Interview at Phillipi Small Business Centre on 21st February 2015. 
129 Interview at Vosloorus on 29 April 2015. 
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always shifted dramatically before and after elections in Zimbabwe, with reference to violent 
and contested elections in 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2013. Some of them recalled and described 
how they suddenly became hopeful whenever national elections were due to be held in 
Zimbabwe, in anticipation that the political and socio-economic situation would change and 
enable their eventual return.  
6.4.1 Critical Moments and Fluctuations in Senses of Belonging  
I held a series of focus group discussions both in the UK and South Africa in which I 
discussed with the participants a number of past events both in Zimbabwe and in the two 
host countries, and effects of these on their senses of belonging. For example, those that had 
been living in South Africa over a considerable period of time also recalled how their feelings 
about Zimbabwe changed during and after the occurrence of such critical events as the 
implementation of the land reform programme (hondo yeminda) in 2000; the closure of banks 
and financial institutions by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in 2004; and Operation 
Murambatsvina which was implemented by the Zimbabwean government in 2005. The 
formation of a government of national unity by the MDC and ZANU PF in 2009, coupled with 
the adoption of a multicurrency system in Zimbabwe, was also frequently cited as a period of 
hope and anticipation by many participants, and this sense of hope was more acute among 
participants in South Africa, who recalled being pressured by xenophobia and restrictive 
immigration policies at the time.  
This hope was, however, shattered when the MDC lost the 2013 elections, resulting in 
a dominant sense of despair and perpetual limbo mostly among undocumented participants 
in South Africa. Many participants in both South Africa and the UK reported how their 
collective senses of hope and longing directed at Zimbabwe often rapidly disappeared 
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following ZANU PF’s contested electoral victories. One of the victories of ZANU PF cited by 
many participants was during the 2013 elections. This was reflected by Mr SC in Cape Town:  
We thought our time to go back home had come. We were very positive the MDC 
would win and lead us into a new Zimbabwe because of the new constitution they had 
put in place and other changes during GNU period. Elections were free and no one was 
beaten so we thought ZANU PF would give MDC a chance, but we were wrong. I waited 
anxiously for the election results and my heart sank when I heard ZANU PF had won 
resoundingly. All my dreams for a future back in Zimbabwe were shattered.130 
Many participants highlighted how they started feeling depressed and uncertain about their 
future again, leaving them with no option but to continue with their struggles to settle and 
establish sustainable livelihoods in South Africa. 
Participants in South Africa also recalled how they felt unwanted, fearful and anxious 
during the time of xenophobic violence in 2008. On the other hand, developments in the host 
country also influence perceptions and sensibilities of migrants towards both their country of 
origin and host country. For example, participants indicated how they felt unsafe, rejected 
and homeless following outbreaks of xenophobic violence in South Africa at different times. 
Most participants who immigrated before 2008 recalled their experiences during that time of 
upheaval with sadness, fear and anger. However, what perplexed most participants during 
focus group discussions was that the May xenophobic violence occurred just after the nasty 
and brutal violence meted out against perceived supporters of the MDC during the March 
2008 elections in Zimbabwe. As a result, most participants who were in South Africa at the 
                                                          
130 Interview at PASSOP offices on 15 March 2015. 
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time describe the heightened feelings of homelessness and rejection in both South Africa and 
Zimbabwe.  
Shifts in immigration policies and practices of the South African government at 
different times emerged as another source of fluctuating and unstable senses of belonging 
among participants. The tendency was for them to feel positive and hopeful about their future 
in South Africa and vice versa, when different policies are implemented. For example, some 
participants who were undocumented and struggling to make ends meet at the time reported 
how they felt they would finally get a chance to set themselves up and settle permanently in 
South Africa when the government announced the suspension of deportations of 
Zimbabweans around 2009-10. The South African government simultaneously adopted the 
decision to allow Zimbabweans in South Africa to apply for work, study and business permits 
until 13 December 2010. Participants who were in South Africa at the time shared the same 
feeling of hope and love for South Africa during that period of time, but that changed quickly 
when the South African government was not clear about whether those permits would be 
renewable or not, and whether beneficiaries would be entitled to apply for permanent 
residency upon the expiry of those permits. Another cause for despair was the resumption of 
deportations in 2011 and the tightening of immigration policy while Naledi Pandor was 
Minister of Home Affairs. 
However, participants also reported another period of hope and optimism when 
South Africa hosted the World Cup in 2010. Other participants who were in the country before 
2010 also described how they had mixed feelings when there was a change of government, 
with President Zuma taking over from President Mbeki. Although their anxieties were 
aggravated by the anti-immigrant tone of the immigration debate at the time, they also felt 
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positive and excited being in South Africa at the time due to the hosting of the soccer World 
Cup in 2010 and promises of economic boom in South Africa during that period. 
Although participants in the UK felt their sentiments had been relatively stable and 
predictable, a number of moments were recalled when their feelings about their presence in 
the UK fluctuated. These shifts in senses of belonging were largely in response to changes in 
UK immigration policies and political developments in Zimbabwe. Another critical factor 
responsible for the instability in senses of belonging among participants in the UK was the 
succession of governments. A greater sense of belonging was reported by participants when 
Labour governments were in power in the UK, compared to Conservative governments whom 
UK-based participants thought were always determined to make life difficult for immigrants. 
It also happened that the Brexit vote occurred while fieldwork for this study was in progress 
and, as I noted earlier, there were mixed feelings about it. Lastly, political developments in 
Zimbabwe represented another critical moment associated with rapid changes in senses of 
belonging among participants. Although a longitudinal study of this temporal dimension of 
belonging could have been more revealing and insightful on how perceptions and orientations 
of Zimbabweans evolve and fluctuate over time, above discussion at least suggests that 
conceptions of belonging are not static and fixed, but are constantly in flux.   
Another dimension of how time influences participants’ emerging senses of belonging, 
relates to their length of stay in both the UK and South Africa. Feelings towards the host 
country and country of origin varied depending on the length of time they had spent in the 
respective countries. For example, those who had stayed for a considerable time (for 
instance, five years and above) tended to have secure immigration status; more stable 
livelihoods; and therefore, viewed life in both the UK and South Africa more positively 
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compared to their newly arrived counterparts. The relatively stable settlement arrangements 
most of these participants enjoyed, led them to begin to feel ‘at home’ in both countries. 
At the same time, those who had stayed in South Africa for a long time maintained 
some degree of sentimental attachment to Zimbabwe, while a tiny minority of participants in 
this category seemed to have lost any emotional attachment altogether (mostly in the UK). 
Given the length of time they had been absent from Zimbabwe, most of these participants 
cited a variety of reasons for diminished love of Zimbabwe including: they had become 
established and their children were attending schools; they had lost any social networks and 
relations in Zimbabwe; not knowing where to start upon return after a long period of absence; 
and the difficulties associated with returning to host country again in the event of failed 
reintegration in Zimbabwe. 
Not everyone who had lived for longer periods outside Zimbabwe had diminished love 
for Zimbabwe. This feeling of frustration with the host country and hope towards Zimbabwe, 
was more acute among participants in South Africa. For example, Cape Town-based D M 
remarked that: 
We have been here for nine years without papers [immigration permission] and we 
have seen it all here in South Africa. We have had enough of being mugged and robbed, 
being called names by South Africans and living in constant fear. We will definitely 
have a better life in Zimbabwe when things change [referring to the political and 
socioeconomic situation].131  
Participants who had not stayed for long periods tended to have fallen out of love with both 
host countries relatively quickly. This feeling was more pronounced among participants in 
                                                          
131 Interview at PASSOP offices on 9TH March 2015 
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South Africa, largely due to what they felt were unfilled expectations and hardships upon their 
arrival and settlement in South Africa. Some of these participants actually regretted having 
left Zimbabwe. For example, it had been barely a year since Mr M.C had arrived and settled 
in Imizamo Yethu (Hout Bay). And he had this to say about his experiences so far: 
I wish I had not come here. People back in Zimbabwe lied to us that this country was a 
land of milk and honey. It’s not like that. I am definitely going back to Zimbabwe if I 
manage to save bus fare before the end of this year. 
Some of these newcomers, however, continued to find South Africa more comfortable than 
Zimbabwe and continue to live in the hope that their situations would improve over time. And 
therefore, many of them were not sure whether to return immediately following their arrival.  
6.5 Becoming a Diaspora Through Senses of Belonging: Concluding Discussion 
Subjective aspects of diaspora citizenship, in the form of senses of belonging, reveal 
deep insights about who those migrants become when settled outside their country. The first 
thing to learn in this chapter is that indeed citizenship is not only a material phenomenon but 
is also constructed subjectively, as scholars observe (see Fortier, 2016). It is also apparent that 
this constructed citizenship, in the form of senses of belonging, is the most fluid, flexible and 
unstable as they tend to be in constant flux. One of the implications of this is that it is 
accompanied by constantly shifting boundaries between who is a citizen and who is not. This 
means sections of the diaspora excluded from formal citizenship can still imagine and feel 
part of any particular society, even if they are denied formal and substantive citizenship. The 
results of this study, therefore, show that not all migrants become ‘homeless’, even in 
contexts where they appear to be visibly and systematically excluded, as they are always 
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inclined to self-identify with either the host country or homeland in any way (see Adida, 
2014).  
However, an analysis of senses of belonging of Zimbabweans reveals how difficult it is 
to pinpoint with certainty where those diasporas universally feel at home, given how they 
develop different constructions of ‘home’. However, it is also apparent that senses of 
belonging vary, with different sections of the Zimbabwean migrant population feeling 
differently towards Zimbabwe and the countries that host them. For instance, although some 
begin to ‘feel at home’ in host countries, as suggested by proponents of assimilation and 
integration (Bulcha, 1986; Harell-Bond, 1986), the above findings show that not everyone 
feels that way. Others maintain long distance and cross border sentimental attachments with 
their country of origin, in ways that resonate with long distance nationalism (Glick-Schiller 
and Fouron, 2004; Anderson, 1983). However not everyone maintains the same level of 
emotional commitment to their country of origin, and whether one does so depend on their 
legal status, gender, socioeconomic status and background and experience.   
Strikingly, few of the participants felt they had become ‘citizens of the world’ or global 
citizens (Mbiba, 2005), belonging in universal global community in the ways suggested by 
Appadurai (1996) and Soysal (1994). Those who displayed a cosmopolitan consciousness only 
did so in a tactical way as a way to legitimise their claims for inclusion and contesting exclusion 
in the host society (see Landau and Freemantle, 2004). Yet again, the above findings also show 
how migrants display a sense of dis-belonging, exclusion and ‘homelessness’ in both the 
country of origin and host country, observed to be prevalent among migrants hosted in the 
UK, EU and South Africa among other places (Hungwe, 2013; Yuval-Davis, 2006; Kabeer, 
2005). Interestingly, the findings also show that migrant exclusion manifests not only in 
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material and substantive forms, but in the form of sentiment and emotion (‘feeling 
excluded’). The above findings, therefore, challenge the view that people belong in one 
country at any particular time, often where they are legally recognised as citizens (Fortier, 
2016; Beck and Cronin, 2006). Instead, the senses of belonging of migrants become 
fragmented, with some developing ambivalent and fluid feelings about both Zimbabwe and 
the different countries hosting them. This differentiation in senses of belonging is mediated 
by gender, geography, context, time and other critical factors.  
6.5.1 A Nation Outside Its Territory? 
More profoundly, an analysis of Zimbabweans’ senses of belonging also helps 
determine who diasporas really become after dispersal from their homelands. For example, 
the fragmentation and transnationalism characterising senses of belonging displayed by 
participants, suggest that Zimbabwean migrants do not become a neatly constituted and 
homogenous nation outside the territorial borders of their country of origin, as suggested by 
proponents of long distance nationalism (Anderson, 1991; Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2004). 
One of the conceptions of a nation which is helpful in determining nationhood on the basis of 
senses of belonging, is that of an imagined community with its people sharing a sense of 
belonging in it (Anderson, 1983). However, although I have discussed how some categories of 
participants continue to feel attached to Zimbabwe for different reasons, not everyone 
maintains the same sentiment towards Zimbabwe. Their senses of belonging are too 
incoherent and fragmented to be viewed as a nation in Anderson’s terms.  
This tendency among some Zimbabweans not to feel part of the Zimbabwean nation, 
also mirrors the deeper fractures that characterise the Zimbabwean nation back home, from 
which these respondents migrated. In other words, the fragmented senses of belonging 
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displayed by participants in this study may be viewed as an extension of what led Sabelo 
Gatsheni-Ndlovu to question whether ‘Zimbabweans’, as a nation, really exist (Gatsheni-
Ndlovu, 2009). It would therefore be somewhat misplaced, in this context, to expect a tightly 
knit Zimbabwean nation bound by a shared and universal sense of belonging outside the 
country. If they do not constitute a nation while outside the territorial borders of their 
country, it is still important to try and characterise the kind of a community those 
Zimbabweans approximate. Do they become a transnational community? 
6.5.2 Zimbabweans as a Transnation? 
The above findings show that some migrants hold transnational affinities displayed 
towards more than one country (Baubock, 2008; Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 2004; Beck, 2000; 
Levitt, 2004; Basch et al, 1994). An analysis of the senses of belonging displayed by a 
significant proportion of the participants in this study reveals this transnationalist tendency, 
with many participants feeling ‘at home’ in both Zimbabwe and the host countries – South 
Africa and the UK (Levitt, 2004; Phizacklea and Westwood, 2000; Vertovec, 2001; Portes, 
2001; Baubock, 2000). The dominant scholarly discourse on migrant transnationalism often 
emphasises migrants’ engagement in what is referred to as a transnational social field/space 
(Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 1999; Levitt, 2004), depicting the complex social connections, 
practices and networks they sustain between their countries of origin and host countries. 
Others tend to focus on the political dimensions of migrant transnationalism (Baubock, 2008; 
Kuhlmann, 2008; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003).  
However, the findings of this study demonstrate that transnationalism also has an 
affective dimension in the form of simultaneous affinities directed at both the country of 
origin and host country. And I would like to suggest that ‘affective transnationalism’ better 
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characterises these simultaneous affinities directed at both the country of origin and host 
country. The findings of this study, therefore, add to this materialist conception of 
transnationalism, demonstrating how senses of belonging of some Zimbabwean migrants are 
split between country of origin and host country across geographical distance and territorial 
borders (Fortier, 2016; Beck, 2000). They are also the most fluid, flexible and ambivalent 
aspect of diaspora citizenship, as shown by how they vary according to time, context, 
socioeconomic status and gender among other variables.  It is important to acknowledge that 
the kind of affective transnationalism displayed by participants in this study is not a unique 
phenomenon, but has been observed among other migrants of an different backgrounds 
hosted in the UK and other contexts (Waite and Cook, 2011; Wodak and Krzyzanowski, 2007). 
Therefore, another contribution of this study relates to how those simultaneous affiliations 
are performed, with specific reference to Zimbabweans hosted in two distinct contexts – 
South Africa and the UK.  
Although a significant proportion of participants displayed these simultaneous 
sentimental        attachments with both Zimbabwe and the two host countries, findings still 
suggest that participants’ senses of belonging are not directed at the host and country of 
origin communities in a static and universal way, but are fragmented and differentiated. 
Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa are diverse as a community along the lines of gender, 
age, immigration status, length of stay and place of settlement among other lines of 
differentiation. Subsequently, as the above findings show, they tend to form diverse senses 
of belonging. Findings also show that participants’ senses of belonging vary and fluctuate in 
response to different socio-spatial, temporal and various contextual factors. This makes 
simplistic or universal generalisations impossible. 
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6.5.3 Zimbabweans as a Fragmented Diaspora    
Based on the incredible complexity characterising the senses of belonging displayed 
by participants, perhaps Zimbabweans outside Zimbabwe indeed constitute a fragmented 
diaspora.132 In my view, whether Zimbabwean migrants can be viewed as a diaspora depends 
on how diaspora is defined. For example, a diaspora carries a metaphoric meaning by which 
it describes anyone resident away from home in a world perceived to be globalising (Pasura, 
2010). On the basis of this conception, the fact that an estimated 3.5 million and 200 000 
Zimbabweans are living in South Africa and the UK respectively, therefore qualifies them as a 
diaspora. However, it is also true that different sections of Zimbabweans make sense of their 
displacement and flight in different ways (see McGregor and Primorac, 2010). For example, 
as confirmed by the findings of this study, different categories of Zimbabweans migrated for 
a variety of reasons, at different times, through different routes and settled under very 
different circumstances in both host countries (Crush, 2015). In this context, it is not difficult 
to understand why the emerging senses of belonging of participants under study become so 
multiple and fragmented. Therefore, Zimbabweans were not only physically ‘dispersed’ and 
‘scattered’ across the world from the country they once called ‘home’, but also, more 
profoundly, in their conceptions of ‘home’.  
Another understanding of a diaspora, based on the experiences of the Jewish 
diaspora, provides that it is defined by following qualities: collective memory and vision of 
homeland, commitment to the restoration of the homeland, and lack of desire to integrate 
and assimilate in the host country (Safran, 1991). Although some participants displayed a 
                                                          
132 Dominic Pasura’s empirical studies on experiences of Zimbabweans in the UK led him to conclude that they 
indeed constituted a fractured and fragmented diaspora (Pasura, 2008 and 2010); see also Betts and Jones 
(2016). 
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shared vision and nostalgia about Zimbabwe, and a desire to see the emergence of a new 
Zimbabwe after Mugabe, not everyone had the same feeling about Zimbabwe. Rather, not all 
participants continue to share the same memory of their experiences back in Zimbabwe and 
certainly hold different views about their future, with some not prepared to return back to 
Zimbabwe ever.  
Therefore, the displacement of Zimbabweans and the circumstances under which they 
have settled in countries that host them have resulted in mixed sentiments and emotions 
towards Zimbabwe among different sections of those migrants, including anger, despair, 
hopelessness, nostalgia, hope and optimism. Although some did not completely cut their 
affinity for Zimbabwe, most of participants showed a strong desire to integrate in both the 
UK and South Africa for tactical reasons. Therefore, the above characterisation of 
Zimbabweans as a diasporic community is not entirely consistent with the findings of this 
study.  
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Chapter Seven: Changing Modes of Citizenship in an Age of Transnational Migration: Thesis 
Conclusions 
7.1 Chapter Introduction  
This chapter summarises the thesis advanced in this study. It also spells out the key 
methodological, empirical and empirical contributions of this study to existing knowledge on 
diasporic citizenship. This thesis adds to existing ways of thinking about the causes of 
migration. In light of the ever-growing body of work devoted to the analysis of the causes, 
routes and patterns of the migration of Zimbabweans using various conceptual lenses (Crush 
and Tevera, 2010; Mlambo, 2010). Emigration represents one of the many responses to the 
citizenship deficit experienced in most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Open Society 
Foundation, 2009). Such a conception helps understand the citizenship implications of flight 
and dispersal, particularly the emerging modes of citizenship within diasporic community 
wherever they eventually settle (Pasura, 2005; Zeleza, 2003). In an area of study where many 
analyses tend to be ahistorical, this thesis also draws on Mlambo’s and other analyses on 
historical migration patterns of Zimbabweans, to situate the post-2000 migratory pressures 
pushing Zimbabweans out of Zimbabwe (Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa), in their 
historical context (see Mlambo, 2010).  
Furthermore, building on this existing scholarly corpus of work and without wading too 
deeply into the theoretical debates surrounding migration, the thesis uses citizenship theory 
as another way of understanding the emigration of Zimbabweans since 2000. Post-
independence Zimbabwe has experienced citizenship deficit as evidenced by the 
dysfunctional state-citizen relationship, which is inconsistent to conventional citizenship 
theory (Isin, 2002; Manby, 2009; Sachikonye, 2011; Masunungure and Koga, 2013). As 
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demonstrated in Chapter two, these citizenship deficiencies resulted in dislocation, political 
marginalisation and deprivation of sources of livelihoods among other aspects of citizenship 
(Kpessa et al, 2011; Mkandawire, 2010). This prompted different responses from different 
categories of Zimbabweans, including struggles for political change and flight towards other 
countries for better lives (see Azarya, 1988; Ake, 1992). In this context, this thesis proposes 
that emigrating represents another way of being political in the face of deprivation of political 
and economic opportunities among other facets of citizenship.  
In the above context, this thesis suggests another way of thinking about migratory 
tendencies of Zimbabweans in the recent past few decades, from a citizenship perspective. 
The massive emigration of Zimbabweans is viewed not as representing a passive act of giving 
in to the repression of the state, but an expression of agency – a political act in search of 
better modes of citizenship elsewhere in a world where transnational human mobility is 
becoming easier (Oldfield, 1997; Castles and Davidson, 2000).133 It is a political act, by which 
emigrants engage in a form of protest against authoritarianism, repression, violence and 
impoverishment (see Trandafoiu, 2013; Azarya, 1988; Baker, 2001).134Thinking of migration 
as a way of being political goes beyond traditional understandings of what constitutes political 
action, at least in relation to scholarship on Zimbabwean politics. 
 Also, to demonstrate its political nature, the study shows that indeed emigration is not a 
neutral activity but a politically loaded endeavour with various political meanings and 
connotations attached to it, as discussed in chapter two. Therefore exit, represented a 
survival strategy  for them and their families in the context of state intransigence and 
                                                          
133 Oldfield talks of citizenship agency. Emigration can also be viewed as its expression. Castles and Davidson (2000) note how migration 
allows people to move around the world thus opening up opportunities for other modes of citizenship outside the nation-state. 
134 Trandafoiu (2013) notes how the ‘great escape’ of Romanians after failed post-communist transition which was accompanied by 
authoritarianism and impoverishment of the majority of the citizenry. Bruce Baker (2001) also speaks of how exiting the state through 
political migration constitutes a political act, as a way of disengagement.  
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organised civil society ineffectiveness to usher in political and socioeconomic change in 
Zimbabwe (see Trandafoiu, 2013; Azarya, 1988).135 In this context, survival, more than 
profound political change, becomes a primary priority for the majority of impoverished 
Zimbabweans, in the absence of a well-functioning state to guarantee welfare and livelihoods 
opportunities to all citizens.  
Finally, in methodological terms, this study contributes useful insights on how to conduct 
fieldwork in the South African context, using empowering and transformative qualitative 
methodologies to research marginalised sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora. For example, 
I offer critical reflections on my own experiences during the three months I spent in South 
Africa, highlighting the importance of sensitivity to power dynamics and positionality in the 
relationship between the research and the researched on the one hand, and the researched 
themselves on the other. These reflections also underscore the messiness of conducting 
fieldwork with immigrants in South Africa, and some of the lessons learnt challenge 
conventional, textbook-based methods, portraying field research as a smooth and linear 
process.    
7.1.1 Diasporic Citizenship: From Crisis to Fragmented and Everyday Citizenship 
Flowing from above dynamics, this thesis sought to determine emerging modes of 
citizenship for those Zimbabweans driven out of the country by the historical citizenship 
deficit. This thesis recognises that where and how diasporas imagine and practice citizenship 
are not easy questions, which represent another dimension of the citizenship crisis 
(Klusmeyer and Aleinikoff, 2001; Spiro, 2009; 2011). This enables us to gain insights into the 
                                                          
135 I underscored in Chapter two of this thesis that Trandafoiu (2013) makes the same reading of the post-communist mass emigration of 
Romanians as a political in protest against failure of their state’s post-communist reform agenda.  
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kind of community they become following their departure from the territory of Zimbabwe. 
This thesis also adds to current ways of thinking about features of diasporas and how they 
claim/contest inclusion/exclusion both in the host country and homeland (see Portes, 1995; 
Laguerre, 1998; Muzondidya, 2006; Betts and Jones, 2016).  
With the crisis of national citizenship alluded to above in the backdrop, one of the key 
outcomes of this study has been to confirm that the emigration was indeed accompanied by 
a reconfiguration of Zimbabwean migrants’ modes of citizenship while outside the country 
(Castles and Davidson, 2000). However, it was also evident that the form taken by that kind 
of citizenship and how it is performed, had shifted from being national citizenship which is 
state-centric, territorially-bounded, status-based and universally applicable to all formally 
recognised citizenship, to being diasporic citizenship with its decentred, fragmented, bottom-
up and not always based on politico-legal aspects of legal status, rights and political 
participation (see McNevin, 2011; Pasura, 2008; Castles and Davidson, 2000; Laguerre, 1994). 
It has become apparent that diasporas find different ways of becoming citizens while outside 
the country. This thesis, therefore, provides a sustained critique of conventional modes of 
understanding citizenship throughout the write-up, demonstrating the limited applicability of 
these state-centric and citizenship-status-based, in light of the everyday experiences of 
Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK.  
Beyond the somewhat narrow, universal, politico-legal and status-based conception 
of citizenship premised on formal legal recognition, rights and political participation, as 
emphasised by some scholars, this thesis also argues that diasporic citizenship is performed 
in multiple ways by different categories of Zimbabweans (see Bosniak, 2000; also see 
Baubock, 2006; Kuhlmann, 2008; Soysal, 1994). As shown in preceding chapters, relatively 
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empowered sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora are likely to partake in conventional 
political activism and rights claims-making, particularly those living in the UK.  
However, the experiences of the majority of those without secure legal status and 
limited experience partaking in politics (mostly in South Africa) suggest that diaspora 
citizenship is indeed constructed, negotiated and contested through a variety of everyday 
sociocultural and other not overtly political, daily practices (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994; 
Turner, 1993).136 These other ways of being citizens include nurturing senses of belonging, 
everyday political talk (online and offline) and mundane social practices by which they contest 
exclusion and claim greater recognition and identity in both the host and country of origin. 
This multiplicity of ways of being citizens also underscore the importance of multi-
disciplinarity in order to fully grasp the different dimensions of citizenship. Political science 
and law, with their emphasis on status-based and ‘big P’ ways of being citizens, may not help 
us understand other more sociocultural and everyday modes of citizenship. 
Results of this study also slightly diverge from the Marshallian idea that the state   
bears responsibility of guaranteeing the welfare and livelihoods of citizens under the rubric 
of social citizenship (see Marshall, 1949; also see Schmitter, 1979). This is the whole essence 
of social and economic citizenship (Isin, 2002; Kpessa et al, 2011). Instead, this thesis 
demonstrates how Zimbabweans often engage in everyday struggles for survival and 
livelihoods with limited reliance on the state and organised civil society, particularly those 
hosted in South Africa (compared to UK-based). Through these alternative spaces and vehicles 
of citizenship, most Zimbabweans in South Africa, particularly those with insecure 
                                                          
136 Refer to chapters 4 and 5 to see how Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK engage in sociocultural and 
other practices designed to contest imposed identities both in the home and host country. They construct 
their own bases on which they claim and justify their inclusion, thus blurring the boundaries between citizens 
and non-citizens. 
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immigration statuses, relatively newcomers and socioeconomically disadvantaged, begin to 
engage in these various forms of everyday citizenship, thus rendering conventional citizenship 
models rather not significantly applicable as a way of understanding diaspora experiences.  
 This tendency of non-citizens in South Africa not to rely much on NGOs and other 
organised civil society entities, for example, was also noted by the African Cities Study and 
Mobilisation study (see Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012; Polzer, 2012; Gastrow and Amit, 
2015).137 Clearly, the arena of citizenship therefore shifts from the state and organised civil 
society; to alternative localised, informal and non-state arenas, including nationality-based, 
social and kinship networks as an alternative vehicle of everyday citizenship in different 
contexts. This is another confirmation of a recently observed tendency among Zimbabweans 
in South Africa who tend to negotiate integration outside the state (see Jinnah and Polzer-
Ngwato, 2012), as opposed to experiences of many of those in the UK whose citizenship is 
meditated by the state and its institutions.  
It is important to note, however, that free support from social, nationality-based and 
kinship networks is not always accessible to everyone, with newcomers most likely to benefit 
from this kind of support. As such, the study demonstrates how market-based transactions 
with service providers and other market participants constitute another vehicle in which 
Zimbabweans without secure legal status negotiate access to substantive benefits of 
citizenship. New relationships and identities (such as customer, tenants, client and so on) 
emerge out of these transactions, with an effect of extending new entitlements and 
responsibilities to those non-citizen Zimbabweans outside the realms of the state. It is in the 
                                                          
137 Vanya Gastrow and Roni Amit made the same tendency of shunning NGOs for assistance among Somalis 
living in Cape Town. They often rely on religious and social networks, and the informal sector, for their survival.  
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above context, Zimbabweans and other immigrants hosted in South Africa’s urban areas tend 
to access public goods and services such as education, water, shelter, housing and livelihood 
opportunities essential for their survival, within the private sphere through market-based 
everyday transactions (see Misago et al, 2010; Jacobsen, 2006). This explains why the right to 
work and access to livelihoods emerged as a critical priority for the majority of Zimbabweans 
for their survival in the absence of state-guaranteed substantive citizenship (see Jinnah and 
Polzer-Ngwato, 2012).  
Apart from the above material aspects of diaspora citizenship, this study also explored 
the subjective and intersubjective components, with a particular focus on senses of belonging 
displayed by various categories of Zimbabweans in the two distinct contexts. Thinking and 
having feelings about the state, constitutes one of the ways in which almost every member 
of the diaspora performs citizenship (see Fortier, 2016).138 Many empirical studies on the 
Zimbabwean diaspora tend to observe the diasporic tendencies of Zimbabweans on the basis 
of their material, observable sociocultural and political practices (Kuhlmann, 2008; 
Muzondidya, 2006; 2010). This study departs from this tendency by examining the subjective 
and intersubjective dimension of citizenship displayed by Zimbabweans in the UK and South 
Africa. This thesis suggests that one dominant way in which Zimbabweans hosted outside of 
the country frequently perform citizenship, is by way of their subjectively held senses of 
belonging. This subjective aspect of citizenship has resonance with what has been referred to 
as affective citizenship, as discussed in chapter three (see Fortier, 2016).  The empirical 
analysis in chapter three explored these senses of belonging, leading to the conclusion that 
                                                          
138 Fortier (2016) criticises the materialist, politico-legal, conception of citizenship emphasising legal status, 
rights and political participation, by suggesting the need to explore subjective elements of citizenship such as 
senses of belonging, emotions, feelings and sentiments among others. These elements are categorised as 
‘affective citizenship’. 
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Zimbabweans living outside the territorial boundaries of the country indeed constitute a 
diasporic community (also see McGregor, 2010; Pasura, 2005; Zeleza, 2003). 
On the basis of the senses of belonging they display, this study indicates that indeed 
Zimbabweans do constitute a transnational diaspora, with simultaneous ties spanning 
Zimbabwe and both South Africa/the UK (Levitt, 2004; Pasura, 2008; 2010). Furthermore, also 
drawing on Pasura’s insights based on his growing work of Zimbabweans in the UK, this thesis 
confirms the observation that Zimbabweans do not only become a transnational diaspora but 
a fragmented one (Pasura, 2008; 2010; 2014). This thesis, however, builds on Pasura’s 
observations and suggests that this fragmentation also lies in the multiple ways they imagine 
and perform their citizenship.  These include plural, fluid, uncertain and gendered feelings, 
imaginaries and sentiments about both the home and host country. These fractured 
conceptions of belonging are mediated by a range of factors including historical influences, 
contextual dynamics, place of settlement and immigration status and past experiences among 
a host of other factors.  
Results of this study, for instance, suggest that senses of belonging displayed by 
Zimbabweans in South Africa tend to be more volatile, ambivalent and diverse, compared to 
those exhibited by their UK-based counterparts. Similarly, senses of Zimbabweans are also 
gendered, with women displaying a tendency to feel safer and ‘at home’ in the two host 
countries, compared to their male counterparts. The importance of historical forces in the 
fragmentation of the Zimbabwean diaspora is also underscored. Zimbabwe indeed 
constitutes a diverse nation fragmented by class, ethnicity, region, race and political 
affiliation, which makes it rather irrational to expect them to suddenly become a united and 
homogenous nation outside territory. The recognition that how Zimbabweans act as citizens 
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depends on a number of factors, marks another important contribution of this study. The next 
section discusses some of these.  
7.2  Diasporic Citizenship as a Mediated Phenomenon 
Diaspora citizenship does not occur in a vacuum, but is shaped by context and other 
forces. This thesis also emphasised how diasporic citizenship does not occur in a vacuum, but 
is mediated by historical, cultural, gender, structural and other contextual forces, as 
McGregor (2010) acknowledges in relation to the Zimbabwean diaspora. Whether (or how) 
any section of the Zimbabwean diaspora partakes in state-centric, status-based, rights-based 
and other forms of engagement with the state, or different kinds of everyday citizenship 
described in Chapters Four and Five, depends on the interplay of the above processes and 
forces. It is important to emphasise the notable contextual differences between how 
Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa perform their citizenship.  
It is evident in the findings, for instance, that Zimbabweans in the UK tend to enact their 
citizenship in ways that closely approximate the liberal conception of status-based and state-
mediated citizenship; while most of those in South Africa largely continuing to practice 
different kinds of everyday citizenship (described above) not only for their survival, but also 
to contest their exclusion within the South African society and back in Zimbabwe. While 
experiences of most of the UK-based Zimbabweans approximated the status-based model of 
citizenship, the majority of South Africa-based Zimbabweans (where most of the Zimbabwean 
diaspora is hosted), ordinarily considered ‘politically inactive’ and excluded, found other ways 
of being political and acting as citizens by way of everyday citizenship discussed above (see 
Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011; Dickinson et al, 2008). This study also makes it apparent that 
another set of settlement-related factors (such as immigration-status, length of stay and place 
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of settlement) influence the ways by which Zimbabweans settled in different spatial locations 
within both host countries are able to act as citizens. 
History and background experiences of diasporas and the modes of citizenship they were 
exposed to in the past, also have a bearing on how they think about and perform citizenship. 
The negative experience of Zimbabweans with this citizenship model resulting in the 
citizenship crisis that pushed them out of the country, almost becomes replicated in South 
Africa as evidenced by exclusion on the basis of legal status and nationality. It is important to 
underscore, however, that Zimbabweans have not been passive victims of exclusion and, as 
they did in response to the citizenship crisis culminating in their departure from their home 
country, they found another way of performing citizenship (everyday citizenship) outside the 
host state (Betts and Jones, 2016).139 Perhaps experiences of the Zimbabwean diaspora 
indicate how ill-suited state-centric and status-based modes of citizenship are in post-colonial 
contexts, particularly in both migrant-sending and hosting countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Given how the majority of research participants based in South Africa resorted to everyday 
citizenship outside the state, this confirms a broader pattern in which marginalised and 
oppressed people always resort to everyday forms of resistance (see Scott, 1985). 
As such, results of this study suggest that migrants from a post-colonial African 
background, with past encounters with authoritarian states and exclusionary modes of 
citizenship, tend to view the state in loathsome ways as a corrupt, repressive and abusive 
entity to be avoided, cheated and fought (Ake, 1992). This is often true of migrants from post-
colonial societies, affected by different manifestations of citizenship crises, as discussed with 
                                                          
139 This confirms the premise held by Betts and Jones in their analysis of diaspora political activism, that migrants are not passive victims of 
authoritarian rule, but exercise different kinds of agency aimed at contesting it. The same logic can be used to show how Zimbabweans 
contest exclusion from formal citizenship, by resorting to everyday forms of citizenship. 
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respect to Zimbabwe in chapter two of this thesis. The same logic may also apply to citizens 
hosted in post-colonial contexts where the relationship between the state and society tend 
to be historically troubled, as is the case with South Africa where over a million Zimbabweans 
were hosted by the year 2007 (Makina, 2007). This thinking also shapes the way they continue 
to perceive any state they come into interaction with while outside the country, usually 
resulting in a sense of apathy and disengagement from mainstream politics. This can also 
explain why some migrants develop a tendency to avoid asserting claims for substantive 
entitlements associated with citizenship (such as welfare and livelihoods, security, rights and 
legal status) both in the host and country of origin state, opting for other convenient sites and 
ways of performing it.  
7.3 Conceptual and Scholarly Implications: Citizenship at Home and Abroad 
Although the analysis partly from historical experiences back in Zimbabwe, insights 
generated on causes of migration and displacement have contemporary domestic 
implications. This study generates insights on citizenship challenges both in Zimbabwe and 
destination countries where Zimbabweans are hosted. Indeed, this study demonstrates how 
historical citizenship deficiencies have been accompanied by displacement and transnational 
migratory pressures. The same lens can be used to understand contemporary patterns of 
internal displacement and migration within Zimbabwe. In many of these instances, citizenship 
deficiencies caused by arbitrary, repressive and violent state action towards citizens have 
resulted in forced internal displacement and migration, including rural-urban-rural and rural-
rural migration. The state was also instrumental in the forced removal of hundreds of 
households from Manzou Estate in Mazowe district, to pave way for expansion of farming 
activities of President Mugabe’s family (Chikuhwa, 2013). Flooding at the Towe Mukorsi dam 
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also resulted in displacement, destitution and homelessness, while others have been 
resettled in precarious conditions (Human Rights Watch, 2015).140 This saw the state 
intervening to forcibly remove and resettle over 20 000 families in Chigwizi Camp within the 
Nuanetsi range, often using harassment, violence and withholding of humanitarian assistance 
to force villagers to move (Human Rights Watch, 2015). This event also displays this tendency 
by the Zimbabwean state to act arbitrarily, forcefully and, in some cases, violently, without 
due regard to the wishes and rights of the citizenry.  
These recent events also share similar several similar patterns with Operation Murambatsvina 
in 2005, forced removals and displacement from Churu Farm in 1993 and other recent forced 
displacements (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2005; Solidarity Peace Trust, 2005). 
These actions triggered internal and international migratory pressures; but more profoundly, 
they represent an assault on citizenship in that the state, meant to protect them as citizens, 
in fact used coercion and violence to perpetrate the violation of citizens’ rights and 
deprivation of sustainable livelihoods options (Sachikonye, 2012). Subsequently, these kinds 
of displacement and migration also raise questions in relation to where and how displaced 
people and migrants become incorporated, what rights they possess and who supports them. 
It is clear that the citizenship lens offers a helpful way of understanding contemporary causes 
of displacement and migration back in Zimbabwe, in the same way it helped analyse the 
historical national problems before and after independence in this study. Citizenship thinking 
also helps us thinking about subsequent developments after displacement and migration. 
                                                          
140 Nuanetsi range is inhabitable due to wildlife infestation and infertile soils, and social networks and kinship 
relations have been disrupted in the process of resettlement. 
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The results of this study also indicate that Zimbabweans outside the country do not 
become a coherent nation outside its territory, as proponents of long-distance nationalism 
tend to suggest, but a fragmented transitional diaspora (Anderson, 1983; also see Pasura, 
2008; 2010; 2014; Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2009). This observation also limits the applicability of the 
integrationist conception on migrant incorporation and becoming, which suggest that 
migrants become completely detached from their country of origin and (with an aim to) 
become embedded in the host country (Bulcha, 1988; Harrell-Bond, 1986). The same 
observed dynamic can also be used to refute the liberal universalist notion that transnational 
migrants become part of the universal supranational and global community through a 
transnational civil society (Tarrow, 2005; Soysal, 1994). This was not supported by the 
empirical findings of this study in both countries, presumably due to a number of factors 
including the remoteness of transnational civil society, limited capacity to engage at that level 
of politics among the majority of diasporas (especially in South Africa).  
Instead, as results show, the transnational practices displayed by Zimbabweans in South 
Africa, as opposed to those in the UK, tended to be bottom-up, unorganised, informal and 
integrated into their day-to-day lives. As such, many of those engaged in such practices were 
frequently engaged in everyday struggles for survival, to meet the needs of their families back 
in Zimbabwe and against exclusion at a very local level. Clearly, these kinds of bottom-up 
transnational practices differ from those based on the activities of organised transnational 
civil society aimed at influencing global institutions of governance and states (see Cohen, 
2011; Tarrow, 2005). However, as I have demonstrated in this thesis, the informal, everyday 
and unorganised elements of diaspora communities and transnational civil society are not 
mutually exclusive. They intersect and complement each other in different ways. 
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Another major implication is that this study further exposes the limited applicability of 
liberal, western-centric, conceptions of universal citizenship, with its emphasis on formal legal 
status, rights and claims-making, ‘Big P’ political participation and the role of organised civil 
society (see Baubock, 2008; Bosniak, 2000; Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008). This is proven by 
the limited proportion of research participants engaging in these kinds of political activity and 
with formal recognition as citizens in both the UK and South Africa. Therefore, such denial of 
secure legal status and exclusion/disengagement of the majority Zimbabweans from political 
activism and rights claims-making experiences of the majority of Zimbabweans 
(predominantly in South Africa) mirror Laguerre’s observation that diaspora citizenship is not 
always directly and universally linked to the state by way of legal status and formal rights 
(Laguerre, 1998). Instead, it could be performed in multiple other material and non-material 
ways, at different scales and in different arenas, as empirical experiences of Zimbabweans 
have demonstrated in this study. 
The study also generates insights on the changing arenas of diaspora citizenship from the 
state to other more localised, informal and everyday sites and vehicles. For example, this 
study shows that diaspora citizenship thrives without the state playing any interventionist 
role in the everyday lives of diasporas; the only sphere in which the active role of the state 
was desired was in relation to the granting of legal documentation allowing them the right to 
work necessary for their survival. This does not mean those without formal legal status or 
completely undocumented would resort to the state; instead, it was evident how these 
diasporas opted to avoid, evade and cheat the state just to remain and access livelihood 
opportunities within the territory of the state. 
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Similarly, although organised civil society is often thought of as the most important 
alternative site in which diasporas achieve citizenship outcomes, this thesis suggests everyday 
life as a more popular and convenient arena in which the majority of Zimbabweans enact their 
citizenship by engaging with different societal actors with or without the mediation of the 
state and organised civil society (Jacobsen, 2006). This tendency challenges the underlying 
premise that political spaces in which migrants engage exist ‘out there’, as a separate realm 
and sphere of activity; instead, it suggests that politics is entangled in migrants’ everyday lives, 
forming part of their daily survival and way of life (see Tarrow, 2005). The majority of 
diasporas who did not resort to the state and civil society for their welfare, protection and 
other substantive aspects of citizenship, found other sites outside the state in which to act as 
citizens in their daily lives.  
Furthermore, as indicated earlier, this thesis also challenges the predominant emphasis 
on  materialist conception of diaspora politics, with a predominant focus on overt political 
activism and mobilisation of Zimbabweans hosted in different countries, at the expense of 
their political subjectivities (Betts and Jones, 2016; Kuhlmann, 2008; Dorman, 2016).141 As is 
apparent in this analysis, both material and subjective (such as discursive) elements are 
critical for a more complete understanding of how diasporas do citizenship, which is why I 
have sought to explore both dimensions of diaspora citizenship (See Sheffer, 1986; McGregor, 
2010; also see Dorman, 2016).142 This shows how diaspora citizenship is not practiced through 
any universally defined mode of being political, but encompasses different forms of overt and 
subjective elements.  
                                                          
141 I observe the same tendency cautioned against by Dorman (2016), of privileging material aspects of 
Zimbabwean politics by Zimbabwean and Zimbabweanist political scientists, at the expense of political 
subjectivities. 
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Although everyday life represents a site in which the struggle for survival and resistance 
to exclusion occur, this study shows that it is not always about adversarial relationships.   
Rather, diasporas negotiate new relationships and transactions without the direct mediation 
and involvement of the state. And in so doing, everyday citizenship is an emancipatory mode 
of practice, particularly for marginalised sections of the diasporas such as those without 
citizenship, permanent residency or any other secure legal statuses and undocumented 
persons. In the same vein, as shown in chapter six which explores the everyday struggles for 
legal status by marginalised sections of Zimbabweans in South Africa, everyday practices 
provide a potent strategy by which those diasporas resist, cheat, contest or evade the 
repressive, irrational and unjust host state.  
The same kinds of everyday citizenship mirror the bottom-up, informal and unorganised 
resistance to authoritarian state action by the Zimbabwean state in contemporary Zimbabwe. 
This pattern, therefore, suggests the importance of these everyday practices as a way by 
which oppressed people contest powerful actors and institutions in post-colonial contexts 
(see Scott, 1985; Ake, 1992; Flint, 2003). In other words, as I have demonstrated in preceding 
chapters, everyday forms of struggle remain useful for diasporas as they seek to contest 
exclusion and marginalisation in both host country and country of origin spaces.  
Everyday citizenship is also used as a survival strategy by marginalised sections of the 
diaspora, which marks the continuation of the everyday struggles from which most of them 
fled. For example, as demonstrated in the study legal status and livelihoods constitute critical 
survival priorities for the survival of Zimbabweans both in the UK and South African contexts, 
and those without access to them engage in a kind of everyday struggle to continue staying 
and working within the host country. Also, everyday citizenship, particularly when practiced 
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in the form of everyday political talk and mundane social practices, becomes another way of 
contesting exclusion not only within the host country but back in the home country. This 
tendency also blurs the boundary of who is a citizen and who is not, and in so doing makes it 
possible for non-citizen sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora to access citizenship’s material 
benefits access to which they are otherwise denied due to their non-citizen status.  
This kind of everydayness (simultaneously directed at host and home country societies) in 
the form of vernacular political discourses and mundane transnational social practices, 
further confirm Pasura’s (2008; 2010; 2014) observation that Zimbabweans indeed constitute 
a transnational diaspora. This study shows that Zimbabwean diaspora also act as citizens in 
relation to their country of origin – Zimbabwe – in various ways. Again, although they 
maintain legal status as Zimbabweans, this study shows that most of them are denied 
opportunities for enjoying the benefits associated with being Zimbabwean citizens, including 
rights, welfare benefits and political rights. They are also denied the opportunity for dual 
citizenship and the right to vote, which is viewed by many Zimbabweans as a fundamental 
injustice against them. Although some scholars tend to emphasise the diaspora political 
activism and mobilisation of Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa (Kuhlmann, 2008; Betts 
and Jones, 2016), this study observed that the proportion of those engaged in this kind of 
political activity was not too significant. Instead, the majority engaged in various everyday 
forms of political activity, in the form of discursive everyday political talk, aimed at indirectly 
contesting the Zimbabwean state. They also rely on mundane transnational social practices 
to claim their Zimbabweanness and contest their marginalisation from the nation (see Levitt, 
2004; Muzondidya, 2006; Pasura, 2008; 2010; 2014), which further affirms the importance of 
everyday citizenship for diasporas in asserting the transnational dimension of diaspora 
citizenship.   
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7.3.1 Conceptual Futures  
This study provides conceptual pointers to help start thinking about questions relating to 
diaspora citizenship in the context of growing displacement and transnational migration, 
beyond this project. This section highlights some useful concepts for understanding how 
marginalised diasporas, often with insecure and illegal statuses and not effectively integrated 
onto the formal labour market, begin to engage alternative forms of citizenship. The concept 
of segmented integration provides another useful lens with which to understand these 
dynamics, particularly how the integration of diasporas become differentiated and layered 
while in the host county (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Heisler, 2000). This concept, for instance, 
acknowledges the inherent diversity of diasporas on the basis of structural forces such as 
backgrounds, class, gender and ethnic origin among other factors which mediate the 
differentiated integration of various categories of migrants in host societies (Portes and Zhou, 
1995; Portes, 1995; Heisler, 2000).  
The state, its institutions and the political process, are often considered opportune for 
practicing citizenship, but this study suggests the existence of other opportunities 
traditionally considered ‘non-political’ in which diasporas can act as citizens (Isin, 2002).  This 
study placed an emphasis on everyday and localised expressions of citizenship; yet 
citizenship, as practiced by diasporas, occurs at different scales spanning the local, national, 
transnational, supranational and global scales (Jones and Gaventa, 2002). Diasporas find ways 
of engaging at these different scales of governance and citizenship, perhaps the concept of 
multi-scaled citizenship can be a useful conceptual lens to mapping out the geographies of 
diaspora citizenship (Groves and Ofer, 2016). This conception does not only help identify the 
different locations of citizenship, but also the interactions and contradictions between them.  
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This study examined experiences of different sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora living 
in South Africa and the UK; and one identifiable section incorporates those that live on the 
margins of the host society. This marginalised section of the diaspora turned out to engage in 
different kinds of agency, aimed at contesting structural and institutionalised forces of 
exclusion operating in the respective societies. The structure-agency dialectical relationship 
can also help understand how marginalised diasporas everyday struggles to overcome 
structural barriers to social mobility (Giddens, 1984; Lister, 1998; Bloch, 2010).143  
The above structural and institutionalised barriers, and how they impact negatively on 
diasporas’ efforts to integrate into host society, can also be understood more deeply using 
the concept of blocked mobility (Kloosterman and Rath, 2003; McGregor, 2008; Bloch, 2010; 
Mbiba, 2011).144 This understanding helps overcome the limits of structural determinism that 
characterises social exclusion thought, demonstrating how marginalised diasporas are able to 
express their citizenship agency in different ways (Lister, 1998). The idea of abject citizenship 
can also help understand how seemingly excluded, passive and politically disengaged sections 
of society, in fact find ways to negotiate inclusion (Sharkey, 2008; Hepworth, 2012; Nyers, 
2011; McGregor, 2008). These concepts will be useful in digging deeper into the experience 
of this ‘excluded’ section of the diaspora, often including those without secure legal statuses 
and with limited rights and entitlement. 
 
 
                                                          
143 For Lister identifies to elements of human agency: simple agency which is located in dialectical relations 
between people and social structures; and citizenship agency which is embedded in social relations.   
144 Consider how immigrants marginalised in the economy find spaces in the informal and moral economy in 
urban contexts. This is the case with opening spaza shops, hair saloons and cross border trading and so on may 
be understood as expressions of abject citizenship. 
301 | P a g e  
 
7.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
This study occurred in the context of time, financial and other constraints, without which 
it would have been valuable to spend more time in the three sites in Cape Town, 
Johannesburg and south-east England. Relatively less time was spent doing the UK and 
Johannesburg components of the study, compared to Cape Town where I had pre-existing 
social, kinship and nationality-based resources (and connections) which proved useful at 
various stages of the fieldwork. The implication of this is that I had more data on Cape Town, 
compared to two other sites, which presented challenges for the analysis. Perhaps, more time 
in the field could have allowed some degree of data equivalence for a deeper comparative 
analysis. As such, the analysis presented in this thesis reflects contains more insights on the 
experiences of South Africa-based Zimbabweans, in contradistinction to those of 
Zimbabweans in the UK.   
Again methodologically, the study could have been designed to allow a more systematic 
and in-depth of any shifts in everyday practices and senses of belonging over time. This would 
have responded to the contemporaneity that generally characterises work on Zimbabwean 
politics, with its tendency to focus on contemporary events and developments, without 
explaining change and continuity over time (see Dorman, 2016).145 Also, Zimbabwe is a 
diverse nation and so is its diaspora, as this and many other studies have demonstrated. Yet 
the research sample in this study was predominantly composed of black, Shona-speaking 
Zimbabweans due to limited social connections and networks from which to recruit.  Although 
there is a belief that most of these categories have disappeared in the ‘underground’ in the 
                                                          
145 Dorman (2016) observes this gap in relation to approaches to the study of Zimbabwean politics, and this 
seems to be a challenge in the study of Zimbabwean diaspora politics. 
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UK and South Africa, depicting how they change their identities quickly, the sample could also 
have included other demographic categories such as white and coloured Zimbabweans to see 
how they negotiate citizenship in the two countries under study. Zimbabwe are a diaspora 
‘scattered’ in different places within the region of Southern Africa and beyond, which is one 
characteristic of their diasporic nature (Muzondidya, 2004; Pasura, 2005; Zeleza, 2003). For 
example, a large population of Zimbabweans have been settled in Botswana and Namibia for 
a considerable time now, yet not much work has been done to examine their experiences, 
compared to existing work on the UK and South Africa I have done. It would be interesting to 
examine their experiences too, to appreciate their experiences in those unique contexts. The 
same applies to Zimbabweans in China, Dubai, Canada, USA and Cyprus among other popular 
host countries. These are some of the gaps which need filling in terms of scholarship on 
Zimbabwean diaspora. 
7.5 Implications for Policy and Practice  
The findings of this study allow us to revisit the way people think about migrants in 
general.  Migrants are often perceived as an anomaly and a source of problems in societies 
hosting them (Neocosmos, 2010). Similarly, they are often looked at disdainfully by their 
governments and stay-at-home compatriots back in their countries of origin as unpatriotic, 
cowards, sell-outs ‘dining with the enemy’, not making a contribution to society, neglecting 
their communities and so on (see Tendi, 2010; Kabeer, 2008; 2005; 2002; 2000).    This study, 
therefore, potentially results in shifts in attitudes both in the host country and back in their 
countries of origin, against these and many other exclusionary attitudes and perceptions. One 
way this study does this is by portraying immigrants as people who actually make a 
contribution in both the host and home country societies.  
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This study also demonstrates some of the challenges facing immigrants, which provides 
baseline information for policymakers and practitioners, with an intention to formulate 
policies to address them. It also acts as a review and impact assessment of some existing 
measures and interventions affecting immigrants’ lives. Particularly, it highlights the 
effectiveness of key policies, measures and interventions around the area of citizenship and 
immigration, based on perceptions and experiences of migrants themselves. This study shows 
that everyday lives and struggles of immigrants are too complex to be easily understood by 
‘outsiders’ intending to make positive change in those lives. Yet, the voice of migrants is often 
not heard in policy making and practice, particularly those that directly affect their day to day 
experiences. Certainly, not everything is understood in terms of how immigrants go about 
their daily lives, especially their needs, expectations and priorities. Therefore, the way this 
study was designed allowed their voices to be heard, hence the results of this study may be a 
useful source of migrants’ voices with respect to various issues affecting them.  
The results of this study also demonstrate the remarkable agency and resilience in 
contexts of injustices and other forms of adversities ordinary people are exposed to in their 
everyday lives (Lister, 1998). In the context of diminishing civil society capacity, this study 
demonstrates that immigrants still manage to get a lot accomplished on their own, which only 
underscores the importance of collaboration between those who want to help and 
immigrants themselves (Polzer, 2012). In other words, governments, NGOs, activists, social 
movements, political parties, donors, or any other concerned actors and ‘do-gooders’, may 
not fully appreciate and understand the everyday struggles of immigrants (or indeed any 
other marginalised section of our society). As much as they may have the capacity to assist, 
those concerned with the plight of immigrants in any context cannot take over the ownership 
of those struggles, by way of by-passing them and trying to find solutions on their behalf 
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without involving them. Finally, civil society organisations are often credited, and this study 
recognises this, as allies and representatives of migrants by way of speaking for them (see 
Polzer, 2012). This study, however, also discusses some of the limitations of some of the 
organisations working with Zimbabweans in different both in the UK and South Africa, which 
might be a source of information to help with their learning and reflection processes.  
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